742 COVER 
Blit altliough we may be able to comprehend how by 
Ills perfonal abilities or fortune one man may obtain the 
rule over many, yet it feems more difficult to explain 
how empire fir/t became hereditary, or in what manner 
fovereign power, which is never acquired without great 
merit or management, learns to defcend in a fucceflion, 
which has no dependence upon any qualities, either of 
underftanding or activity. The caufes which have in¬ 
troduced hereditary dominion into fo general a recep¬ 
tion in the world, are principally the following :—TJie 
influence of alfociation, which communicates to the fon 
a portion of the fame refpecl which was wont to be paid 
to the virtues, or itation, of the father—the mutual jea- 
loufy of other competitors—the greater envy, with 
which ajl behold the exaltation of an equal, than tlie 
continuance of an acknowledged fuperiority—a reigning 
prince leaving behind him many adherents, who can 
preierve their own importance only by fupporting the 
lucceiflon of his children.—Add to thefe reafons, that 
eleiftions to the fupremc power having upon trial pro¬ 
duced deflruttive contentions, many Hates would take 
refuge from.a return of the fame calamities, in a rule 
of fucceflion; and no rule prefents itfclf fo obvious, 
certain, and intelligible; as confanguinity of birth. 
The early (late of fociety in mod countries, and the 
modern condition of many uncivilized parts of the 
world, exhibit that appearance, which this account of 
the origin of civil government would lead us to expciT. 
Tlte earliefl hiltories of Paleftine, Greece, Italy, Gaul, 
and Britain, inform us, that thefecountries were occupied 
by many fniall independent nations, not much perhaps 
unlike tiiofcwhicii are Ibund at prefent amongfl: the la¬ 
vage inhabitants of North America, and upon the coafl: 
ot Africa. Theic nations may be conlidcred as the am¬ 
plifications ot fo many lingle families ; or as derived 
from the junction of two or three families, wliom fo- 
ciety in war, or the approach of I'ome common danger, 
had united. Suppole a country to have been ftrll peo¬ 
pled by Ihipwrcck on its coafts, or by emigrants or ex¬ 
iles from a neighbouring country ; the new fettlers hav¬ 
ing no enemy to provide againlf, and occupied with the 
care of their perfonal fubliflence, would think little of 
digelting a fyltem of laws, of contriving a form of go¬ 
vernment, or indeed of any political union whatever; 
but each fettler would remain at the head of his own 
family, and each family would include all of every age 
and generation who were defcended from him. So many 
of thefe families as were holden together after tlie death 
of the original anceflor, by the reafons and in the me¬ 
thod above recited, would ripen, as the individuals 
were multiplied, into tribes, clans, hordes, or nations, 
limilar to thole into which the ancient inhabitants of 
many countries are known to have been divided, and 
which are Hill found, wherever the flate of fociely and 
manners is immature and uncultivated. 
Nor need we be furprifed at the early exiflence in the 
world of fome vaft: empires, or at the rapidity w'ith 
wliich they advanced to their greatnefs, from compara¬ 
tively fmall and obfcure originals. Whilfl: the inhabi- 
tant.s of fo many countries were broken into numerous 
communities, unconnedted, and oftentimes contending, 
with each other; before experience had taught thele 
little ftates to fee their own danger in their neighbour’s 
ruin ; or had inftrudted them in the neceflity of relilfing 
the aggrandizement of an afpiring power, by alliances 
and timely preparations ; in this condition of civil po¬ 
licy,, a particular tribe which by any means had got the 
flart of the reft in ftrength, or difcipline, and happened 
to fall under the condudt of an ambitious-chief, by di- 
re'dfing their firft attempts to the part where fuccefs 
was moft feCLire, and by afl'uming, as they went along, 
thofe whom they conquered into a fliare of their future 
cnterprizes, might foon gather a force, which would in- 
/allibly overbear any oppofition that the fcattered power 
unprovided ftate of fuch enemies could make to 
N M E N T. 
the progrefs of their vidlories. This theory affords a 
prefumption, that the earliefl; governments were mo¬ 
narchies, becaufe the government of families, and of ar¬ 
mies, from which civil government probably derived 
its inftitution, is univerfally monarchical. And this 
theory incontrovertibly proves, that the notion of An- 
SOLUTE EQUALITY among men, is foundeii ill error and 
abfurdity. Seethe articleEQUALiXY, vol. vi. p.874—3. 
