M CART 
camp. After Tapper, when all was quiet, the cattle were 
brought in good order to the hill, where Fabius had placed 
fome Roman parties in ambufh to flop up the pafs. Upon 
a fignal given, the faggots on the horns of the oxen were 
fet on fire; and theherdfmen, fupported by fome battali¬ 
ons armed with fmall javelins, drove them forward. The 
Romans feeing the light of the fires, imagined that the 
Carthaginians were marching by torch-light. However, 
Fabius kept clofe in his camp, depending on the troops he 
had placed in ambufcade ; but when the oxen, feeling the 
fire on their heads, began to run up and down the hills, 
the'Romans in ambufh, thinking themfelves furrounded 
on all (ides, and climbing the ways where they faw lead 
light, returned to their camp, leaving the pals open to 
their enemies. Fabius, though rallied by his foldiers for 
being thus over-reached by the Carthaginian, (fill conti¬ 
nued topurfue the fame plan, marched directly after Han¬ 
nibal, and encamped on fome eminences near him. 
Upon this, the deflator was recalled to Rome; and, as 
Hannibal, notwithftanding the ravages committed, had all 
along fpared the lands of Fabius, the latter was fufpefted 
of holding a fecret correfpondence with him. In his ab- 
fence, Minucius, general of the hovfe, gained fome advan¬ 
tages, which greatly tended to increafe a fufpicion of the 
dictator, infomuch, that before his return, Minucius was 
put upon an equal footing with him. The general of the 
liorfe propofed that each fhould command his day ; but 
the dictator cliofe rather to divide the army, hoping by 
that means to fave at leaf! a part of it. Hannibal foon 
found means to draw Minucius to an engagement; and, 
by his mafterly (kill in tactics, the Roman general was 
furrounded on every fide, and would have been totally 
cut off, had not Fabius battened to his aflifiance. Then 
the two armies uniting, advanced in good order to renew 
the fight-: but Hannibal, not caring to venture a fecond 
aftion, retired to his camp; and Minucius, being afhamed 
of his raflinefs, refigned his (h ire of the command. 
The Romans, at length finding what an invincible ene¬ 
my they had to contend with, augmented their army to 
87,000 men, horfe and foot; and Hannibal, being reduced 
to great diftrefs for want of provifions, refolved to leave 
Satnnium, and penetrate into the heart of Apulia. Ac¬ 
cordingly he began his march in the night; and, by leav¬ 
ing fires burning, and tents Handing in his camp, made 
the Romans believe for fome time that his retreat was only 
feigned. When the truth was difeovered, ASmilius vvas 
againft purfuing them; but Terentiu-s and Servilius were 
©bftinately bent on following the enemy, and overtook 
them at Cannae. A battle enfued in this place, as memo¬ 
rable and bloody as any mentioned in hiftory, in which 
the Romans were put to flight with mod terrible (laugh¬ 
ter; for particulars of which fee the article Cann .e, p.752 
of this volume. The confequence of this vitlory was, a 
difpofition of that part of Italy called the Old Province, 
Magna Grecia, Tarentum, and part of the territory of 
Capua, to fubmit to Hannibal. The neighbouring pro¬ 
vinces likewife difeovered an inclination to fliake off the 
Roman yoke, but wanted fit ft to fee whether Hannibal 
was able to protect them. His firft march was into Sam- 
nium, being informed that the Hirpini and other neigh¬ 
bouring nations were difpofed to enter into an alliance 
with the Carthaginians. He advanced to Compfa, which 
opened its gates to him. In this place lie left his heavy 
baggage, as well as the immenfe plunder he had acquired. 
After which he ordered his brother Mago, with a body 
of troops deftined for that purpofe, to polfefs himfelf of 
all the fortreffes in Campania, the molt delicious province 
of Italy. The humanity Hannibal had all along (hewn 
his prifoners, added to the fame of the victories he had. 
obtained, wrought fo powerfully upon the Lucani, Brutii, 
and Apulians, that they expreffed an eager defire of being 
taken under his protection. Even the Campanians, a na¬ 
tion more intimately allied to the Romans, difeovered an 
inclination to abandon their natural friends, Of this, Han¬ 
nibal receiving intelligence, he bent his march towards 
HAG E. 
