x& 2 
ARMY. 
by lot to go to the wars; or fometimes of a whole nation, 
called forth by their prince or kipg ; as we frequently read 
both in the fcriptures and in profane hidory. One of the 
fird (landing armies of which we have any didinct: account 
inauthentic hiflory, is that of Philip of Macedon. His con¬ 
tinual wars with the Thracians, Illyrians, Thefialians, and 
fome of the Greek cities in the neighbourhood of Mace- 
d'on, gradually formed his troops, which in the beginning 
were militia, to the exaCt difcipline of a (landing army. 
When he was at peace, which was very feldom, and never 
for any long time together, he was careful not to dilband 
his army. It vanquifhed and fubdued, after a long and 
violent druggie, all the gallant and well-exercifed militias 
of the principal republics of ancient Greece; and afterwards 
the effeminate and ill-exercifed militia of the great Perfian 
empire. The fall of the Greek republics, and of the Per¬ 
fian empire, was the effeCt of the irrefidible fuperiority 
which a handing army has over every fort of militia. It is 
the di d great revolution in the affairs of mankind of which 
hidory has preferved any didinct or circumdantial account. 
The fall of Carthage, and the consequent elevation of 
Rome, is the fecond/ All the varieties in the fortune of 
thofe two famous republics, may be accounted for from 
the fame caufe. From the end of the dill to the beginning 
of the fecond Carthaginian war, the armies of Carthage 
were continually in the field, and employed under three 
great generals, who fucceeded each other in the command: 
Amilcar, his fan-in-law Afdrubal, and his fon Hannibal; 
fird in chadidng their own rebellious flaves, afterwards in 
fubduing the revolted nations of Africa, and ladly, in 
conquering the great kingdom of Spain. The army which 
Hannibal led from Spain into Italy mud necedarily, in 
thofe different wars, have been gradually formed to the 
exadl difcipline of a danding army. The Romans, in the 
mean time, though they had not been altogether at peace, 
yet they had not^ during this period, been engaged in any 
war of very great confequence ; and their military difci¬ 
pline, it is generally faid, was a good deal relaxed. The 
Roman armies which Hannibal encountered at Trebia, 
Thrafymenus, and Cannae, were militia oppofed to a dand¬ 
ing army. This circumdance, it is probable, contributed 
more than any other to determine the fate of thofe battles. 
The danding army which Hannibal left behind him in 
Spain, had the like fuperiority over the militia which the 
Romans fent to oppole it, and in a few years, under the 
command of his brother the younger Afdrubal, expelled 
them almod entirely from that country. 
Hannibal was ill fupplied from home. The Roman mi¬ 
litia, being continually in the held, became in the progrefs 
cf the war a well-difciplined and well-exercifed danding 
army ; and the fuperiority of Hannibal grew every day lefs 
and lefs. Afdrubal judged it necelfary to lead the whole, 
or almod the whole, of the danding army which he com¬ 
manded in Spain, to the aflidance of his brother in Italy. 
In this march lie is faid to have been mided by his guides; 
and, in a country which he did not know, was furprifed and 
attacked by another danding army, in every refpeCt equal 
or fuperior to his own, and was entirely defeated. 
When Afdrubal had left Spain, the great Scipio found 
nothing to oppofe him but a militia inferior to his own. He 
conquered and fubdued that militia; and, in the courfe of 
the war, his own militia necedarily became a well-difci¬ 
plined and well-exercifed danding army. That danding 
army was afterwards carried to Africa, where it found 
nothing but a militia to oppofe it. In order to defend 
Carthage, it became necelfary to recal the danding army 
of Hannibal. The difheartened and frequently-defeated 
African militia joined it, and at the battle of Zama com- 
pofed tine greater part of the troops of Hannibal. The event 
of that day determined the fate of the two rival republics. 
