^6 GREECE. 
ong time endused the! public depredation; but eVen potent. By the affiftance of P’erdanmoney he equipped 
their fervility could not brook tlie private rapacity of ,a fleet of eighty fail, from tlie mercenary fea-ports of 
the fiiilors and troops. Tliey attacked the Grecian Greece and Afia, from the intermediate ifles, and event 
camp in the night, and furprifed the tent of Thraly- front tlie coafls of Italy and Sicily. This armament 
bulus, who thus fell a facrifice to a very unj.uftifiable was independent of the fquadrons with which Teribazus 
paflion, which greatly debafed the dignity of his other- prepared to attack the i(le of Cyprus, if the prefump- 
wife illuflrious character. This uniuif treatment of tion of Evasoras, unaflifted and alone, fliould ftill dare 
Afpendus would never perliaps have reached the ears 
of Artaxer.xes, had it not been cpmmunicated through 
the vigilance of Antalcidas, who let flip no opportunity 
to roufe the jealouly of the great king againfl: the Athe¬ 
nians. The fevere exaftions from Pamphylia, a pro¬ 
vince which acknowledged his authority, afforded a 
powerful argument with the Perfian monarch to concur 
with the wilhes of the Spartans, at the very moment 
when his flucluating irrefolution was completely de¬ 
cided by the Athenians themielves, whofe imprudence 
at once crowned the triumph of Antalcidas. 
The fignal victories of Conon asid Thr.afybulus, and 
the rifiiig fortune of Athens, encouraged Evagoras king 
ot Salaniis to execute his long-meditated defign of re¬ 
volting from Perfia. Egypt was actually in rebellion ; 
Artaxerxes liad undertaken a war againfl: the Cardu- 
chians, who were by no means a contemptible enemy. 
Thele were favourable circumflauces to Evagoras ; al¬ 
though the Perliau fleet, which, after performing the 
fervice for which it had been equipped, had continued 
to lie inadtive in the Phoenician and Silician harbours, 
was ready to be employed in any nev/ enterprife. The 
fltilful and experienced bravery of the king of Salamis, 
feconded by the youthful ardour of his Ton Protagoras, 
obtained an eafy victory over the firfl Iquadrons that 
were fent to invade his illand. But there was reafon to 
dread the arrival of a far fuperior force. In this dan¬ 
ger, Evagoras requefled, and obtained, the afliflance of 
ihe Athenians. This extraordinary meafure of a peo¬ 
ple, in preferring their gratitude to their interefl ; a 
gratitude which they might have forefeen to be ufelefs 
to him they meant to oblige, and pernicious to the mofl 
important intereflsof their republic ; finally determined 
Artaxerxes to efpoufe the caufe of the Spartans ; and 
to didfate tlie terms of a general peace, as propofed by 
Antalcidas : “That the Greek cities in Afia, with the 
illand of Cyprus, and the peninfula of Clazomene, 
fiiould be fubjedt to Perfia ; Athens Ihould be allowed 
to retain iier immemorial jurifdidtion in the illes of 
Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros-; but all the other repub¬ 
lics, liiiali and great, fliould e.njoy the independent go¬ 
vernment of tlieir own hereditary laws. Whatever peo¬ 
ple rejected thele conditions, fo evidently calculated for 
prefeiving tiie public tranquillity, nuifl expect the ut- 
luofl indignation of the great king, who, in conjunction 
with tlie republic of Sparta, would make war on their 
perverfe and dangerous obflinacy, by fea and land.” 
Teribazus and Antalcidas returned from the eafl, charg¬ 
ed with thele definitive rel'olutions of Artaxerxes, which 
■were confirmed by tlie unalterable fandtion of the royal 
fignet, in the year before Chrift 387. 
Tiiere was reafon to apprehend that Thebes, Athens, 
and Argos, would rejvd't tlie terms of a peace fo perni¬ 
cious to tlieir particular and immediate interefls, and 
equally dilhoiiourable to the whole Grecian name. 
