B A 
perty, from its nature, cannot be entirely converted, but 
is more or lefs fixed or immovable) would ferve only for 
a fhort time, when their general property mud lerve at 
lall, for a purpofe to which it is equally applicable from 
the firft ; namely, that of exchange or barter. If a fo¬ 
reign enemy could pofiibly land with an irrefifliblc force; 
if the bank of England was annihilated; if the public 
debt followed, accompanied with general confufion; fome 
order of things mtift either continue to exift, or foon be 
re-eftablifhed: we know, from authority more than hit¬ 
man, what followed even a ftate of chaos.- The circula¬ 
ting paper cannot be entirely deftroyed ; it mufl in every 
event preferve a certain value: in the firft place, it muft 
liquidate, and at par, a large rnafs of engagements by a 
mutual exchange, as thofe who hold a large fum in paper 
have generally a large fum to pay: the balance which re- 
fults, after fuch liquidation, will ftand, however, in a very 
different predicament, and depends altogether on cir- 
cumftances, but appears in fuch numerous intricate points 
of view, as to render a difcltfiion impoffible; excepting 
only that thofe balances, even viewing them in their worft 
light, cannot be confidered as of no value. Property muft 
always exift under every government, and cannot be anni¬ 
hilated ; its nominal value will vary confiderably ; but its 
comparative value, although it may be affefted for a time 
by accidental circumftances, will in the end be more or 
lefs the fame. The comparative advantage, therefore, of 
?.ny one defeription over-another, is at leaft dubious, and 
opens a wide field for opinion. It depends, at the fame 
time, upon the magnitude or value of fuch property. 
To illuftrate this, we will fuppofe an inveftment to the 
amount of io,oool. each, in the cafe of an invafion, or 
even conqueft of the country, by a foreign enemy; the 
one in corn, the other in bank of England notes. The 
fum of io,oool. veiled in corn, will form a mafs of confi- 
derable bulk, and cannot el'cape the knowledge of the 
neighbourhood ; it will -no doubt preferve its comparative 
value more than any other article, becatife it is indifpen- 
fable; but in this confifts its difadvantage or danger : for 
what relates to the neighbourhood, they will pay for their 
purchafes by an exchange of goods or labour, as far as 
their capacity will permit, by a transfer of debts to a cer¬ 
tain extent; and, as the exchange and ,the transfer cannot 
fuffice for the whole amount, they may perhaps offer in 
payment for what remains the circulating medium of the 
time; for perfons in fuch fituations cannot be pofTelfed of 
gold or filver. If the proprietor accepts fuch payment, 
all objeftions againft the circulating medium vani flies; 
but, as it is probable the wealthy proprietor or farmer will 
refufe, the neighbourhood will not lfarve, with the means 
of fubliftence in view ; and then the common proverb may 
be literally verified, that ‘hunger will break through ftone 
walls.’ With regard to invaders, or fuppofe even that 
they are conquerors, they would demand coni as well as 
money; and their requifitions would be more irrefiftible 
for corn, which cannot be concealed, than for articles 
which are lefs bulky and more eafily kept out of view: 
thefe circumftances are independent of fire, and deprecia¬ 
tion of quality. If it (hall be faid, that the objections are 
againft the mafs, or amount, and not to the article, the ef¬ 
fect will ftill be the fame, whether corn is withheld by one 
or by twenty perfons. Its being withheld produces the 
confequences; in the firft place againft the large maftes, 
but finally againft all; and the fame argument will apply 
againft holding a flock of any article of fuperior ufe or 
necefiity for the public, in cafes of calamity and danger. 
The circumftances which would attend the notes of the 
bank of England do not require fo much detail. Under 
every fituation of convullion, or invafion, moft of the gold 
and filver would difappear, and fomething muft be fubfli- 
tuted. In fuch a predicament, what fubftitute can equal 
the paper of the bank of England ? the extent being fo 
moderate,' compared to the circulation of the country, and 
iffuing totally independent of the government. It would 
even be for the intereft of an invading enemy to l'upport 
Vol. II. No. 96. 
