VETERINARY JURISPRUDENCE. 
263 
defendant comes over at that time, he naturally enough wants to have a 
veterinary surgeon of his own to examine him. He accordingly goes 
and fetches a veterinary surgeon, named Taylor, with whom the plaintiff 
unfortunately seems to have had some quarrel, and he, the plaintiff, I 
think very foolishly and very wrongly, refuses to let Taylor see the 
horse at all. Now, I think, in common fairness, when the defendant had 
selected his veterinary surgeon, and wanted him to see the horse, the 
plaintiff should have allowed that veterinary surgeon to have examined 
him as much as he liked. I think the plaintiff might very reasonably 
have said, “This is a man who has had a quarrel with me, and I would not 
like him to examine my horse, and, therefore, I wish you would get some¬ 
body else insteadbut when the defendant said, “ Let this veterinary 
surgeon of mine examine him,” I think the plaintiff's refusal to do so iveahens 
his evidence , because, of course, it has not been fairly tested by the defen¬ 
dant’s evidence on the other side. I think you ought to give this much 
weight to that circumstance, that it was not giving the defendant quite 
fair play. 1 do not suppose it was done from any bad motive. It was 
because the plaintiff had quarrelled with that particular man, and, con¬ 
sequently, appears to have resented bringing that particular man to 
examine the horse. The defendant himself seems to have thought the 
horse was sound at that time, and Taylor says the same thing, though he 
only saw him trot upon soft ground as he was run out for sale. I must 
say there is a very great weight of evidence against them, because all 
these people, selected by the plaintiff, men of skill and position, all say 
that the horse was unsound, and had a chronic disease at the time, so 
that I think the evidence preponderates greatly that he was unsound 
then. 
However, the horse is put up for sale, and the defendant bids as high 
as £64, and the plaintiff buys it in for £66. The plaintiff says the 
reason he did that was that a horse with navicular disease, by nursing 
and taking care of him, might be made to appear sound for a time, and 
that he thought that was what the defendant intended to do, in view of 
an action at law, and that he would so produce him to the jury as to 
make a better case for himself. But I do not think that was proper conduct , 
or a very wise course to pursue. However, it was frankly admitted, and 
was what a man might naturally enough do. Still he has bought the horse, 
and has said by that act that the horse is worth sixty-six guineas to him, 
for he gave sixty-six guineas to prevent the defendant getting the horse, 
therefore that is very strong evidence against himself that the horse was 
worth sixty-six guineas at that time. That you must take into con¬ 
sideration in considering the amount of damages in case you find the 
horse to have been unsound. 
And that is the last point. If you find the horse was sound on the 
18th November, then of course the defendant is entitled to your verdict. 
It rests with the plaintiff to satisfy you that the horse was unsound on 
the 18th November. If he has satisfied you that the horse was unsound, 
then the plaintiff is entitled to your verdict, and the measure of damages 
which wou would award would be the difference between the sound value 
of the horse and the real value of the horse, with such unsoundness as 
be actually had at the time. That will be the meausure of the damages, 
with the addition of a reasonable allowance for the expenses incurred in 
keeping and trying to cure the horse ; all, in short, which might reasonably 
he done during a reasonable time, whilst trying to ascertain whether the 
horse was really unsound, and trying to find out whether he could cure 
him or not. Not all the time he kept him, when he might have sold him, 
but for a reasonable time, during which he was trying to find out whether 