Capua, ntit doubting but by means of the popular faftion 
there, he fhould eafily make himfelf mafter of it; which 
accordingly happened. . Soon after tills place had made 
its fubmillion,many cities of the Brutii opened their.gates; 
and Mago was then difpatched to Carthage, with the news 
of the victory at Cannae, and the important confequences- 
attending it. 
Hitherto we have feen Hannibal completely victorious; 
and, indeed, if we confider what he had already performed, 
we (hall find his exploits fuperior to thofe of any other 
general, either ancient or modern. Other commanders 
have been celebrated for victories gained over barbarous 
and uncivilized nations. Alexander tlie Great over-rail 
the Perfian empire; but that kingdom was then funk in 
(loth and effeminacy, fo as to'be an eafy conqueft : but 
had that great commander turned his arms againft the 
weftern nations, who were of a more martial difpofition, it 
is probable lie had not found fo eafy a conqueft. Hanni¬ 
bal, on the contrary, lived at a time when the Romans 
were not only the mod powerful, but the moll warlike 
people in the world. That nation he attacked with an ar¬ 
my of only 26,000 men, without refources, either of re¬ 
cruits, money, or provifions, except what he could procure 
in the enemy’s country. With tliefe, lie had three 
years relifted the Roman armies; which had proved in¬ 
vincible to all other nations. Their armies had been com¬ 
manded by generals of different tempers, difpoftlions, and 
abilities : the Ioffes they fuftained are by the Roman writ¬ 
ers imputed folely to the faults of their generals; but ex¬ 
perience had abundantly (hewn, that tliefe commanders, 
with all their faults, were able to conquer the moft war¬ 
like nations, when commanded by any other than Hanni¬ 
bal. In the battles fought with the Romans, he had de- 
ftroyed 200,000 of their men, and taken 50,000 prifoners; 
yet, from the battle of Cannae, the affairs of this great man 
began to decline. The reafon of this lias been faid to be, 
that, when he put his army into winter-quarters at Capua, 
he fo enervated himfelf and his men by debaucheries, 
that he became no longer capable of coping with the Ro¬ 
mans. But this feems by no means to have been the cafe, 
for many of the Roman hiftorians own, that after the bat¬ 
tle of Canute he gave their armies many terrible defeats, 
and took a great number of towns in their fight. The 
true reafon of that reverfe of fortune which he was now 
to experience, was, his not having fufficient refources for 
recruiting his army. On the firft news, indeed, of his fuc- 
cef’s, at Carthage, a body of 4000 Numidian cavalry, 40 
elephants, and 1000 talents of lilver, wese granted by the 
fen ate. A large detachment of Spanifli forces was alfo ap¬ 
pointed to follow them; and that tliefe might be ready in 
due time, Mago fet out for Spain, to raife 20,000 foot and 
4000 horfe there. Had this fupply been fent with proper 
expedition, it is not probable that the Romans would have 
had any occalion to refleft upon Hannibal’s conduct at 
Capua. But, notwithftanding the influence of tlie Barci- 
nian faction at Carthage, Hanno and his party found means 
not only to retard the march of the (applies, but even to 
diminifli their number. Mago, through the oppofition of 
that party, could finally obtain only 12,000 foot, and 2500 
horfe; and even for this inconfiderable body of troops, he 
was fent into Spain. Hannibal, thus deferred by his coun¬ 
try, could only aft on the defenfive; his army amount¬ 
ing to no more than 26,000 foot, and 9000 liorfe. But, 
though deftined to aft in this partial manner, he was only 
prevented from conquering; the utmoft efforts of the 
whole Roman power not being able to drive him out of 
Italy for more than fourteen years. 
During this inaftivity of Hannibal, Cneius and Publius 
Scipio had carried on the war in Spain with great fuccefs 
againft the Carthaginians. Afdrubal had been ordered to 
enter Italy with his army to aflift Hannibal; but, being de¬ 
feated by the Romans, was prevented. The diftator and 
fe.nate of Rome, encouraged by this event, carried on the 
preparations for the next campaign with great vigour, 
whilll Hannibal remained unallilled at Capita. The difta- 
2 tor 
