8S6 ' FRA 
His Sicilian majefty, as we have feen, p. 877, had entered 
into a treaty of neutrality with Napoleon ; but through 
the influence of the queen-mother, this neutrality had 
been recently violated, and the Neapolitan army had re¬ 
ceived reinforcements front Ruflia and England, whole 
caule it had efpoufed. Exafperated beyond meafure at 
this deceptive conduff, the emperor of the French com¬ 
manded reinforcements to be lent to the army of St. Cyr, 
under ntarefchal Maffena, who was to take the chief com¬ 
mand, until the arrival of his brother Jofeph, who was 
deliined to puniflt the perfidy of the queen. An attempt 
was made to foften his relentment againlf the miftakes of 
a woman ; but he replied, “ Were hoflilities to recom¬ 
mence, and the nation to fupport a thirty years war, fo 
atrocious an act of treafon cannot be pardoned.” He then 
publilhed the following proclamation to his army : 
“ Soldiers, —For ten years I have done all I could to 
fave the king of Naples: he has done every thing in his 
power to deftroy himfelf. After the battles of Dego, of 
Mondovi, and of Lodi, he could give me no effectual op- 
pufition. I placed confidence in the word of this prince, 
and I behaved with generofity towards him. 
“ When the fecond coalition was difl’olved at Marengo, 
the king of Naples, who was the fir ft to commence that 
unjuft war, abandoned at Luneville by his allies, re¬ 
mained alone, and without protection. He folicited my 
pardon, and I forgave him a fecond time. 
“ A few weeks ago you were at the gates of Naples. I 
bad fufficient reafon to fufpeft the treachery which was 
intended, and to avenge theinfults which I had received. 
Still I was generous. I acknowledged the neutrality of 
Naples—I ordered you to evacuate that kingdom, and 
for the third time the houfe of Naples was confirmed and 
faved. 
“ Shall we grant pardon for a fourth time ? Shall we, 
for a fourth time, place any confidence in a court, with¬ 
out truth, honour, or common fenfe ?—No! No! The 
Neapolitan dynafty has ceafed to reign—its exiftence is 
incompatible with the repofe of Europe, and the honour 
of our crown. 
“ Soldiers! march—drive into the fea, if they will 
wait your attack, thefe feeble battalions of the tyrants of 
the fea. Shew to the world the manner in which we punifh 
the perjured. Lofe no time in informing me that the 
•whole of Italy is fubjeCf to my laws or thofe of my allies ; 
that the fineft country of the world is emancipated from 
the yoke of the moft perfidious of men ; that the facred- 
rvefs of treaties is avenged ; and that the manes of my 
brave foldiers, maffacred in the ports of Sicily, on their 
return from Egypt, after having efcaped from the dangers 
of the fea, the deferts, and a,,hundred battles, are at 
length appeafed. 
“ Soldiers! my brother will lead you on; he is ac¬ 
quainted with all my plans; he is the depofitary of my 
authority—he is in full poffeffion of my confidence—let 
him have your’s. Napoleon.” 
The treaty of concert and co-operation which had been 
agreed upon between the allied powers, had for one of its 
principal ends the re-eftablifhment of what was called the 
equilibrium of Europe.” To etr'eift this objedf, the 
high contracting powers pledged themfelvesto each oilier 
not to enter into any feparate or private treaty of peace 
with France, until this grand purpofe fhould be com¬ 
pletely attained, and the five following conditions folemnly 
Submitted to by the emperor Napoleon; viz. 1. The eva¬ 
cuation of the country of Hanover, and the north of Ger¬ 
many.—2, The eftabliftiment of the independence of the 
republics of Holland and Swifferland.—3. The re-eftablifh¬ 
ment of the king of Sardinia in Piedmont, with as large 
an augmentation of territory 3s circumftances will permit. 
•—4- The future fecurity of the kingdom of Naples, and 
the complete evacuation of Italy, the ifland of Elba in¬ 
cluded, by the French forces.—5. The eftabliftiment of 
an order of things in Europe, which may effectually gua- 
N C E. 
rantee the fecurityand independence of the different Hates, 
and prefent a folid barrier againff future ufurpations. 
