C R E A 
■or transformed into it: whereas the true notion of Crea¬ 
tion, is not a forming Something out of Nothing, as out 
of a material CauJ'c ;' but only a bringing fomething into 
being, that before had no being at all; or a cauling fome¬ 
thing to exift noiu, that did not exift before ; or which, 
without this Caufe, would not have exilted. Which no man 
can ever reduce to a contradiction ; any more than the 
formation of any tiling into a ihape which it had not be¬ 
fore, can be reduced to a contradiction.—Clark’s Demon- 
ftration of the Being and Attributes of God, prop. 10. 
The true and proper Idea of God, in its molt contracted 
form, is this, A Being Abfolutely Perfect. For this is that 
alone, to whifch KeceJJary Exijlence is elfential, and of which 
it is demonftrable. Now as Abfolute Perfection includes in 
it all that belongs to the Deity, fo does it not only com¬ 
prehend (belides KeceJJary Exijlence) PcrfeEl Knowledge or 
Underftanding, but alfo Omnicaufality, and Omnipotence, 
(in the full extent of it,) otherwife called Infinite Power. 
God is not only xqirov, and Ammans quo nihil in omni 
Natura prafiantius, as the Materiarian Theijls dclcribed 
him, the Bejl Living Being ; nor as Zeno Eleates called him, 
K.pa Tifov iroevrav, the Mojl Powerful of All Things', but he 
is alfo Tcxfygcx.T'ni, and 7rayroy.qa.re1q, and 7ralh^aaio;, Abjo- 
lute/y Omnipotent, and Infinitely Powerful', and therefore 
neither Matter , nor any thing elle, can exift of itfelf in¬ 
dependently upon God ; but lie is the Sole Principle and 
Source, from which-all things are derived.—Cudworth’s 
Intellectual Syftem, b. i. c.4. p. 200. ed. 1688. 
Others would have Matter to be eternal, notwithftand- 
Ing that they allow an eternal, cogitative, immaterial, 
Being. This, though it take not away the Being ol a God, 
yet iince it denies one, and tire firft great piece ot his 
workmanfiiip, the Creation, let us conlider it a little. 
Matter mult be allowed eternal: Why ? Becaufe you can¬ 
not conceive how it can be made out ol nothing. Why 
do you not alfo think yourfelt eternal? You will anlwer 
perhaps, becaufe about twenty or torty years Iince, you 
began to be. But if I alk you what that you is, which 
began then to be, you can fcarcely tell me. The matter 
whereof you are made, began not then to be ; lor if it 
did, then it is not eternal ; but it began to be put toge¬ 
ther in fuch a fafhion and frame as makes up your body : 
but yet that frame of particles is not you ; it makes not 
that thhking Thing you are ; (for I have now to do with 
one, who allows an eternal, immaterial, thinking Being , 
.but would have unthinking Matter eternal too:) there¬ 
fore when did that thinking Thing begin to be ? If it did 
never begin to be, then have you always been a thinking 
Thing from eternity ? The abfurdity whereof I need not 
confute, till I meet with one who is fo void of under¬ 
ftanding, as to own it. If therefore you can allow a 
thinking Thing to be made out of Nothing, (as all things 
that are not eternal muft be,) why alfo can you not allow 
it polfible for a material Being to be made out of Nothing, 
by an equal power, but that you have the experience of 
the one in view, and not of the other? Though, when 
well confidered, Creation of a Spirit will be found to 
require no lefs power, than the Creation of Matter. Nay, 
poflibly, if we would emancipate ourfelves from vulgar 
notions, and raife our thoughts as far as they would 
reach, to a clofer contemplation of Things, we might be 
able to aim at fome dim and feeming conception how 
Matter might at firft be made, and begin to exilt by the 
power of that Eternal Firft Being ; but to give Beginning 
and Being to a Spirit, would be found a more inconceiv¬ 
able effedt of Omnipotent Power.—Locke’s Ellay con¬ 
cerning Human Underftanding, b. iv. c. 10. fedt. 18. 
1. The true notion of Creation is the bringing of fome¬ 
thing into being, which before had no being at all; for 
the phrafe of making fomething out of nothing, or out 
of no pre-exiftent matter, does miflead our underftanding 
into odd conceits, as if nothing could be the material 
caufe of fomething, or as if nothing could be what is 
material. 
