COVER 
by tlieir number and property, as well as by their in¬ 
fluence, and the duties of their ftation; yet, whilrt; 
every other profeflion has thofe amonglt the national 
reprefentatives, who, being converfant in the fame oc- 
. cupation, are able to ftate, and naturally difpofed to 
fupport, the rights and interefls of the clafs and calling 
to which they belongs the clergy alone are deprived of 
this advantage; which hardlhiji is made up to them by 
introducing the prelacy into parliament; and if bilhops, 
from gratitude or exj eftation, be more obfequious to 
the will of the crown than thofe who poflefs great tem¬ 
poral inheritances, they are propeily inlerted into that 
part of the conftitution, from which much or frequent 
refiftance to the meafures of government is not expetSled. 
But, among political writers on the Bririlh conftitu¬ 
tion the grand fubjeit of contention has been,—the in- 
creafing influence of the crown. Yet it remains a 
confideration of the higheft magnitude—-W’hether the in¬ 
fluence fo loudly complained of can be deftroyed, or 
even much diminiflied, without danger to the ftate, 
Whilft the zeal of fome men beholds this influence with 
ajealoufy, which nothing but its entire abolition can 
appeafe, many wife and virtuous politicians deem a con- 
frtleii'ble portion of it to be as neceffary a part of the 
Britilji conftitution, as any other ingredient in the com- 
pofition—to be that, indeed, which gives cohefion and 
folidity to the whole. Were the meafuies of govern¬ 
ment, fay they, oppofed from nothing but principle, 
government ought to have nothing but the rectitude of 
its meafures to lupport them ; but fince oppolition often 
fprings from other motives, government mull poflefs an 
influence to counteradt thefe motives ; to produce, not 
a bias of the paflions, but a neutrality : it muft have 
fome weight to call into the fcale, to fet the balance 
even. It is the nature of power always to prefs upon 
the boundaries which confine it, Licentioufnefs, fabfion, 
envy, impatience of controul, or inferiority; the fecret 
pleafure of mortifying the great, or the hope of dif- 
polfelling them; a conftant willingnefs to queftion and 
thwart whatever is dictated or even propofed by ano¬ 
ther; a difpolition common to all bodies of men to ex 
tend the claims and authority of th^ir orders; above 
all, that love of power, and of Ihewing it, whicli refides 
more or lets in every human breaft, and which, in po¬ 
pular affemblies, is inflamed, like every other paflion, 
by communication and encouragement: thefe motives, 
added to private defigns and refentments, cherifhed alio 
by popular acclama ion, and operating upon the great 
fliare of power alieady pofl'efl’ed by the houle of com¬ 
mons, might induce a majority, or at leaft a large party 
of men in that atfembly, to unite in endeavouring to 
draw to themfelves the whole government of the ftate ; 
or at leaft fo to obftruiSl the conduft of public affairs, 
by a perverle oppolition', merely for oppolition lake, as 
to render it impollible for the wifeft Itatefman to carry 
forwards the bulinefs of the nation with luccefs or fatil- 
facf ion. 
Si me paflages of our national hiftory will fufficiently 
elucidate this remark. Before the acceftion of James I, 
or, at leaft, during the reigns of liis three immetuate pre- 
deceffors, the government of England was a government 
by force; that is, the king carried his meafures in par¬ 
liament by intimidation. A lenfe of perfonal danger kept 
the members of the houfe of commons in lubjedlion. 
A conjunction of fortunate caufes delivered at laft the 
parliament and nation from flavcry. 1 hat overbearing 
fyftem, which had declined in the hands of James, ex¬ 
pired early in the reign of his Ion. After the reltorarion 
there fucceeded in its place, and fince the revolution 
has been methodically purl tied, the more fuccelsful ex. 
pedient oi influence. Now we lemeniber what palfed be. 
<;tween the luio oi terror, and the eftablilhmenl of niflu- 
ence. 'I he tranladlions of that interval, whatever we 
may think ot their occafion or efteit, no friend of regal 
government would wilh to fee revived. But the atfairs 
VOL. Vlll. No. 5'4i. 
