EQUALITY. 
875 
One fliall rife, 
Of proud ambition; who, not content 
"With fair equality , fraternal date, 
Will arrogate dominion undeferv’d, 
Over his brethren. Milton. 
Evennefs; uniformity; conftant tenon r ; equability.—* 
Meafure out the lives of men, and periodically define the 
alterations of their tempers, conceive a regularity in mu¬ 
tations, with an equality in conftitutions, and forget that 
variety which phylicians therein difcover. Broom. 
On the very delicate yet interefiing fubjert of equality, 
much has been written, much midaken, and much pervert¬ 
ed. Neither in England, nor even in France, can the rights 
of men be underflood to confifl in every perfon’s doing 
what he pleafes ; nor can equality be confidered as im¬ 
plying the levelling of all property. Yet thefe notions 
have been artfully dilfeminated, to bring into difcredit 
that true principle of equal rights, which is the bafts of 
Englifh freedom, by thofe perhaps who have perfonal 
reafons for widling to perpetuate political abufe and cor¬ 
ruption. That Inch have been the defigns of fome indi¬ 
viduals, is clearly evinced, from the great number of 
pamphlets written avowedly to eftablifit this deceptive 
idea; but tire cool and difpafiionate reafonings of Dr. 
Paulus of Haarlem, profefTor Cras of Amflerdam, profef- 1 
for Brown of Utrecht, M. Turgot, Dr. Rennell, and 
other eminent authors, have contributed to difpel the al- 
lufion, nd to place the fad in an obvious and fatisfatlory 
point of view : and from thefe writers our prefent remarks 
are feierted. It is in vain, however, to attempt the dif- 
cuflion of io complicated a queftion, unlefs the terms be 
accurately underltood : it is therefore neceffary to pre- 
mife, that the word equality, in its prefent application, 
fuppofes comparifon, and indicates a certain agreement 
or refemblance in the things compared ; fo that fome 
properties or circumffances, belonging to the one, mnft 
alfo be found to belong to another, which, in thisrefpert, 
is faid to be equal to the former; and by the nature and 
number of thefe common circumdances, the mode and 
degree of equality mud be edimated. Hence equality, as it 
refperts mankind, maybe refolved into phyfical and moral-, 
the former relates to circumdances which are independent 
of the will, and which therefore cannot be fubjert to any 
law ; the latter confids in a parity of rights, which law 
confers, and a pariry of duties, which it preferibes. Moral 
equality maybe termed either natural, or civil, according 
to the kind of law on which it is founded ; and it may be 
confidered either as abfolute or relative : in abfolute equa¬ 
lity, the parity mud extend to all rights and duties what¬ 
ever ; whereas, in relative, it is liable only to particular 
exceptions. 
We may now advert to the grand propofition, Wherein 
does the equality of jnankind covfjl ? In order to anfwer this 
queftion, it is necefiary to take into our view thofe parti¬ 
culars which are common to all; fuch as the vicifiitudes 
of health and ficknefs, of pleafure and pain, of profperity 
and adverfity, to which all men arealike expofed. Who, 
that contemplates individuals in thefe points of view, does 
not difeern their equality ? This may properly be termed 
moral equality, to didinguith it from that fimilitude in 
other refperts, which may be referred to phyfical equality : 
but thefe twoki^ds are intimately conm'rted ; and, as the 
common rights and duties of men arife from the w hole of 
human nature, fo moral equality mud, in fome refpe'rt, 
refult from phyfical. That equality of rights and duties, 
arifing from the common nature and condition of man¬ 
kind, is not a mere firtionof imagination, but actually takes 
place jn many cafes, not only between nations indepen¬ 
dent of each other’s authority, but alfo between indivi¬ 
duals, w ho happen to be connected by no other ties than 
thofe of humanity. It is remarkable that the celebrated 
M. Necker, greatly mifreprefents the propofition, and 
confounds phyfical witli moral equality ; though the lat¬ 
ter is clearly and corrertly indicated by the expredion, 
That all men are born equal w ith refpeit to rights. . This 
maxim is by no means new ; for Montefquieu has affirm¬ 
ed the very fame in his Spirit of Laws, book viii. M. 
