530 
Telopea Vol. 6(4): 1996 
to the pheneticists. All that pheneticists ever intended was that systematists should 
pay attention to data and not assume that they know which taxa are phylogenetically 
related to which prior to running the necessary studies. In no way can systematics 
be theory free even in the earliest stages. On this interpretation, phenetics is anything 
but controversial. 
However, several participants at a conference 1 attended on the species concept in 
Cardiff, Wales in the spring of 1995 seemed to be as hostile as ever to theories 
entering into the early stages of classification — theories of any kind. In Great 
Britain, at least, phenetics in the sense of theory-free classifications still has some 
enthusiastic supporters. If these systematists represent a larger group, phenetics is 
far from dead. 1 also feel compelled to note that, after a few initial polite responses 
to the papers being presented, the proceedings became more lively, reminiscent of 
the good old days when the New York code of conduct prevailed. 
Cladistics and cladistics 
To complicate matters further, one branch of cladists has been interpreted as sharing 
the anti-theoretic stance frequently attributed to the pheneticists, a group that is 
commonly termed 'pattern cladists.' Johnson (1989: 95) dismisses transformed 
cladistics as 'meaningless.' Once again, terminology is controversial. Initially cladists 
did not want to be termed 'cladists' (Nelson 1971), and later 'pattern cladists' objected 
to being singled out to be grouped together under a new name. However, several of 
Hennig s most productive and original descendants reject his method of reciprocal 
illumination and argue, as did ideal morphologists and pheneticists before them, 
that systematists must begin with observations and nothing but observations. Any 
intrusion of theoretical speculation, especially speculation about phylogeny or the 
evolutionary process, in the early stages of classification is hopelessly 'unscientific.' 
The abstract of Platnick s (1979: 537) 'Philosophy and the Transformation of Cladistics' 
serves as a good early summary of this view: 
Although Hennig presented cladistic methods by referring to a model of the 
evolutionary process, neither the value nor the success of the methods is limited 
by the value or success of that evolutionary model. Dichotomous cladograms 
can be preferred simply on the basis of their maximal information content, 
without reference to speciation mechanisms. Because only the interrelationships 
of diagnosable taxa (those with unique sets of apomorphic characters) can be 
investigated, questions about wliether speciation can occur without branching, 
or whether species become extinct at branching points, are irrelevant to cladistic 
practice. The distinction between plesiomorphic and apomorphic character states 
depends not on the reconstruction of actual evolutionary history, but on the 
discrimination of more general from less general characters; groups based on 
plesiomorphy are defined by the absence of characters and are therefore artificial. 
Hence, cladistic methods are not the methods of phylogenetics per se, but the 
methods of natural classification in general; phylogenetic conclusions are an 
extrapolation from hypotheses about natural order. 
As Platnick sees it, cladistics does not consist in the methods necessary to produce 
phylogenetic classifications of the sort that Hennig had in mind but are the methods 
o natural classification in general. However, as wrong as Hennig was on so many 
points, Platnick (1979: 538) insists that cladistics has not been transformed because 
Hennig s methods for analyzing data and constructing classifications from them, 
remain essentially unchanged,' and Hennig's methods are the essence of his 
