£8 L O C 
propofition whofe confequent is disjunctive. The minor 
affirms that the confequent (per omnia membra) is falfe, and 
the concluding propofition affirms that the antecedent is falfe ; 
(a remotione confequentis ad negationem antecedents 
valet confequentia.) 
Remark. The ancients confidered the Dilemma of great 
importance, fince it enabled them to perplex their antago- 
nift by producing numerous obftacles to whatever opinion 
he might adopt. But it is a fophiftical artifice, inftead of 
direftly refuting a pofition, merely to expofe its diffi¬ 
culties, which may indeed be done in molt cafes. If we 
mean to affert that all is falfe which is difficult, it is ex¬ 
tremely eafy to overturn every thing. It is certainly 
right in argument to (bow the impoffibility of the con¬ 
trary ; but there is fomething deceptive even in this, when 
we take the inconceivablenefs of the oppofite for its impoffibility. 
The Dilemma therefore requires great caution, although 
it concludes rightly ; for it may be employed not only to 
defend but to controvert true pofitions by oppoficg diffi¬ 
culties to them. 
Formally-expreffed and hidden Ccnclufions. 
80. A formally-expreffcd Rational Conclufion is one 
which contains every requifite, not only as to matter , but 
as to form alfo, correftly and properly expreffed. To this 
is oppofed the hidden conclufion (cryptica), in which ei¬ 
ther one of the premifes is inverted, or one of them omit¬ 
ted ; or laftly where the middle term alone is connected 
with the conclufion. A hidden conclufion of the fecond 
fort, in which one of the premifes is not expreffed, but 
only underftood, is called Enthymema, or Mutilated ; thofe 
of the third fort are termed Contracted. 
III. Conclusions of Judgment. See Plate IV. 
Determinative and RefleClive Judgment. 
81. Judgment is twofold, both determinative and re- 
JleClive. The former proceeds from univerfal to parti¬ 
cular, the latter from particular to univerfal. This has 
only fubjeCtive validity ; for the univerfal, to which it at¬ 
tains through the particular, has only an empirical univer- 
fality, a mere logical Analogon. 
Conclufions of (Ref (Clive) Judgments. 
84. Conclufions of Judgment are certain modes of Con¬ 
cluding from particular conceptions to univerfal. They 
are therefore not Functions of Determinative, but of Re¬ 
flective, Judgment. They do not determine the object, but 
only the manner of reflecting upon it, in order to obtain a 
knowledge of it. 
Principle of thefe Conclufions. 
83. The Principle which confiitutes the ground of Con¬ 
clufions of Judgment is the following: 'That many things 
cannot agree-in one Jir.gle point vAtbout a common principle-, 
and that vohatfoever applies, to many things in this manner , 
mufl do fofrom a common principle. 
Remark. As Conclufions of Judgment reft upon fuch 
a principle; they cannot on that very account be confi¬ 
dered as immediate conclufions. 
Induction and Analogy the two Modes of Conclufions 
of Judgment. 
84. Judgment, whilft it proceeds from particular to 
■univerfal, in order to derive univerfal Judgments from 
experience, that is to fay, not d priori, but empirically, 
concludes either from many things to all of one fort, or 
from many determinations and properties, in which things 
of one fort agree, to the reft of their determinations and 
properties, fo far as they belong to tire fame principle. The 
fir ft mode of concluding is called Induction ; the other Analogy. 
Remark (1.) Induction concludes therefore from the 
particular to the univerfal, according to a univerfally- 
conftitutive principle; namely, IVhat applies to many things 
of one Genus applies alfo to the reft. Analogy concludes from 
the particular fimilarity of fome properties of two things 
I c. 
to their total agreement according to the principle of/pa¬ 
cification. Things of one genus, which agree in many 
properties, agree alfo in the reft. InduBion extends the 
empirical objefts from particular to univerfal, in refpeft 
to many objefts; Analogy, on the contrary, from the given 
properties of one thing to more of the very fame thing. If 
one property is found in many things, it exifis in all of 
the kind (Induction). If snany properties of one thing 
are alfo in another, confequently all the properties of the 
firft will be found in the other (Analogy). Thus for in- 
flance is the proof of Immortality , from the complete deve- 
lopement of the natural prediipofitions of every creature, 
a conclufion according to analogy. In conclufions of 
Analogy, the identity of the principle is not required ; for 
we conclude according to analogy that there may be ra¬ 
tional inhabitants in the Moon, not that they are men ; 
neither can we conclude by analogy beyond the tertium 
comparitionis. 
(2.) Every Conclufion of Reafon muft pofiefs neceffity. 
Induction and Analogy are therefore not Conclufions of 
Realon, but only logical prefumptions, or empirical conclu¬ 
fions. For by indu&ion we obtain general but not uni¬ 
verfal propofitions. 
(3.) The preceding Conclufions of Judgment are both 
ufeful and indifpenfable for the purpoie of extending our 
experimental knowledge. But, as they only produce em¬ 
pirical certainty, we muft ufe them with great caution. 
(4.) It might prevent much confufion if fuitable words 
were adopted in general ufe to denote the three diftinff afts 
of concluding or inferring; for inltance, for Conclufion of 
Underfunding or immediate conclufions, the term illa¬ 
tion, or immediate inference ; for Conclufions of Rea- 
fon, Syllogism, Ratiocination, or Conclusion; for 
Conclufion of Judgment, Induction and Analogy, which 
are particularly happy, and will always imply a Conclufion 
of Judgment or of Experience, where the inference pro¬ 
ceeds either from a few particular experiments to all cafes 
(Induftion) ; or from the particular agreement of two 
things to the determination of all the reft of that fpecies 
(Analogy). As the Science of Mind becomes extended, 
language will naturally improve with it, and more appro¬ 
priate terms will be found to exprefs detenninately, and 
to feparate diftinftly, the various operations of the think¬ 
ing faculties, which are at prefent treated of in a very 
loofe and confuied manner. 
Simple and compound Conclufions. 
85. A Rational Conclufion is termed flmple'when it con- 
fifts only of one. Compound when it confifts of mere 
than one rational conclufion. 
Polyfyllogiflical Ratiocinations. 
86. A compound conclufion, in which the various ra¬ 
tional conclufions are connected together, not by mere 
co-ordination, but by fubordination, i. e. as ground and 
coniequence, are called cbain-fyllogifms. 
Pro-fyllogifms and Epi-fyllogifms. 
87. By chain-fyllogifms we may conclude in two ways: 
either from the ground to the confequence, or from the confe- 
quence to the ground. The former are called Epi-fyllogifms ; 
the latter Pro-fyllogifms. An Epi-fylbgifm is a conclufion 
where one of the premifes is the conclufion in a Pro-fyllo- 
gilin. 
Sorites, or Chain-Syllogifms . 
88. A conclufion refulting from leveral abridged con¬ 
clufions in a feries, is termed a Sorites, or chain-iyllogil'm ; 
and may be either Progrefive or RegreJfve, according as 
we afcend from the approximate to the remote mark, or 
converfely defcend. 
Categorical and Hypothetical Sorites. 
89. Progrefive as well as Rigreflive chain-fyllogifms 
may be either Categorical or Hypothetical. The former"con- 
s Hit 
