VETERINARY JURISPRUDENCE. 
137 
of speaking of the person slandered at all, and that was what he 
called an ordinary case of defamation ; secondly, a person was called 
upon to speak of another, and in regard to the matter which was 
called slander, in the discharge of a duty. In the first of these 
cases, where a man was not called upon to speak of another at all, 
the law always presumed that if he uttered slanderous words he did 
so from an improper motive, and that was a very fair result of the 
law, because no man was entitled morally, and just as little legally, 
to say illegal and slanderous things of his neighbour, even although 
they might be true, when he was not called upon to speak of him. 
And if this was an ordinary case of slander they would be right in 
finding for the pursuer. But he was bound to tell them, in the 
next place, as matter of law, that this case belonged not to that 
ordinary class of cases of slander, but to the second class, which 
were called privileged cases : because Mr. Williams, the principal of 
this institution, and the other two gentlemen. Dr. Dalzell and Dr. 
Strangeways, were called upon to investigate the matter of the dis¬ 
turbances. It was quite plain that they would not have been doing 
their duty to the institution which was under their management 
unless they had made an investigation, which they did, and acted 
upon the conscientious opinions which they had formed as to the 
result of that investigation. If the defenders believed that the pur¬ 
suer was incapable of efficiently teaching that class from want of 
order, they were called upon to take action, and they were not only 
entitled, but it was a matter of duty, to make known to those with 
whom the pursuer’s appointment rested that such was the insu¬ 
bordination in the class that it could not be taught by him. The 
jury would see at once that it was not merely a matter of pre¬ 
sumption that because the words were slanderous that they had 
been used from a malicious motive on the part of the defenders. On 
the contrary, it must be established against them as matter-of-fact. 
In other words, the pursuer must show not only that the letter was 
sent as alleged and contained the meaning alleged, but that all that 
was done maliciously by the defenders against the pursuer. It was 
very true that in cases of that kind it was always possible to prove 
maliciousness of a man’s mind by expressions or actions importing 
ill will against the pursuer, and they were quite entitled to gather 
from the whole circumstances of the case whether there was malice 
at the bottom of the proceedings. On the other hand, while they 
were entitled to look into the whole circumstances and history of 
the case for the purpose of arriving at that conclusion, they must 
still be satisfied in their own mind as matter of substantial fact of 
the existence of that malicious motive. The real question, and the 
only question of importance there, was whether the defenders had 
been actuated by malice in writing and sending that letter. They 
had not disguised in the least degree that the object which they had 
in view was to induce the pursuer to resign his lectureship. They 
considered that to be indispensable for the wellbeing of the college, 
and they had not disguised, further, that if he could not be induced 
to resign, their desire was that he should be deprived of it by those 
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