Thefe conditions very fatisfaflorily account for the ad¬ 
herence of the court of Naples to the allied powers ; but 
its conduCt ought unquefrionably to have been more open 
and decilive, and its folicitation for a ftriCt neutrality 
fhould have been by all means avoided. It was this 
double-dealing that excited the refentment of Napoleon, 
and which now determined him to fend a fufficient army 
to conquer the whole of the Neapolitan territory. In the 
mean time lie devoted the utmoft attention to regulate the 
important countries within his grafp. By the fubmifiion 
of the houfe of Auftria, and the retreat of the emperor 
Alexander to St. Peterfburgh, the Germanic body found 
itfelf wholly under the controul of the emperor of the 
French. The Pruffian monarch, agitated by the alternate 
paflions of hope and fear, had fagacioufly avoided to un- 
flieath the fword, in the view of fharing fome fragments of 
the f'poil with the conqueror of Germany, as a reward 
for his duplicity and forbearance. This remuneration ap¬ 
peared not far diftant. By exercifing the heavenly bene¬ 
volences of a pacificator, he procured leave of Napoleon 
for the Englifh, Ruffian, and Swedifh, troops in Hanover, 
who had never ftruck a blow, peaceably and quietly to 
evacuate that electorate, and to return each to his own 
proper home, without hindrance or moleftation. The 
French army which was palling the Yfel, in order to ad¬ 
vance into the bilhopric of Munfter, received orders to 
halt; and Augereau, who was deflined to co-operate in 
the ample recovery of the north of Germany, was directed 
to flacken his march, while the politic Frederic-William 
pufhed forward his own battalions, which fpeedily fur- 
prifed the Englifn, and took poffeffion of Hanover in his 
own name. For this connivance it is now underftood, that 
the emperor of the French will choole to be gratified by 
lopping off the central provinces of Anfpach and Bay¬ 
reuth from the Pruffian territory. 
That the Pruffian monarch, at a certain period of the 
war, when under circumffances of a threatening afpect, 
had refolved to co-operate with the allies in aCtive hofti- 
lity, appears obvious, from the following official commu¬ 
nication, fent by fpecial courier, on the 2?d of December, 
1805, by baron Von Hardenberg, minifter of ftate to the 
king of Pruffia, to lord Harrowby ; a document which it 
appears highly expedient to recite in this place, becaufe 
it ferves to explain in fome degree the wavering and inde- 
cifive meafures adopted by Frederic-William during the 
fliort courfeof this arduous conflict. The paper ftates as 
follows : 
“ My Lord, —Conformably to the anfwer I have al¬ 
ready had the honour to tranfmit to your excellency, to 
the queftion which you addreffed to me, relative to the 
fecurity of the troops of his Britannic majefty in the 
north of Germany, I haften to lay before you the pofitive 
affurances which I have the pleafure to be able to com¬ 
municate to you. 
“ Your excellency is acquainted with the prefent ftate 
of affairs. You will firft perceive that, at the point to 
which matters have now come, fince the unfortunate battle 
of Aufterlitz, between Auftria and France, in confequence 
of the return of the great Ruffian army, and the total un¬ 
certainty in which we are with regard to theintention of 
Napoleon towards Pruffia, the utmoft caution is abfoluteiy 
neceffary. The braveft army cannot always reckon upon 
fuccefs; and it is, undoubtedly, the intereft of Pruffia, 
and the intereft of the world, to prevent any attack upon 
her at the prefent moment, when the would have to 
bear the whole burden of the war; and no confederacy 
adapted to circumftances has been formed ; for, in cafe 
her armies fhould prove unfuccefsful, the laft ray of hope, 
to maintain the fecurity and independence of the conti¬ 
nent, would be extinguifhed. 
“ The king, ftill animated by the fame wifh to eftablilh 
a general peace on a permanent footing, and, if poilible, 
1 to 
