r 
74S COVER 
trial for any otlier crime : and what is of more import¬ 
ance to the party than all the reft, the teftimony of two 
witnelfes, at the leajl, is required to convift a perfon of 
treafon ; wliereas, one pofitive witnefs is fufficient in al- 
moft every otlier I'pecies of acciifation. 
proceed, in tiie fecond place, to enquire in what 
muiner the conftitution h.as provided for its own pre- 
fcvation ; that ts, in what manner each part of the le- 
giilature is fecured in the exercife of the powers afiigned 
to it, from the encroaciiment of the other parts. The 
lecurity is foinetiines called the balance of the conflitution ; 
and the political equilibrium, v/hich this phrafe denotes, 
tonlilis in two contrivances—a balance of power, and a 
balance of intereft. By a balance of power is meant, 
tiiHt tliere is no power polfeiled by otie part of tlie le- 
gillature, tlie abule or excefs of which is not checked 
by fome antagoiiift potver refiding in another part. Thus 
tlie piower of tlie two lioufes .of parliament to frame 
laws is cliecked by the king’s negative; that, if laws 
iuoverfivc of regal government ftiould obtain tlie con- 
jent of parliament, the reigning prince, by interpofing 
his prerogative, may lave the necefl'ary rights and au¬ 
thority ot his ftation. On the other hand, the arbitrary 
appiication ot this negative is checked by the privilege 
which parliament poft'cH'es, of refining fupplies of mo¬ 
ney to the exigencies of the king’s adminiftration. The 
conftitu tional maxim, “ that the king can do no wrong,” 
IS balanced by another maxim, not lefs conftitutional, 
“that the illegal commands of the king do notjuftify 
thofe wlio aflift, or concur, in carrying them into exe¬ 
cution and by a lecond rule, fublidiary to this, “ that 
tne adls of tlie crown acquire not a legal force, until 
authenticated by the fubfeription of fome of its great 
officers.” 1 he wifdom of this contrivance is worthy of 
obfervation. As tlie king could not be puniftied, with¬ 
out a civil war, the conftitution exempts his perfon from 
trial or account; but, left this im.punity Ihould encou¬ 
rage a licentious exercife of dominion, various obftacles 
are oppol'ed to the private will of tlie fovereign, when 
dirccled to illegal objefts. The pleafure of the crown 
mult be announced with certain folemnities, and attefted 
by certain officers of Ifate. In fome cafes, the royal 
order mult be fignified by a fecretary of ftate ; inotliers, 
it muft pals under the privy feal; and, in many, under 
the great leal. And when the king’s command is regu¬ 
larly publidied, no milchief can be achieved by it, with¬ 
out the miniftry and compliance of thofe to whom it is 
directed. Now all who "either concur in an illegal or¬ 
der, by autiienticating its publication with their leal or 
fublcription, or who in any manner alTift in carrying it 
into execution, lubject themfelves to profecution and 
piinilhment, for the part they have taken ; and are not 
permitted to plead or produce the command of the 
king, in juftification of their obedience. But farther; 
She power of the crown to dired't the military force of 
the kingdom, is balanced by the annual necellity of re- 
lorting to parliament for the maintenance and govern¬ 
ment ol tliat force. 'I'he power of the king to declare 
war, is checked by the privilege of the houfe of com¬ 
mons, to grant or withhold riie fupplies by which the 
war muft be carried on. The king’s choice of his mi- 
nifters is controlled by the obligation he is under of 
appointing thofe men to offices in the ftate, who arc 
found capable of managing the affairs of his govern- 
nient, with the two houles of parliament. Which con- 
I'lderaticm impofes futh a neceffity upon the crown, as 
hatJi in a great meafure lubdued (he influence of fa- 
vouritilm ; inlomuch, that it is become no uncommon 
fpeffacle in this country, to fee men promoted by the 
king to the liigheft offices and richelt preferments which 
he iias in his power to bellow, wlio have been diftin- 
guillied by tiieir oppofition to bis perfonal inclinations. 