In order to prove that civil obedience to a govern¬ 
ment, after it has been formed, is a moral duty, and an 
obligation upon the confcience, it hath been ufual with 
many political writers to ftate a compaB between the ci¬ 
tizen and the ftate, as the ground and caufe of the re¬ 
lation between them ; which compaft, binding the par¬ 
ties for the fame general reafon that private contrafts 
do, refolves the duty of fubmiflion to civil government 
into the univerfal obligation of fidelity in the perform¬ 
ance of promifes. This compact is twofold : Firft, 
an exprefs compa6t by the primitive founders of the 
ftate, who are fuppoled to have convened for the de¬ 
clared purpofe of fettling the terms of their political 
union, and a future conftitution of government. 'I'he 
whole body is fuppofed, in the firft place, to'have una- 
nimoLifly confented to be bound by the refolutions of 
the majority ; that majority, in the next place, to have 
fixed certain fundamental regulations; and thentoliave 
conftituted, either in one perfon, or in an alTembly (the 
rule of fucceflion or appointment being at The lame 
time determined,) a Jlanding legi/lature, to whom, under 
tliefe pre-eftabli(hed reftritlions, the government of tlie- 
ftate was thenceforward committed, and whofe laws the 
feveral members of the convention were, by their firft 
undertaking, thus perfonally engaged to obey. This 
tranfaclion is fometimes called the focial compaEl, and 
thefe fuppofed original regulations compofe what are 
meant by the conjlitution, the fundamental laws of the con- 
fitution ; and form, on one fide, the inherent indfeafble 
prerogative of the crown ; and, on the other, tlie unalien¬ 
able birthright of the fubjedt. 
Secondly, a tacit or implied compacf, by all fucceeding 
members of the ftate, who, by accepting its protedlion, 
confent to be bound by its laws ; in like manner as who¬ 
ever voluntarily enters into a private lociety, is under- 
ftood, without any other or more explicit ftipulation, 
to promife a conformity with the rules, and obedience 
to the government, of that fociety, as the known con¬ 
ditions upon which lie is admitted to a participation of 
fts privileges. This account of the lubjedi, although 
fpecious, and patronized by names the moft refpedtable, 
appears to labour under the following objedfions : that 
it is founded upon a fuppofition falfe in tadf, and lead¬ 
ing to dangerous conclufions. 
No focial compadf, fimilar to what is here defcribcd, 
was ever made or entered into iii reality ; no fu.ch pri- 
ginal convention of the people was ever actually held, 
or in any country could be held, antecedetit to the ex- 
iftence of civil government in that country. It is to 
fuppofe it pollible to call favages out of caves and de- 
ferts, to deliberate and vote upon topics, whicli the ex¬ 
perience, and ftudies, and refinements, of civil life alone 
fuggeft. Therefore no government in the univerfe began 
from this original. Some imitation of a focial coiupacl: 
may have taken place at a revolution-. The.prel'ent :ige 
has been witnefs to tranfadtions, which bear the neareft 
rcfemblance to this political idea, of any of which hif- 
tory has preferved the account or memory : the efta- 
blilhment of the United States of North America ; and 
the unprecedented revolution in France. 
As the firft members of the ftate were bound by 
exprel's ftipulation to obey the government wliich tliey 
had eredted, lb the fucceeding inhabitants of the lame 
country are underftood to promife allegiance to the con¬ 
ftitution'and government they find e'ftabliftled, by ac¬ 
cepting its protedfion, claiming its privileges, and ac- 
quiefeing in its laws; more efpeciully, by the parchafe 
or 
