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THE NEW YORK Tr=*FS. SUNDAY, JANUARY 30, 1955. 
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isia declares war on 
>rces into Manchuria, 
m surrenders, ending 
Let Treaty of friend- 
>cow. In accompany- 
:rees that moral and 
snail be “entirely 
lonal Government as 
iment of China.'’ 
statement pledging 
ind unity issued by 
But clashes between 
ationalists have bro- 
occupy Manchuria, 
th there is civil fight- 
[nces. 
MEDIATION 
EUROPEANS ARE CRITICAL 
OF U. S. FORMOSA POLICY 
! In Britain Labor Attacks Are Offset 
By Government Moves for Accord 
This is the larger picture: If Formosa should fall, Western 
defense arc would be dented. The value of our base at 
Okinawa (1) would be sharply reduced, and the Philippines 
(2) would be brought within range of Communist jet planes. 
Also Chiang’s troops on Formosa (3) would be lost to West. 
(GHUGHTS OF 30 YEARS 
By DREW MIDDLETON 
Special to The New York Times. 
LONDON, Jan. 29—Western 
Europe's reaction to recent de¬ 
velopments in the Far East and 
in Washington range from Brit¬ 
ain’s concern to Germany’s dis¬ 
interest in any problem that does 
not affect the basic issue of re¬ 
unification of the country. There 
is a good deal of anxiety in the 
foreign ministries of France and 
Italy but events have not touched 
the public directly. Everywhere, 
however, Communist propaganda 
is trying to make the most of 
the situation. 
The deep and comprehensive 
involvement of the British press, 
people and Parliament In the sit¬ 
uation has one happy aspect. It 
shows that no matter how much 
Senator McCarthy or Aneurin 
Bevan may dissent, the people of 
this country know they are in¬ 
extricably connected with the 
destiny of the United States. 
Moreover, although The New 
York Times correspondents in 
Paris and elsewhere on the Con¬ 
tinent have reported intellectual 
criticisms of the United States’ 
action, it is only in Britain that 
a well-defined attempt to try to 
hfiljj-find a -way-out of the pres 
George C. Marshall, 
tlissimo and Madam 
U. S. aid could have changed the out¬ 
come. 
AUG. 24, 1949—Acheson defends the 
White Paper against broad attacks on 
it, in Congress and press, as biased 
and distorted. . 
OCT. 1, 1949—Communists, by now in 
effective control of mainland, proclaim 
People’s Republic of China with Mao as 
Chairman and Chou En-lai as Premier. 
DEC. 8, 1949—Nationalist Government 
moves its headquarters to Formosa. 
5. EMERGENCE OF PEIPING 
FEB. 14, 1950—Thirty-year treaty of 
friendship and mutual aid signed in 
Moscow by Mao and Soviet Premier 
Stalin. 
MARCH 5, 1950—Chiang, on Formosa, 
reassumes Presidency of Nationalist 
ent crisis augments the criticism. 
In taking the lead in the ex¬ 
changes with the Soviet Union, 
and China seeking a cease-fire, 
the British are aware that they 
may be assailed by some politi¬ 
cians in the United States for ap¬ 
peasement of the Communists. 
Neither Sir Anthony Eden nor 
his aides have forgotten the bit¬ 
ter attacks in the United States 
at the time of the Geneva confer¬ 
ence. There is, however, an im¬ 
portant difference between that 
situation and this. Britain in its 
diplomatic efforts in Peiping and 
Moscow is acting with the sup¬ 
port and encouragement of the 
United States Government. 
Reasons for Criticism 
Two factors contributed to the 
criticism heard here and the prop¬ 
aganda opportunity which the 
Communists and their sympathiz¬ 
ers have seized. The first was 
that the President's message on 
Monday was not clear to many 
Europeans. The second was that 
before the Governments abroad 
could really judge the message 
on its merits, the movement of 
United States warships and planes 
to the Formosa area was an¬ 
nounced to the world. 
Roger Massip, writing in Le 
Figaro of Paris, suggested that 
the President’s message might 
prove maladroit and that it would 
have been better to undertake a 
t 
secret negotiation. 
An editorial in the Manchester 
Guardian found the ambiguities 
of the Presidential message “de¬ 
plorable” and said it was so 
“clumsily constructed that it ap¬ 
pears to contain a veiled threat 
of American attack on the Chi¬ 
nese mainland.” 
meeting or Soviet Russia’s veto 
of discussion of the Formosa sit¬ 
uation prevents the matter’s be¬ 
ing raised, the British Govern¬ 
ment will certainly seek another 
means toward attainment of the 
second stage of a settlement. 
This stage has been discussed 
ir. the Government and in the 
Foreign Office since last autumn. 
It seeks the establishment of two 
Chinas, Communist China on the 
mainland and Nationalist China 
on Formosa. 
U. N. Question 
The thorny question of Chinese 
representation in the United Na¬ 
tions might be answered at this 
stage by providing representation 
for both the Chinese nations in 
the world body. Similarly the in¬ 
volved question of the doubtful 
sovereignty of Formosa, a ques¬ 
tion which British believe exacer¬ 
bates the present difficulty, 
might be solved through the crea¬ 
tion of a separate state of For¬ 
mosa. 
Establishment of this situation 
will take a long time.. Since it 
involves the surrender of Com¬ 
munist claims to Formosa and 
Nationalist claims to the main¬ 
land territory of China, each side 
will have to make concessions. 
The British admit that the Gov¬ 
ernments in Peiping and Formosa 
may find such concessions impos- j. 
sible. 
One argument against conces¬ 
sions is that the Communist re¬ 
gime needs the paper dragon of 
possible Nationalist invasion of 
the mainland to rally popular 
support* and enforce the drastic 
'HOW FAR BEYOND?" 
Fitzpatrick in The St. Louis Post-Dispatch^ 
economic changes required by itf 
plans for industrialization. Anoth¬ 
er argument applying to Nation¬ 
alists is that if Chiang Kai-shek 
and his lieutenants are denied 
hope of eventual invasion and re¬ 
turn to power the regime will bo 
deprived of its support in For¬ 
mosa, on the rm 