By the balance of interejl, which accompanies and gives 
efficacy to tJic balance of porver^ is meant this—tliat the 
N M E N T. 
refpedfive interefts of the three eftates of the empire are 
lo difpofed and adjufted, that whichever of the three 
fliall attemnt any ' encroachment, the other two will 
uni'-e in reftfting it. If the king Ihould endeavour to 
extend his aufliority, by contradting the power and pri¬ 
vileges of the commons, the houfe of lords would fee 
tlieir own dignity endangered by every -advance v/hich 
tlie crown made to independency upon the refolutions 
of parliament. The admiffion of arbitrary power is no 
lefs formidable to the grandeur of the ariftocracy, than 
it is fatal to the liberty of the republic ; that is, it would 
reduce the nobility from the hereditary ftiare they pof- 
fefs in th.e national councils, in which, their real great- 
nefs cop.fifts, to the being made a part of the empty 
pageantry of a defpotic court. On the other hand, if 
the houfe of commons Ihould intrench upon the diftlndt 
province, or ufurp the eftabliflied prerogative, of the 
crown, the houfe of lords would receive an inftant alarm 
from every new ftretch of popular power. In every 
conteft in which the king may be engaged with the re- 
prefentative body, in defence of his eltabliffied fiiare of 
authority, he will find a fure ally in the colledtive 
power of the nobility. An attachment to th.e monarchy, 
from wliich they derive their own diftinffion ; the al¬ 
lurements of a court, in the habits and with the fenti- 
ments of which they have been brought up ; their ha¬ 
tred of all levelling pretenfions, which may ultimately 
aff'eft tlie privileges, or even the exiftence, of their or¬ 
der; in ffiort, every principle and every prejudice wh.ich 
are wont to adfiiate human conduft, will deteimine their 
choice to the fide and fupport of the crown. Laftiy, 
if the nobles themfelves Ihould attempt to revive tlie 
fuperiorities wliich their anceftors exercifed under the 
feudal conftitution, the king and the people would alike 
remember, how the one had been infulted, and the other 
eiillaved, by that barbarous tyranny. They would ibr- 
get the natural oppofition of their views and inclina¬ 
tions, when they faw themfelves threatened with the 
return of a domination, which was odious and intolera¬ 
ble to both. 
The proper ufe and defign of the lords fpiritual and 
temporal, as an indifpenfible part of the Britifli confti¬ 
tution, are therefore the following: Firft, to enable tlie 
king, by his right of bellowing the peerage, to rev/ard 
the I'ervants of the public, in a manner moll grateful to 
them, and at a fmall expence to the nation ; fecondly, 
to fortify the power and to fecure the ftability of regal 
government, by an order of men naturally allied to its 
interefts; and, thirdly, to anfwer a purpofe, which, 
though of fuperior importance to the other two, does 
not occur fo readily to our obfervation; namely, to 
llem the progrels of popular enthufiafm. Large bodies 
of men are lubjeft to fudden phrenzies. Opinions are 
fometimes circulated amongft a multitude without proof 
or examination, acquiring confidence and reputation 
■merely by being repeated from one to another; and paf- 
fions founded upon thefe opinions, diffuling themlelves 
with a rapidity which can neither be accounted for nor 
-relifted, may agii.ite a country with the molt violent 
commotions. Now the only way to flop the fermenta¬ 
tion, is to divide the mals; that is, to eretl difi'erent 
orders in the community, with feparate prejudices and 
interefts. And this would nioft naturally anle out of 
an hereditary nobility, invefted with a Ihure ot legilla- 
tion. 'Averle to thofe prejudices which adfiiate the 
minds of tlie vulgar; accultomed to condemn the cla¬ 
mour of the populace; difdaining to receive laws and 
opinions from tlieir inferiors in rank, they will oppofe 
refolutions which are founded in the lolly and violence 
of the lower part of the community. 
The admillion of a fmall number of ecclefiaftics into 
the houfe of lords, is but an equitable compenfation to 
the clergy for tlie exclulion of their order from the 
houfe of commons. They are a fet of men eonliderablc 
by 