From the end of the fecond Carthaginian war till the 
fell of the Roman republic, the armies of Rome were in 
every refpeCt danding armies. The danding army ot Ma¬ 
cedon made fome relidance to their arms. In the height 
td their grandeur it cod them two great wars and three 
i 
great battles to fubdue that little kingdom ; of which the 
conqued would probably have been dill more difficult, had 
it not been for the cowardice of its lad king. The militias 
of all the civilized nations of the ancient world, of Greece, 
of Syria, and of Egypt, made but a feeble refidance 'to 
the danding armies of Rome. The militias of fome bar¬ 
barous nations defended themfelves much better. The 
Scythian or Tartar militia, which Mithriffates drew from 
the countries north of the Euxine and Cafpian feas, were 
the mod formidable enemies whom the Romans had to en¬ 
counter after the fecond Carthaginian war. The Parthian 
and German militias too were always refpeftable, and up¬ 
on feveral occadons gained very condderable advantages 
over the Roman armies. In general, however, and when 
the Roman armies were well commanded, they appear to 
have been very much fuperior. 
Many different caufes contributed to relax the difcipline 
of the Roman armies. Its extreme feverity was, perhaps, 
one of thofe caufes. In the days of their grandeur, when 
no enemy appeared capable of oppofing them, their heavy 
armour was laid adde as unneceffarily burdenfome, their 
laborious exercifes were negleCted as unneceflarily toil- 
fome. Under the Roman emperors, beddes the danding 
armies of Rome, thofe particularly which guarded the Ger¬ 
man and Pannonian frontiers became dangerous to their 
maders, againd whom they ufed frequently to fet up their 
own generals. In order to render them lefs formidable, 
according to fome authors Dioclefian, according to others 
Condantine, fird withdrew them from the frontiers, where 
they had always before been encamped in great bodies, 
generally of two or three legions each, and difperfed them 
in final! bodies through the different provincial towns, 
from whence they were fcarcely ever removed, but when 
it became necedary to repel an invadon. Small bodies of 
foldiers quartered in trading and manufacturing towns, 
and feldom removed from thofe quarters, became them- 
felves tradefmen, artificers, and manufacturers. The civil 
came to predominate over the military character; and the 
danding armies of Rome gradually degenerated into a cor¬ 
rupt, negleCled, and undifeiplined, militia, incapable of 
redding the attack of the German and Scythian militias, 
which foon afterwards invaded the vvedern empire. It was 
only by hiring the militia of fome of thofe nations to oppofe 
to that of others, that the emperors were for fome time 
able to defend themfelves. The fall of the vvedern em¬ 
pire is the third great revolution in the affairs of mankind, 
of which ancient hidory has preferved any didinCt or cir¬ 
cumdantial account. It was brought about by the irrefidi¬ 
ble fuperiority which the militia of a barbarous has over 
that of a civilized nation; which the militia of a nation of 
diepherds has over that of a nation of hufbandmen, arti¬ 
ficers, and manufacturers. The victories which have been • 
gained by militias have generally been not over danding 
armies, but over other militias in exercife and difcipline 
inferior to themfelves. Such were the victories which the 
Greek militia gained over that of the PeFfian empire; atjd 
fuch too were thofe which in latter times the Swifs militia 
gained over that of the Audrians and Burgundians. 
The military force of the German and Scythian nations, 
who edablifhed themfelves upon the ruins of the wedern 
empire, continued for fome time to be of the fame kind in 
their new fettlements as it had been in their original coun¬ 
try. It was a militia of diepherds and hufbandmen, which 
in time of war took the field under the command of the 
fame chieftains whom it was accudomed to obey in peace. 
It was therefore tolerably vVell exercifed and tolerably well 
difeiplined. As arts and indudry advanced, the authority 
of the chieftains gradually decayed, and the great body of 
the people, being employed in domedic avocations, had lefs 
time to fpare for military exercifes. Hence, therefore, a 
danding army, though they may never have feen an ene¬ 
my, have greatly the advantage over a militia; and, though 
in a long peace the generals may fometimes forget their 
(kill, a well-regulated danding armv feem never to forget 
their valour. 
It: 
