GOD. 
m^y be conceived not to be, or to be in any refped dif¬ 
ferent from what it is, witlnnit a contracli6(:ion. The 
fubilance or clfence of the ielf-exilfent being is abfo- 
liitely inconiprehenfible by ns. We are fare however 
tliat Eifential Godlicad can be but One. In that unity 
of Godhead tiiere may co-ex iff Ihree Intelligences of 
one and the fame nature. Dr. Cl'ike’s words are: 
“ Wiielher in the unity of the divine nature tlierc may 
not co-exiib with the fupremc caufe, fneh emanations 
from it as may themfelves be equally eternal, infinite, 
and perfect, by an abfolute and complete communica¬ 
tion of all the divine attributes, excepting only felf- 
origination ; as there is nothing in bare reafon, by which 
it can be demon.firated, fo neither is there any argument 
by which it can be proved impoflible, or unreafonable ; 
and therefore, when made known to us by revelation, it 
ought to be believed.” \Jl Edit, on the Attributes, &c. 
Many of the eifential attributes of his nature are ItriT- 
iy demonfirabie, as well as his exiftence. The felf-ex- 
illent being, liaving no caufe of its exiftence but the ab- 
folure necellity of its own nature, muft of necelfity have 
exifted from everlafting, without beginning; and muft 
of neceftity exift to everlafting, without end. The felf- 
exiftent being muft of neceftity be infinite and omnipre- 
fent. Such a being muft be every where, as well as al¬ 
ways unalterably the fame. It follows from hence, that 
the felf-exiftent being muft be a moft fimple, unchange¬ 
able, incorruptible, being, without parts, figure, mo¬ 
tion, divilibility, and otlier piroperties of matter, which 
are utterly inconfiftent with complete infinity. The felf- 
exiftent being muft of neceftity be but one; becaufe in 
abfolute neceftity there can be no difference or diverfity 
of exiftence; and, therefore, it is utterly impoflible, 
that there ftiould be two independent felf-exiftent prin¬ 
ciples, fuch as God and matter. The felf-exiftent and 
original caufe of ail things muft be an intelligent being. 
This propofition cannot be demonftrated ftridtiy and pro¬ 
perly d priori-, but, a pojleriori, the world affords unde¬ 
niable arguments to prove that all things are the effeffs 
of an intelligent and knowing caufe. The caufe muft 
be always more excellent than the efleiit; and, there¬ 
fore, from the various kinds of powers and degrees of 
excellence and perfection, which vifible objeCls poffefs ; 
from the intelligence of created beings, which is a real 
diftinCt quality or perfection, and not a mere effeCt or 
compofttlon of unintelligent figure and motion; from 
the variety, order, beauty, wonderful contrivance, and 
fitnefs of all things to their proper and refpective ends; 
and from the original of motion; the felf-exiftent creat¬ 
ing being is demonftrated to be intelligent. Tlie felf- 
exiftent and original caufe of all tilings is not a necefi'ary 
agent’ but a being endued with liberty and choice. Li¬ 
berty is a neceftary confequent of intelligence ; without 
liberty, no being can be faid to be an agent, or caufe of 
any thing; fince to aCt necelfarily, is really and properly 
not to act at all, but to be aCted u.pon. Befides, if tlie 
fupreme caufe be not endued with liberty, it will fol¬ 
low, that motliing which is not, could polnbly liave 
been; that nothing which is, could poftibly not have 
been; and that no mode or circumftaiice of the exiftence 
of any thing could polfibly have been in any refpect 
otherwife than what it now actually is. Farther, if there 
be any fiinl caufe in the iiniverfe, the fupreme caufe is 
a free agent; and, on the contrary fuppofition, it is im- 
potfible that any effeCt lliould be finite : and in every 
ert'edt:, there muft have been a progreffion of caufes in 
infinitum, without any original caufe at all. The felf.ex- 
jlteiit being, the fiiprenie caufe of all things, muft of 
necelfity have infinite power; fince all things were made 
by him, and are entirely dependent upon him; and all 
the powers of all things are derived from him, and per¬ 
fectly fubjedl to him; nothing can refill the execution 
of his will. The fupreme caufe and author of all tilings 
nuift of neceftity be infinitely wife. This follows from 
the propolitions already ellablilhed; and the proof d 
■G:>\ 
pefieriori, of ihe infi;iitc wii’dom of God, from ilie ronfi- 
deration ot the exquifite perfection and confiniiinaic ex¬ 
cellency of his works, is no lei's Itroiig and iiiideniable. 
