COVER 
tion provides, i/l, For the intereft of its fubjedts. 2dly, 
For its own prefervation. 
Tlie contrivances for the firft of tliefe piirpofes are 
the following : In order to promote the eftabliihment of 
falutary public laws, every citizen of the hate is capable 
of becoming a member of the fenate; and every fcnator 
poU'efl'es the riglit of propounding to the deliberation of 
the legillature whatev'er law he pleafes. Every diftridt 
of the empire enjoys tlie privilege of chooling repre- 
fentatives, informed of the interefls and circumllances 
and delires of their conftituents, and entitled by their 
fituation to communicate that information to the nation¬ 
al council. The meanelt fubjeft has fome one whom 
he can call upon to bring forward his complaints and 
requefts to public attention. 
By annexing the right of voting for members of the 
houfe of commons to different qualifications in different 
places, each order and profeflion of men in the commu¬ 
nity become virtually reprefented ; that is, men of ail 
orders and profellions, flatefmen, courtiers, country gen¬ 
tlemen, lawyers, merchants, manufatturers, foldiers, 
lailors, intcrefted in the prolperity, and experienced in 
the occupation, of their refppdlive profellions, obtain 
feats in parliament. The eleftions, at the fiime time, 
are fo connected vvitli the influence of landed property 
as to afford a certainty that a conliderable number of 
men of great eftates will be returned to parliament; and 
are alfo' lo modified, that men the mofl,eminent and 
I'uccefsful in their refpeftive profeflions, are the moft 
likely, by their riches or the weight of their ffations, to 
prevail in thefe competitions. The number, fortune, 
and quality, of the members; the variety of interells 
and charadfers amongft them ; above all, the temporary 
duration of their power, and the change of men which 
every new election produces, are fo many fecurities to 
the public, as well againft the fubjedlion of their judg¬ 
ments to any external didlation, as againft the formation 
of a junto in their own body, fufficiently powerful to 
govern their decilions. 
The reprefentatives are fo intermixed with the con- 
ftituents, and the conftituents with the reft of the people, 
that they cannot, without a partiality too flagrant to be 
endured, impofe any burthen upon the fubjedt, in which 
they do not (hare themfelves ; nor fcarcely can they 
adopt an advantageous regulation, in which their own 
interefts will not participate of the advantage. The 
proceedings and debates of parliament, and the parlia¬ 
mentary condudt of each reprelentative, are alfo known 
by the people at large. The reprefentative is fo far de- 
pendent upon the conftituent, and political importance 
upon public favour, that a member of parliament can¬ 
not more efleCftiially recommend himfelf to eminence 
and advancement in the ftate, than by contriving and 
patronizing laws of public utility. 
When intelligence of the condition, w'ants, and occa- 
fions, of the people, is thus colledted from every quarter, 
when f'uch a variety of invention, and fo many under. 
Bandings, are fet at wmrk upon the fubjedt, it may be 
prefumed, that the moft eligible expedient, remedy, or 
improvement, will occur to fome one or other ; and 
when a wife counfel, or beneficial regulation, is once 
fuggefted, it may be expedled, from the difpoJition of 
an mfembly fo conftituted as the Britifh houfe of com- 
mons is, that it cannot fail of receiving the approbation 
of a majority. To prevent thofe deftrudfive contentions 
for the lupreme power, which are lure to take place 
wheie the members of the ftate do not live under an 
acknowledged head, and a known rule of fuccelfion ; to 
preferve the people in tranquillity at home, by a fpeedy 
and vigorous execution of the laws; to protedt their in- 
terelf abroad, by ftrength and energy in military opera¬ 
tions, by thofe advantages of decilion, fecrecy, and dif- 
patch, which belong to the refolutions of monarchical 
councils; for theie purpofes, the conllitution has com- 
N M E N T. 747 
mitted the executive government to the adminiftration 
and limited authority of an hereditary king. 
In the defence of the empire; in the maintenance of 
its power, dignity, and privileges, with foreign nations; 
in the advancement of its trade by treaties and conven¬ 
tions; and in the pioviding for the general adminiftra¬ 
tion of municipal juftice, by a proper choice and ap¬ 
pointment of magiftrates; the inclination of the king 
and of the people ufually coincides: in this part, there¬ 
fore, of the regal office, the conllitution entrufts the 
prerogative with ample powers. The dangers } rinci- 
pally to be apprehended from regal government, relate 
to tlie two articles, taxation and punijliment. In every 
form of government, from which the people are ex¬ 
cluded, it is the intereft of the governors to get as 
much, and of the governed to give as little, as they 
can : the power alfo of punifliment, in tlie hands of an 
arbitrary prince, oftentimes becomes an engine of ex¬ 
tortion, jealoufy, and revenge. Wifely, therefore, hath 
the Britifti conftitution guarded the fafety ot the people,, 
in thefe two points, by the moft ftudious precautions. 
Upon that oitaxation, every law which, by the renioteft 
conftrudtion, may be deemed to levy money upon the 
property of the fubjeft, muft originate, that is, muft 
firft be propofed and alTented to, in the houfe of com¬ 
mons: by which regulation, accompanying the weight 
which that aflembly pofteffes in all its fundlions, the- 
levying of taxes is almoft exclufively referved to the 
popular part of the conftitution, who, it is prefumed, 
will not tax themfelves, nor their fellow-fubjecls, with¬ 
out being firft convinced of the neceftity of the aids 
which they grant. The application alfo of the public 
fupplies, is watched with the fame circumfpeCtion, as 
the aireffinent. Many taxes are annual; the produce of 
others is mortgaged, or appropriated to fpecific fer- 
vices ; the expenditure of all of them is accounted for 
in the houfe of commons ; as computations of the charge 
of the purpofe, for which they are wanted, are previ- 
oufty fubmitted to the fame tribunal. 
In the inflidlion oipunijliment, the power of the crown, 
and of the magiftrate appointed by the crown, is con. 
fined by the moft precife limitations: the guilt of the 
offender muft be pironounced by twelve men ol his^ow'n 
order, indifferently chofen out of the county where the 
offence was committed: the punifliment, or tlie limits 
to which the punifliment may be extended, are afeen- 
tained and affixed to the crime, by laws which knew 
not the perfon of the criminal. And whereas arbitrary 
or clandeftine confinement is the injury moft to be 
dreaded from the ftrong hand of the executive govern¬ 
ment, becaufe it deprives the prifoner at once of pro- 
tedlion and defence, and delivers him into the power, 
and to the malicious or interefted deligns, of his ene¬ 
mies ; the conftitution has provided againft this danger 
with extreme folicitude. The ancient writ of habeas 
corpus, the habeas corpus a6t of Charles the Second, 
and the praftice and determinations of our fovereign 
courts of juftice founded upon thefe laws, afford a com¬ 
plete remedy for every conceivable cafe of illegal im- 
prifonment. 
Treafon being that charge, under colour of which the 
deftrudtion of an obnoxious individual is often fought ; 
and government being at all times more immediately a 
party in the profecution ; the law, befide the general 
care with'which it watches over the fafety of the ac- 
cufed, in this cafe, fenfible of the unequal conteft in 
which the fubjedt is engaged, has ailifted his defence 
with extraordinary indulgencies. By two ftatutes, en¬ 
acted lince the revolution, every perfon indidled for 
high treafon fliall have a copy of his indidiment, a lift 
of the witnelfes to be produced, and of tlie jury im¬ 
panelled, delivered to him ten days before tlie trial ; 
he is alfo permitted to make his defence by counfel— 
privileges which are not allowed to the prifoner, in a 
X trial 
