&82 G R E 
temper of his troops, whofe ideas of military fubordina- 
tion were confined to the field of battle. 
Meanwhile Nicias folTcited and obtained freth rein¬ 
forcements from Athens. In addition to his original 
force, he had colletted a body of fix hundred cavalry, 
and the fum of four hundred talents; and, in tlie eigli- 
teenth fummer of the war, which was in tlie year before 
Chrifl 414, the atlivity of the troops and workmen had 
completed all necelfary preparations for renewing the 
fiege of Syracufe. The Athenian armament enjoyed a 
profperous voyage to the northern harbour of Trogile, 
and the troops were no fooner difembarked than they 
feized an opportunity of fignalifing their valour againii 
a body of feven hundred men, who marched to reintorce 
the garrilon of Labdalus, a fortrefs fituate on the lugh- 
efl: of the mountains wliich overlook the city. Tliree 
hundred Syracufans were killed in the purluit; the reft 
took refuge behind their walls; and the caftle ot Lab¬ 
dalus was taTen, and ftrongly guarded by the vidlors. 
The plan whicli Nicias adopted for conquering the city, 
was to draw a wall on either fide from the neighbour¬ 
hood of Labdalus, towards the port of Trogile on the 
north, and towards the gulph, called the Great Har¬ 
bour, on the fouth. When thele circumvallations had 
furrounded the place by land, he expedted, by his nu- 
merous fleet, to block up the wide extent of the Syra- 
cufan harbours. The wiiole ftrength of the Athenian 
ai mament was employed in the former operations ; and, 
as all neceflary materials had been provided with due 
attention, the works rofe with a rapidity which fur- 
priled and terrified the befieged. Their former as well 
as tlieir recent defeat deterred them from oppofing 
the enemy in a general engagement; but the advice of 
Hermocrates perluaded them to raife walls which 
might traverfe and interrupt thofe of the Athenians. 
The imminent danger urged the activity of the work¬ 
men; the hoftile bulwarks approached each other; fre¬ 
quent fkirmi/hes took place, in one of which the brave 
Lamachus unfortunately fell a victim to his rafh va¬ 
lour ; but the Athenian troops maintained their ufual 
fuperiority, and the Syracufans prepared to capitulate. 
But, while the aflembly were deliberating on the 
terms, Gongylus arrived from Carthage, announcing 
a fpeedy and eft'eCtual relief to the belieged city. He 
acquainted the Syracufans that his countrymen had 
fitted out a conliderable fleet, the arrival of which 
might be expected every hour. The Lacedaemonians 
alloliad fent a finall Iquadron, and the tvhole armament 
was conducted by the Spartan Gylippus, an officer of 
tried valour and ability. While the defponding citi¬ 
zens of Syracufe liftened to this intelligence with plea- 
ling aftonifliiuent, a incflenger arrived by land from Gy- 
lijjpus Itimlelf, That experienced commander, inftead 
of purfuing a direCt courle to Sicily, w hich might have 
been intercepted by the Athenian fleet, had landed on 
the weftern coaft of the ifland. 1 he name of a Spartan 
general determined the wavering irrefolution of tlie Si¬ 
cilians. 'I'lie troops of Himera, Selinus, and Gela, 
flocked to his ftandard; and he approached Syracufe 
on the fide of Epipole, where the line of contravalla. 
tion was ftil! unrinifhed, with a body of feverai thou- 
fand men. The moll courageous of the citizens I'aliied 
forth to meet their protector; their Junction was ef¬ 
fected; tlie ardour of the troops was kindled into en- 
Ihiifiafm.; tliey furprifed fcveral Athenian pofts; and 
after a vigorous lally, deprived the enemy ot the (trong 
caftle of Labdalus. Nicias, perceiving tliat the in- 
terelt of the Athenians in Sicily would be continually 
weakened by delay, wifhed to bring the fortune of the 
War to the decilion of a battle. Nor did Gylippus de¬ 
cline the engagement. The firft action was untavoura- 
ble to the Syracufans, who had been imprudently poll¬ 
ed in the defiles between their own and the enemy’s 
walls, which rendered of no avail their fuperiority in 
cavalry and archers. Tlie magnanimity of Gylippus 
E C E, 
acknowledged this error, for which he completely 
atoned by his judicious condu6l in the I'ucceedmg en¬ 
gagement. His forces were drawn up in a more fpa- 
cious ground. The pikemen received the fliock of the 
enemy’s front. The horfes and liglit-armed troops af- 
failed and harafled their undefended flanks. The Athe¬ 
nians were throwti into diforder, repulfed and purfued 
to their camp with confiderable lofs, and with irrepara¬ 
ble (lifgrace. 
