FRA 
tp.ges of their late victories, by attacking general Vau- 
bois on the Upper Adige, and driving him with great 
{laughter to Pefchiera. Davidovich had by thefe means 
advanced within a few leagues of Mantua, when Bona¬ 
parte, alarmed at his fuccefs, joined Vaubois, and attack¬ 
ed him on the heights of Campara, where Davidovich, 
being greatly inferior in force, made little refiftance, but 
retired to Alla. The expedition for the relief of Man¬ 
tua was thus completely fruftrated, by the aftonifhing 
activity and promptitude of Bonaparte in attacking each 
tlivilion feparately, and preventing their junction. The 
garrifon was, however, fupplied with provifions inconfe- 
quence of a vigorous fortie made by Wurmfer ; and the 
remainder of the year palled away without any other im¬ 
portant conflict. 
Bonaparte was (till engaged in the blockade of Mantua, 
while the Auftrian government was making vaft efforts to 
recruit the army of Alvinzi after its defeat at Arcole, 
and to enable that general to make a lafr and defperate 
effort for the relief of Mantua. The young men of 
Vienna were urged to give their affiftance on this impor¬ 
tant occafion, and 6000 of them marched into Italy as 
volunteers. Alvinzi’s army now amounted to nearly 50,000 
men ; and he commenced his operations on the 8th of 
January 1797, by fkirmilhing along the whole of the 
French line, from Porto Legnago upwards to La Corona 
near the Lake Garda. On tire 10th, Bonaparte was at 
Bologna, taking precautions againft the efcape of Wurm¬ 
fer by that quarter, which, from an intercepted letter, lie 
had learned was in contemplation. But being informed 
of the approach of the Auftrians, he hafiened to Mantua, 
and from thence to Verona, which was the centre of the 
line of his army .that oppofed Alvinzi. He arrived at 
Verona on the morning of the 12th; but as the Auftrians 
continued to make their attacks upon different quarters 
at once, he was unable to penetrate the defign of their 
leader. On the 13th, the efforts of the Auftrians began 
to affume a formidable afpeCt on the lower part of his line 
near Porto Legnago ; but on the evening of the fame 
day he received intelligence that the upper extremity of 
his line, where Joubert commanded, had been attacked 
by fucli an immenfe fuperiority of numbers, that there 
could be no doubt that the mafs of the imperial troops 
was concentrated there. The poft of La Corona had 
been forced, and Joubert compelled to withdraw to Ri- 
voli, which he alfo abandoned. 
The Auftrians ftill perfifted in their unfortunate plan 
of dividing their army, that they might have two chances 
of fuccefs. Ten thoufand chofen troops, among whom 
were the Vienna volunteers, were deftined under general 
Prowera to penetrate to Mantua by Porto Legnago, at the 
lower extremity of the French line; while Alvinzi in 
perfon advanced with the main army againft Joubert at 
its other extremity. Bonaparte, in the mean time, left 
Verona in the evening of the 13th, having ordered the 
whole centre of his army under Malfena to follow him to 
the neighbourhood of Rivoli. Here he fpent the night 
in arranging the order of battle for next day, and in oc¬ 
cupying ftrong pofitioiis. At day-break of the 14th the 
attack was begun by Joubert’s divifton, to the no fmall 
furprife of the imperialifts, who were not aware of the 
arrival of Bonaparte with reinforcements. The battle,, 
however, was long and obftinate. The fuperiority of 
numbers on the fide of the Auftrians enabled them to 
defeat all the efforts of the French to turn their divifions. 
They alfo fucceeded in driving back upon tire centre the 
two wings of the French army in conliderable diforder. 