The remembrance of the glorious confederacy for de¬ 
fending the Aliatic colonies againlf the oppreliion of 
barbarians, could not, indeed, much influence the de¬ 
generate councils of thole republics ; but the Thebans 
mult relign, with reludfance, their real or pretended au¬ 
thority over the cities of Boeotia ; the Argives mull 
unwillingly withdraw' their garrifoii from Corinth, and 
leave that important capital in the power of the Lace- 
diEinonian fadtion ; and the Athenians mull abandon, 
with regret, the fruits of their recent vidtories, and the 
hopes of recovering their ancient grandeur. The' op- 
polition of thefe ftates had been foreleen by Antalcidas, 
tvho took the nioft effedliral meafures to render it un¬ 
to provoke his hoflility. The fatrap allb had colledled 
a very confiderable army, which was ready to co-ooe. 
rafe -w-ith Agcfilaus, and to march, at the firfl fummo’ns, 
againfl any city.or republic that might rejedt the peace 
ot Antalcidas. Tliefe vigorous preparations, intimi¬ 
dating the weaknefs of the confederates, comjielled 
them into a rehuTant compliance w'ith the terms of tlie 
treaty. The Thebans made the ftrongefl and mofl ob- 
flinate relillance ; but their pretenlioiis were finally 
filenced by the threats of the Spartan king, the invete¬ 
rate enemy of theinrepublic. The Boeotian cities were 
acknowledged to be independent, and admitted as par-- 
tics in the peace. The Argives retired from Corinth, 
wliich, being defertedby the leaders of tlie democravical 
fadtion, became the ally of Sparta. T'he military and 
naval operations ccarecl, tranquillity was rcllored, and 
the armies and fleets were, oi, both tides, dilbanded and 
dilTolved. 
But amidfl this univeiTal fubmiflion to tlie court of 
Perlia, tlie article refyedfling Cyprus was nobly rcjedled 
by Evagoras, who afl'erted the independence of his na¬ 
tive illand ; and, with a magnanimity that formed a 
llriking' contrail with the degenerate foftnefs of his 
Grecian allies, let the power of Artaxerxes at defiance. 
Evagoras trufled to the refources of his own vigorous 
mind, to the fuperior Ikill of his feanien, and to the af- 
fiflance of Acoris king of Egypt. But the numerous 
fquadrons of Teribazus prevailed over all his hopes. 
He was difconifited in a naval engagement; his territo¬ 
ries were invaded and ravaged ; he was driven into his 
capital, Salamis ; and even Salamis was threatened with 
a fiege. His refiftance had already exceeded what his 
ftrength warranted, or what his dignity required ; yet 
his enemies were unwilling to drive him to defpair. 
He refigned his numerous and recent conquefls in Cy¬ 
prus, but retained pollelTion of the ancient principality 
of Teucer, which his fortunate arms had recovered 
from an ufurper; and he fubmitted, in the year before 
Chrift 385, to imitate the example of other princes, and 
acknowledge himfelf the tributary of the king of Perfia. 
Nearly all writers, both ancient and modern, have 
concurred in del'cribing the peace of Antalcidas aa 
highly difgraceful and injurious to the interefls of La¬ 
cedaemon. Mr. Mitford, however, in his recent Hif- 
tory of Greece, has controverted this opinion. He 
fays, “that king Agefilaus highly approved the treaty 
of Antalcidas ; and it would be difficult for thofe who 
have declaimed mofl vehemently againfl it, to flicw how 
peace could have been given to Greece in any other 
manner. The abandoning of tlie Afian Greeks to fub- 
jedtion under Perfia, is indeed a fpecious ground of re¬ 
proach, fince it was unqueflionably a furrender of the 
proudell and lairefl claim of glory that Lacedaemon 
perhaps ever acquired. But this I'eems not juflly im¬ 
puted as a peculiar crime or diflionour to Antalcidas ; 
for, by confidering the interelt of Lacedaemon as diflindl 
from the common interefl of Greece, Antalcidas cer¬ 
tainly fervecT his country very ably. Simple and con- 
cife as the terms of the peace are, not only they appear 
diredtly calculated to promote the interefl of Lacedae¬ 
mon, but they anfvvered all tlie principal purpoles of 
the Lacedaemonians completely. To break the grow¬ 
ing power of Thebes by emancipating the Boeotian 
towns, and to divide Corinth from Argos, had been the 
great objeft of the war, and were the immediate effedts 
of the peace ; for the more ready and quiet production 
of which Athens was bribed with the permiliion, con¬ 
trary to the general fpirjt of the treaty, to retain the 
dominioi), 