The fupreme caufe and autiior of all things muft of ne¬ 
ceftity be a beiiig ot infinite goodiief', jiillice, and trutli, 
and all other moral perfections; Inch as become tlie 
fupreme governor and judge of the .world. Tlie will 
of a being, infinitely knowing and wife, independent and 
all-powerful, can never be influenced by any wrong a'f- 
feCtion, and can never be milled or oppofed from with¬ 
out ; and, llicrefore, be muft do always wliat we know 
fitteft to be done ; that is, he muft aCt always according 
to the ftriCteft rules of infinite goodnefs, juftice, and 
truth, and all other moral jierfeCtions ; and, more par¬ 
ticularly, being infinitely and necefl’arily happy and all- 
fufficient, he muft be unalterably difpofed to do and to- 
communicate good or happinefs. 
To this more abftrufe argument, d priori, for the ex¬ 
iftence of God, we may add another, more generally 
obvious, and carrying irreliftible conviction, which is 
deduced from the frame of the world, and from the 
traces of evident contrivance and fitnefs of tilings for 
one another, that occur through all the parts of it. 
Tliefe confpire to prove, that the material world, which 
in its nature is originated and dependent, could not have 
been the effeCt of chance or necelfity, but of intelligence 
and dellgn. The beautiful, harmonious, and beneficial, 
arrangement of the various bodies that coinpofe the 
material fyfteiii; their mutual dependence and fubfer- 
viency; the regularity of their motions, and tlie apti¬ 
tude of thefe motions for producing the moft beneficial 
elfeCfs, and many, other phenomena refulting from their 
relation, magnitude, fituation, and ufe, aftbrd uiiqucf- 
tionable evidences of the creating power and wife dif- 
pofal of an intelligent and almighty agent. Tlie power 
of gravity, by which the celettial bodies perfevere in 
their revolutions, deferves our.particular confideratioii. 
This power penetrates to the centres of the fun and pla¬ 
nets, without any diminution of its virtue, and is ex¬ 
tended to iiiimenfe dilbances, regularly decrealjng, and 
producing the moft fenfible and important eft'eCts. Its 
action is proportional to the quantity of folid matter in 
bodies, and not to tlieir furfaces, as is ufual in meciia- 
nical caufes; and, therefore, feems to furpafs mere nie- 
chaiiifin. But however various tl'.e plieiiomena that de- 
pend on tliis power, and may be explained by it, no 
mechanical piiiiciples can account for its efteCts; much 
tefs could it have producc’d, at the beginning, tlie regu¬ 
lar fituation of tlie orbs, and the [irelent dilpolition of 
tilings. Gravity could not liave determined tlie planets 
to move from weft to eaft, in orbits nearly circular, ai- 
nioft in the fame plane ; nor could their po'wtr hav i 
projected tlie comets, with all the variety of their di¬ 
rections. If we fuppofe the matter of the fyfteni to be 
accumulated in the centre by its gravity, no mechanica.* 
principles, with the alfiltance of this power, could fejia- 
rate the huge and unwieldy inafs into fuch parts as tlie 
fun and planets; and, after carrying them to their dif¬ 
ferent diltanccs, project them in their f'everal directions, 
preferving (till the equality of aCtion and re-aCtion, or 
the ftate of the centre of gravity of the fyfteni. Such 
an exquifite ftruCture of tilings could only arife from 
the contrivance and powerful influences of an intelli¬ 
gent, free, and moft potent, agent. The fame poweis, 
therefore, which at prefeiit govern the material woild, 
and conduct its various motions, are very different from 
thofe, which were necelfary to have produced it from 
nothing, or to liave difpofed it in ihe admirable form in 
which it now proceeds. 
But we Ihould exceed the limits of our plan, even if, 
confining our obfervatioii to the earth, our own habita-' 
tion, we were to enumerate only the principal traces of 
delign and wifdom, as well as goodnefs, which are dll- 
ceriiible in its figure and conflitueiit parts, in its diurnal 
and annual motion, in the polition of its axis with re- 
