334 
THE LAWS OF WARRANTY. 
give or require a warranty, but generally, however, a repre¬ 
sentation made at the sale is part of the contract, and equi¬ 
valent to a warranty.’^ 
In Salmo 7 i v. Ward the plaintiff wrote to the defendant, 
‘‘ You will remember that you warranted a horse as a five- 
year old,” &c.; to which the defendant answered, The 
horse is as I represented it.” It was ruled that this was 
evidence of a warranty at the time of sale. In Wood v. 
Smith, where the seller said, ^‘The horse is sound, to 
the best of my knowledge, but I will not warrant it;” 
yet at the same time knew it to be unsound; he was held 
answerable on this qualified warranty, viz. “ that it was 
sound, to the best of his knowledge.” In Richardson v. 
Brown, where the warranty was, ^^To be sold, a black 
gelding, five years old, has been constantly driven in the 
plough; warranted.” This was held to be only a warranty 
of soundness. So in Budd v. Fairmaiier, Received of B. 
£10 for a grey four-year old colt, warranted sound,” is not a 
warranty of age. In Margetson v. Wright, a general war¬ 
ranty of soundness was not deemed to extend to a manifest 
defect, to which the attention of the parties is called at the 
time of the bargain, and that a splint is not such a manifest 
defect. Under the head of “Breach of warranty,” he says, 
“ If the breach be denied, the plaintiff must give positive 
proof of unsoundness, &c., at the time of the sale. A sus¬ 
picion that a horse was unsound is not sufficient.— Eaves v. 
Dixon. In Kiddell v. Barnard, the term “ sound ” in the 
case of a horse implies the absence of disease, or the seeds of 
disease, which impairs the natural usefulness of the animal. 
Does not this clause alone show the necessity of at once 
abolishing the statute in its entirety ? Let men be as 
talented as they may, when it comes to the question of how 
long the seeds of a disease may exist before becoming mani¬ 
fest as a disease, there will always be conflicting opinions, 
especially when the case turns upon the state a horse was in 
when bought, perhaps months before being examined 
at all. 
In Elto7i V. Brogden, Lord Ellenborough ruled that an 
infirmity, as a temporary lameness, which renders a horse 
less fit for present use or convenience, though not of a per¬ 
manent nature, and though removed after action brought, is an 
unsoundness. In Coates v. Stephens a cough, though not 
permanent, is an unsoundness. Yet in Gai'me^it v. Barrs, 
Chief Justice Eyre ruled that a horse labouring under a 
temporary injury or hurt, is not an unsound horse. 
Roaring is not necessarily unsoundness, unless symptom- 