N M E N T. 74f) 
of tills kingdom afford a more recent atteftation to the 
fame doiSliine. In tlie Britifli colonics of North Ame¬ 
rica, tlie late afl'emblies pofTeffed much of ihe power 
and conftitution of our houfe of commons. I'he king 
and government of Great Britaiii held no patronage in 
tJie conniry, wliich could create attachment and influ¬ 
ence fiiflicient to counteradt that rcftlefs arrogating fpi- 
rit, wliich in popular affemblies, wlicn left to itfelf, 
will never brook an authority, that checks and inter¬ 
feres with its own. To this caufe, excited j^erhaps by 
fome unfeafonable provocations, we may attribute, as 
to their true and proper original, the changes that have 
taken place in the Britifli empire. The admonition, 
which fucli examples (uggeft, will have its weight with 
thofe, who are content with the general frame of the 
Englilh conftitution; and who confider liability amongft 
the firft perfedtions of any government. 
We proteft however againft any conftrudlion, by which 
what is here faid fhall be attempted to be applied to 
the juftification of bribery, or of any clandefline reward 
or folicitation whatever. The very fecrecy of fuch ne- 
gociations confefles or begets a confcioufnefs of guilt ; 
wliich when the mind is once taught fo endure without 
luieaftnefs, the charadler is prepared for every compli¬ 
ance : and there is the greater clanger in thefe corrupt 
pradlices, as the extent of their operation is unlimited 
and unknown. Our apology relates folely to that in¬ 
fluence, w'hich relults from the acceptance or expedla- 
tion of public preferments. Nor does the influence, 
which we defend, require any facrifice of perfonal pro¬ 
bity. In polirical, above all other fubjeCts, the argu¬ 
ments, or ratlier the conjedlures, on each fide of the 
queftion, are often fo unequally poifed, that tlie wifeft 
judgments may be held in lufpenfe. As tlie balance 
muft preponderate, the ferious queftion .is, what influ¬ 
ence fhall be aclmitted. If you remove the influence of 
the crown, it is only to make way for influence trom a 
different quarter. If motives of expedlaiion and grati¬ 
tude he withdrawn, other motives will (mceed in their 
place, acling probably in an oppofite direction, but 
equally irrelative and external to the proper merits of 
the queftion There exift, as we have leen, paflions in 
the luimaii heart, which will alw.iys make a ftrong party 
againft the executive power of a mixed government. 
According as the dilpolitio i of parliament is friendly or 
adverfe to the recommendation of the crown in matters 
whicli are really or apparently indifterent, the bulinefs 
of empire will be tranfatled with eale and convenience, 
or embarralfed with endlels contention aiid difficulty. 
Nor is it a conclufion founded in juftice, or warranted 
by experience, tiiat, becaufe men are intiuced by views 
of iiitereft to yield their conleiit to meafures, concerning 
which their judgment decides nothing, they may be • 
brought by tlie fame influence to act indeliberate oppo- - 
fitioii to knowledge and duty. Whoever reviews the 
operations of govenimeiu in this country fince tlie revo- 
liuion, will find few even of the moft queftionable mea- • 
lures of ddmimftiation, about which the beft iiiftrudfed 
judgment might not have doubted at the time ; but of . 
which lie may aflirm witii certainty, that they were ■ 
indiff'erent to the greateft part of thofe wlio coneurred in 
tlicui. From the fuccefs, or the facility, with which 
they wlio dealt out the patronage of the crown carried 
meafures like thefe, ouglit we to conclude, iliat a fiini- ■ 
lar application of honours and emoluments would pro¬ 
cure the confent of parliament to counfels evidently de¬ 
trimental to the common welfare f Is there not, on the 
contrary, more reafon to tear, tliat the prerogative, if 
deprived of influence, would not be lo.'g able to fup¬ 
port itfelf ? F'or wiien we reflect upon the power of the 
houfe of commons to extort a compliance vvitli its refb- 
lutions from the other parts of the Jegiflautre; or to 
put to death the conliitution by a refulal of the annual . 
grants of money to the fupport of the neceffary functions 
of government—when we reflect alfo what motives there.- 
9 E are. 
