FROM ASIA MINOR TO EGYPT. 
167 
which implicit credit was given. This man affirmed, that 
our intention was to land the army at Jaffa, upon the coast of 
Syria. 
The delay shown upon this occasion was not solely owing 
to the weather. A principle source of it might be referred to 
another cause. Major M 4 Arras, chief engineer, fiad been for¬ 
warded in a vessel, previous to the sailing of our fleet from the 
b&y of Mar in once, in order to reconnoitre the country, and to 
obtain information necessary for expediting the landing of our 
troops. This officer had been twice on shore, either in the 
Penelope’s or Petrell’s boat, and with the greatest success. 
Pie had observed the lake of Aboukir 5 had surveyed all the 
adjoining territory 5 ascertained the different heights ; and 
selected a convenient place for landing. Having finished all 
his plans, he unfortunately ventured on shore the third time, to 
confirm the accuracy of certain observations, and was observ¬ 
ed by a French armed boat, in the very instant when he was 
putting off to return to his ship. The wind was against him ; 
and the crew of his boat, finding every effort ineffectual, suf¬ 
fered it to fall alongside, and surrendered. By a most das¬ 
tardly instance of cruelty on the part of the French, they pour¬ 
ed.a volley of musquetry into the boat, after the surrender had 
taken place ; by which Major M 4 Arras was killed. Soon af¬ 
ter this disaster, our fleet arrived ; and the commander in 
chief, instead of obtaining the information confidently expect¬ 
ed, was reduced to the dilemma of waiting until the business of 
reconnoitring, now rendered more difficult than ever, could in 
some measure be again accomplished. 
Thus was the descent of our army postponed until (lie 
eighth of March. The French had gained even more time 
than they thought proper to employ for the means of defence; 
and were stationed upon the sandy heights eastward, and with¬ 
in gun shot of Aboukir castle, between that fortress and the 
entrance to the lake Said. The spot selected for landing the 
troops was immediately under this hill; and that a worse place 
could hardly have been chosen, is evident from this circum¬ 
stance, that the enemy had, beside their artillery upon the 
heights, a covering for their flanks, of eight field pieces upon the 
rigid, and four upon the left. These, together with the guns of 
the castle, bore down upon the place oflaadiag;* The day prior 
* It is known to every officer who attended this expedition, that the army might 
have been landed any where to the eastward, near Rosetta, without the loss, of a single 
man. Whenever it is asked, why was not this the case? there is but one mode ef 