Vol. V. No. 277, 
T I O N. ,341 
2. Every'one mu ft grant, that fomething is; for wc 
fee that tilings are, however they came to be. 
3. Every one mu ft grant, that that which v/as ef itfelf 
was always ; for nothing can begin to be of itfelf. 
4. It is much more eafy to conceive how a thing, that 
once was not, might lometimes be brought into being 
by another, than how a thing ihouid be always of itfelf: 
for that which once was not, is fuppofed to have fome¬ 
thing before it, by which it might be made, though not 
out of which it was made: but that which was always, 
neither had, nor could have any thing by which, or out 
of which it could be made. And why cannot a thing 
come into being, when there was nothing before it, out 
of which it was made, as well as a thing be always, when 
there could not be any thing before it, out of which it 
Iliould be ?—-Tillotfon’s Serm. 152. 
It is fo far from being true that God is corporeal, that there 
could be no fuch thing as either Matter or Motion, if there was 
not fome Superior Being, upon whom they depended. Or, God 
is Jucli a Being, that without Him there could be neither Matter 
■nor Motion. This mult be true of Matter: becaufe, it has 
been proved already, that there can be but one independ¬ 
ent Being; that lie is incorporeal ; and that tile exigence 
of all other beings mult depend upon Him. But the fame 
tiling may be proved otherwife. If Matter, (I mean the 
exigence of it,) does not depend upon fomething above 
it, it mull be an independent Being ; and if an independ¬ 
ent Being, a neceflary Being; and then there could be 
no fuch thing as a vacuum : but all bodies muft be per - 
ftclly foil'd-, and, mofe than that, the whole world could 
be but one fuch body, five times as firm as brafs, and in¬ 
capable of all motion. For that being which cxijls nc~ 
cejjarily, does vccejfarily ex if: that is, it cannot not exiJL 
But in a vacuum Matter does not exilt. 
Moreover, if Matter be an independent, neceflary Being, 
and exifts of itfelf, this muft be true of every particle of 
it: and if fo, there could not only be no vacuum, but 
every particle muft be every where. For it could not 
be limited to occupy only a place of fuch certain dinien- 
fions by its own nature-, Iince this confinement of exift- 
ence within certain bounds implies non-exiftence in other 
places beyond thole bounds, and is equal to a negation 
of exiftence ; and when exijlence is elfential to any being, 
a negation of exijlence cannot be fo. Nor, in the next place, 
could its exiftence be limited by any thing e!fe, becaufe 
it is fuppofed to have its exiftence only of itfelf; i. e. to 
have a principle of exiftence in itfelf, or to have an ex¬ 
iftence that is not dependent upon or obnoxious to any 
other. 
And I may 3dd Hill, if Matter be felf-exiftent, I do not 
fee, not only how it comes to be reftrained to a place of 
fome certain capacity, but alfo how it comes to be li¬ 
mited in other refpedls ; or why it fhould not exift in a 
manner that is in all refpetts perfedt.— So that thus it ap¬ 
pears, Matter muft derive its exiftence from fome other 
Being, who caufes it to be juft what it is. And the Being, 
who can do this, muft be God.—Wollafton’s Religion of 
Nature Delineated, fedt. 5. prop. 13. 
With thefe dedqdtions of Reafon, correfponds the 
Mofaic Hiftory. It is impoflible however not to obferve 
the diftinguilhing characteriftic, which marks the Scrip¬ 
ture. It is this. Its alfertion is direct, firm, grand, con~ 
vincing. No circuitous wanderings for argument, no long 
chain of combined propofitions, appear in the Words of 
Revelation. The Fact is announced with all the au¬ 
thority, and yet all the fimplicity, which infpired Truth 
would naturally bring with it; “ In the beginning Goi> 
created the Heaven and the Earth.” Gen. i. 1. In re¬ 
ceiving this, as a Fadt indilputable, we give to it that 
rational affent, which on the ftrongeft grounds of the 
foundeft philofophy, credibility and probability demand 
of every candid mind. Lord Bacon has this remarkable 
palfage : “ The principal difference (fays he, fpeaking 
yf she ancient Philofophers and the Scriptures) is this : 
4 S That 