Necker fays, “ that men are no otherwife equal with refpert 
to rights, than in confequence of their defire and (enle of 
happinefs;” and then, obferving that brutes have alfo this 
defire and fenfe, he attempts to ridicule the propofition, 
by concluding that brutes are equal to men in rights. 
This is a grofs miftake : for the equality ot men refults, 
not from any particular properties which they may have 
in common with brutes, but from the aggregate ot thofe 
which are common to mankind, and which conditute hu¬ 
man nature. In the animated as well as inanimated na¬ 
ture, in man as well as the inferior creatures, we dilcern 
not only uniformity but alfo variety ; and he mud be a 
poor philofopher indeed, who does not perceive how much 
this variety, in the moral not lefs than in the phyfical 
world, contributes to preferve the order and harmony of 
the whole. Did mankind come into life like the fabled 
Theban colony, which fprang from the ferpent’s teeth-, 
their abfolute equality might be pofiible : but we teat the 
event would be what the poet deferibes, when he adds, 
- -Jitoque 
Marte cadunt fubiti per mutua vulncra fratres. 
This, however, is not the cafe ; for the mod driking in¬ 
equality refults from the circumdances in which we are 
born, and mud inevitably attend mankind even in a date 
of nature, were it only in thofe'refpedts which refult from 
the various degrees of bodily and mental powers, by which 
individuals are diilinguifited. Civil fociety mutt there¬ 
fore have been the obvious confequence of the firft focial 
union, which mud have fubfided in a date of nature; in 
which, as mankind increafed in number, and as indivi¬ 
duals became more independent on each other, common 
laws were found neceffary, in order to protect the weak 
againd the drong, and to preferve the peace of the com¬ 
munity. Thefe fird rudiments of civil fociety were pro¬ 
bably as fimple and rude as w r ere the men for whom they 
were defigned, till experience taught them to improve 
thefe regulations, and at length to form regular lydems 
of legifiation. Belide thefe circumdances of inequality 
in a date of nature, a very driking one refults in civil 
fociety from the abfolute necefiity of government. The 
lower <.daffies of citizens, wdio conditute the majority in 
every date, are too clofely employed in procuring their 
fubfiftence, to have either time, or inclination, to attain 
fufficicnt knowledge for the didribution of judice and the 
administration of public affairs. Hence it becomes necef¬ 
fary to felect thofe for the offices of government, on whom 
wealth has conferred leifure ; whofe education has called 
forth and improved their abilities; and whofe moral cha- 
rarter, as well as talents and knowledge, entitle them to 
the confidence of the community. From thefe premifes, 
we may legitimately conclude, that mankind are equal, 
inafmuch as the rights and duties refulting from human 
nature are common to all ; that hence men ought to be 
deemed equal in all cafes, except thofe in w'hici), either 
from the ties of blood, or from mutual compart, or elfe 
from the very nature of civil fociety and government, pe¬ 
culiar rights and duties neceffarily induce fubordination, 
and hence inequality. 
It may here be judly obferved, that, as all moral law 
(and it is by this that man, in whatever (late we fuppofe 
him to be, tnufl be direrted) is founded in the common 
nature of mankin 1, all the rights which it confers, all 
the duties which it preferibes, mud be referred equally to 
every individual. Hence the force of that moral maxim, 
to art towards others as we would with them to art to¬ 
ward its; which, in fart, prefuppofes the moral equality 
of mankind as the principle on which its authority de¬ 
pends ; and hence we immediately feel the grand right 
and correfpondent obligation refulting from equality ; 
which, however extenfive, may be generally expreffed in 
thefe words: “ Whatever others, who are our equals, 
can judly require of us, we have an abfolute right to re¬ 
quire of them ; and they are under the fame obligation to 
comply 