Alvinzi now attacked the centre, which fcarcely main¬ 
tained its pofition; and the Auftrian wings advancing on 
both Tides, completely furrounded the French army. The 
victory feemed already won ; and it is faid that Alvinzi 
di (patched a courier to Vienna to announce the approach¬ 
ing capture of Bonaparte and his army. The fituation 
ot the republican chief was certainly alarming ; but from 
the nature of his order of battle, his troops had rather 
N C E. 
been concentrated than fcattered by the reptilfe they had 
received, and it was therefore ftill in his power to make a 
defperate effort. Having formed three ftrong columns, 
he fent them againft the Auftrian right wing. They fuc¬ 
ceeded in penetrating it at different points; and it fled 
in fuch confufion, that having encountered a party of 
French that had not arrived in time to join the body of the 
army, four thoufand Auftrians laid down their arms, apd 
furrendered themfelves prifoners of war. Night put an 
end to any farther conteft in this part, when Bonaparte 
inftantly flew to oppofe general Provera, leaving Joubert 
to profecute the vidtory he had To far gained. This fcr- 
vioe he performed with great addrefs. A detachment 
under Murat, having marched all the night of the 14th 
after the battle, feized Montebaldo in the rear of the po¬ 
fition at Corona, to which a confideratle divifton of the 
Auftrians had retreated, while Joubert, next morning, 
attacked them in front. Finding themfelves thus fur- 
rounded, they fell into confufion : fix thoufand were 
made prifoners, many were drowned in attempting to 
crofs the Adige, and the remainder fled into the Tyrol. 
During this fanguinary conteft on the upper part of the 
Adige, Provera had forced his paffage acrofs the lower 
part of that river at Angiara, and compelled Guieux to 
retire to Ronco. Augereau colledted all the troops in the 
neighbourhood, and marched to attack Piovera; but as 
be haftened towards Mantua, Augereau could only come 
up with his rear ; of which, after an engagement, betook, 
two thoufand prifoners. On the 15th, however, Provera 
arrived in the vicinity of Mantua. The city, which 
ftands on a lake, was blockaded at the two points by 
which it has accefs 10 the main land, called St. George 
and La Favorite. Alvinzi was to have formed his junc¬ 
tion with Provera at t-he poft of St. George. Receiving 
no intelligence of him, general Provera fummoned the 
French commander here to furrender ; and on his refufal, 
endeavoured to carry the pofition by affault. Having 
failed in this attempt, he turned his attention towards the 
poft of La Favorite, which he attacked on ths-morning 
of the 16th ; while Wurmfer, who had perceived his ar¬ 
rival, advanced with the troops of the garrifon againft the 
fame point. But by this time Bonaparte had arrived 
with reinforcements. Wurmfer was repulfed ; and Pro¬ 
vera being completely furrounded by the French, was 
under the necefiity of furrendering his army prifoners of 
war. The refuit of all thefe battles was the capture of 
23,000 prifoners and fixty pieces of cannon ; and thus four 
imperial armies had periftied in Italy in the attempt to 
preferve-Mantua. The capture of this city, however, 
was now inevitable, in confeqttence of famine. It fur- 
rendered by capitulation on the 2d of February 1797. 
Bonaparte on this occafion endeavoured to acquire the 
reputation of humanity. To allow the French emigrants 
in the garrifon to efcape, he confented to an article in the 
capitulation, that general Wurmfer fliould be allowed to 
feleft and carry out of the garrifon feven hundred men, 
who were not to be examined nor confidered as prifoners; 
and the general himfelf was allowed to depart uncondi¬ 
tionally. 
In the mean while, the pope, who of all the European 
princes had the greateft reafon for difliking the French 
caufe, incautioufly perfevered in hoftility, in the hope that 
fome of the imperial armies might fucceed in driving 
Bonaparte from Italy. Having recovered from the panic 
which induced him to folicit an armiftice when the French 
firft entered Lombardy, he had avoided concluding a 
treaty of peace, and attempted to enter into a ciofe alli¬ 
ance with the court of Vienna. He procured officers to 
be fent from thence to take the command of his troops, 
and flattered himfelf with the vain iiope of being able to 
make an important diverfion in favour of the Auftrian 
troops. , 
As the emperor and the French were both preparing to 
renew their bloody conteft on the frontiers of Germany, 
it was of importance to Bonaparte to leave Italy com¬ 
pletely 