N K. 677 
a banlj fo eftablifhed ; for by deftroying it they would de¬ 
prive themfelves of the means of drawing any advantage 
from it. When the French took poflefiion of Amfterdam, 
they were wife enough not to touch the bank; and bank 
money at Amfterdam is worth more fince that invalid* 
than it was before. It is therefore not impofiible but that, 
even in fuch an event as is now ftated by way of fuppofi- 
tion, paper of this defeription, inftead of being the worft, 
would prove the beft, fecurity in which property could be 
inverted. At all events, a wheat-flack may be confirmed 
by fire, and the whole of the capital loft ; but fomething 
muft attach to a bank note in the worft of times, fo long as 
the independence of the bank on government Aral I be prec 
ferved, and that their notes in circulation do not much 
exceed the quantity ftated by the directors to parliament 
on the 25th of February, 1797, which then amounted to 
eight millions and a half. 
The late alarming fituation of the bank is now totally 
removed, in confequence of the very high courfe of ex* 
change with Hamburgh, which has produced a prodigious 
influx of gold and filver, wjiilft the panic has fubfided, 
and confidence is generally reftored. In this plealing ftate 
ot things, it only remains to confider the effects of the tem¬ 
porary indemnity bill, or aft of parliament, which empow¬ 
ers the bank of England to retain its gold, to iflue notes 
without reftriftion, and makes, as far as relates to their 
corporate capacity, their own notes a legal tender. 
On this fubjeft 'Sir Francis Baring obferves as follows : 
“ 1 am aware of all the objeftions which can be m*ged 
againft the making paper of any defeription a legal tender; 
and 1 fliould have been forward in oppofitionto every fuch 
plan or propdfal, if the bank had not flopped payment. 
But, though we have fuffered the difgrace, no ferious con¬ 
fequences have arifen; yet, if the fame difgrace fltall hap¬ 
pen a fecond time, we may not be equally fortunate with 
regard to the confequences. I defire, however, to be un‘- 
derftood, that 1 do not recommend government paper of 
any defeription as a circulating medium ; between that, 
and the paper of a corporate, independent, refpon’fible, 
company, there is a wide difference, a long interval indeed. 
The exchequer bills of government never can circulate, 
and never will be taken, as a medium, becaufe the public 
never can rely on the amount being confined within proper 
bounds. So long as they are paid, or can be abforbed i« 
the revenue, foon after they become due, they are of ufe 
to the executive government, and a benefit to the public. 
But, when the amount exceeds the means of liquidation, 
they become a dead weight, and clog every channel of the 
general circulation in fuch a manner as to compel the mir- 
nifter to reduce them once more within proper bounds. If 
this were not the cafe, exchequer bills and aftignats would 
be fynonimous terms, and ultimately experience the fame 
fate. The aftignats ilfued originally under a plan and pro- 
mife for their gradual extinftion; but, when it was found 
that they continued to iflue to an amount far beyond what 
was extinguiftied, the difeount bore a proportion to that 
amount, and finally fwallowed up the principal. We were 
at one time induced to fuppofe, that the deftruftion of af- 
lignats in France was neceflary for the falvation of Europe. 
But, if the intention of this country was to diftrefs France 
by every poflible means, we ought to have ufed every en¬ 
deavour to encourage and fupport the aftignats in France; 
becaufe they would have entailed an enormous debt on 
that country, for which taxes muft have been impofed, 
foon or late, to defray the intereft. V/hat a fituation the 
two countries would have been in, -if peace could have 
been made, leaving the aftignats in exiftence, with a dif¬ 
eount of feventy or eighty per cent! thereby intailing up¬ 
on the country the necefiity of iinpofing taxes fufficient to 
pay the intereft, and of courfe augmenting the price of 
labour in a proportionable degree. At prefent the debt of 
France is trifling, and the taxes, when peace comes, will 
fcarcely aft'eft the price of labour; wliilft our own taxes, 
for the purpofe of defraying the intereft alone, will amount 
to full thirty {hillings for every head; and which for every 
» K labourer. 