Nicias, whofe fenfibility deeply felt the public dif- 
trefs, wrote a moft defponding letter to the Athenians. 
He honeftly deferibed, and lamented, the misfortunes 
and diforders of his army. Tlie flaves deferted in great 
numbers; the mercenary troops, who fought only for 
pay and fubfiftence, preferred tlie more fecure and lu¬ 
crative fervice of Syracufe ; even the Athenian citizens, 
difgufted witli the unexpedted length and intolerable 
hardiliips of the war, abandoned the care of the gallics 
to unexperienced hands. He therefore exhorted the af. 
feinbly, either to call them home without delay, or to 
fend immediately a fecond armament, more powerful 
than tlie firft. 
Gylippus and Hermocrates were well acquainted with 
the diftrefs of the befiegers, and therefore determined 
to prefs the enemy on every fide, and at once to afl'ail 
thein,by lea and land. The principal Iquadrons of Sy¬ 
racufe lay in the harbour of Ortygia, feparated, by an 
ifland of the fame name, from the ftarionof tlie Athenian 
fleet. While Hermocrates fiiiled forth with eigJity gal- 
lies, to venture a naval engagement, Gylippus attacked 
the hoftile fortifications at Plemmyriurii, a promontory 
oppolite to Ortygia, which confined tlie entrance of the 
Great Harbour. The defeat of the Syrac-ufans at fea, 
whereby tliey loft fourteen velTels, was balanced by 
their vidtory at land, in which they took three fortref- 
fes, containing a large quantity of military and naval 
ftores, and a confid.erable fum of money. In fome fub- 
fequent adtions, which fcarcely deferve the name of 
battles, their fleet was ftill iinfuccefsful ; but as they 
engaged with great caution, and found every where a 
fecure retreat on a friendly fliore, their lofs was ex¬ 
tremely inconliderable. The want of fuccefs, in their 
firft attempt, did not abate tlieir refolution to gain the 
command at fea. The hopes of defending their coun¬ 
try Iharpened their invention, and animated tlieir adti- 
vity. By unexampled alfiduity, therefore, the Syracu¬ 
fans at length prevailed in a naval engagement, whicli 
was fought in the Great Harbour. Seven Athenian 
fliips were lunk, many more were difabled, and Nicias 
faved the remains of his Ihattered armament by retiring 
behind a line of merchantmen and tranfports, from the 
mafts of which had been fufpended huge mafl'es of lead, 
fufficient to crufli, by their falling weight, the ftouteft 
gallies of antiquity. This unexpected obftacle arrefted 
the progrefs of the vidtors; but the advantages already 
obtained eieyated them with the liigheft hopes, and re¬ 
duced the enemy to defpair. 
But the Athenians fiiltained misfortunes at home ftill 
more dreadful. Alcibiades, now an exile, took a de¬ 
cided part agaiiift his native city. He fuggefted to the 
Spartan king, that the town of Decelia was litiiated on 
tlieAttic frontier, at an equal diftance of fifteen miles from 
Thebes and Athens. This place, whicli commanded an 
extentive and lertile plain, might be furprifed and for¬ 
tified by tlie Opartans, who, inftead of haralling their 
foes by annual excurfioiis, might tliiis iiifelt them by a 
coiitimial war, Tliis advice was adopted in the com¬ 
mencement of the year 413 before Chrill, and the war¬ 
like Agis led a powerful army into Attica. The de- 
fenceiefs inhabitants fled before his arms ; but infteiid 
of purfuing them into the heart of tjie country, he ftop- 
peil Ihort at Decelia. As all neceflary materials had 
been provided in^great abundance, the place was forti¬ 
fied as loon as it was taken ; and now the walls of Dece¬ 
lia, which might be diftiuClly feen acrofs the intermediate 
plain, 
