22 L O G I C. 
jeCt is thought as contained within the fphere of the.pre¬ 
dicate; in negative, it is placed out of the fphere of the 
predicate; and in infinite, the fubjeCt lies fomewhere out 
of the fphere of the predicate, in an infinite fphere. Thefe 
Judgments either add or exclude qualities or properties to 
or from a thing, and improve our Knowledge; for by af¬ 
firming I increafemy knowledge, by negating I purify it. 
They may alfo be either univerfal, particular, or Angular. 
Relation of Judgments ; Categorical, Hypothetical , and Dfi- 
jundive. 
23. According to Relation, Judgments are either cate¬ 
gorical, hypothetical, or disjunctive. Here the given re- 
prefentations are one fubordinated to the other, either as 
Predicate to the SubjeCl, as Confequence to the Ground, or as 
Members of Divifion to the Conception divided. The Catego¬ 
rical adds qualities to an Intuition, the hypothetical adds 
elfeCts, and the disjunctive adds parts to a whole, and may 
be affirmative or negative ; univerfal, particular, or An¬ 
gular. 
Categorical Judgments. 
24. The fubjeCt and predicate in Categorical judgments 
conftitute their matter. And the Relation between the 
fubjeCt and predicate, i. e. their agreement or contradiction, 
conltitutes the form, and is determined by the Copula. 
Remark. Categorical judgments indeed conftitute the 
matter of both hypothetical and disjunctive ; but they 
mult not on that account be confounded with them. Nor 
mud we think, as many logicians have done, that they 
are only different modifications of the Categorical, and 
confequently reducible to it. Thefe three kinds of Judg¬ 
ment depend upon efi'cndally■ different logical functions, and 
mult therefore be treated of leparately. 
Hypothetical Judgments. 
25. The Matter of Hypothetical Judgments confifts of 
two Judgments which are connected to one another as 
ground and confequence. The one of thefe judgments, 
which contains the ground, is the antecedent ; the other, 
which is related to the former, the confquent ; and the re- 
prelentation of this kind of connection of both judg¬ 
ments under one another to a unity of confcioufnefs is 
termed the confequence, which conftitutes the form of an 
hypothetical judgment. 
Remark (1 ) As the Copula, in a Categorical Judgment, 
conltitutes its form, fo does the Confequence in a Hypo¬ 
thetical Judgment. 
(2.) It has been thought eafy to change a Hypothetical 
into a Categorical Pofition ; but this cannot be done, for 
they are in their nature entirely different. In the Catego¬ 
rical there is nothing Problematical, but every thing is 
AJfertorical. Whereas in the Hypothetical the Confequence 
only is Affertorical. In the latter I may therefore conned 
two fa fie judgments with one another; for Logic merely con¬ 
cerns itie!f with the correCtnefs of the connection which 
conftitutes the form, and is the confequence upon which 
the logical (or formal) truth of this judgment depends. 
There is an effential difference in the two pofitions : All 
bodies are divifible, and If all bodies are compofed then they are 
divifible. In the former pofition, I maintain the thing ab- 
folutely-, in the latter, only problematically, under a certain 
condition. 
Manner of Connexion in Hypothetical Judgments; Modus po- 
nens, and Modus tollens. 
26. The form of connection in hypothetical Judgments 
is two-fold. The placing (modus ponens), or the taking 
away (modus tollens.) 
(x.) If the Antecedent be true, then the Confequence is alfo 
true, that is determined by it; and this is called the modus 
ponens. 
(2.) If the Confequence be fafie, then the Antecedent is alfo 
fafie j and this is called the modus tollens . 
Disjunctive Judgments. 
27. A Judgment is Disjunctive, when the parts of the 
fphere of a given conception determine one another, as 
parts of a whole, or are confidered as complements to a 
whole. 
Matter and Form of Disjunctive Judgments. 
28. The feveral given judgments of which the disjunc¬ 
tive judgment is compofed, conftitute its matter, and are 
called members of disjunction or oppofition. The form of thefe 
judgments confifts in the disjunction itfielf-, that is, in the 
determination of the relation of the feveral judgments 
as members of the whole fphere of a divided knowledge, 
mutually exclude each other or complete each other. 
Remark. All disjunCiive judgments therefore reprefent 
various judgments as united in one fphere ; and each judg¬ 
ment is only produced by means of the limitation of the 
others with regard to the entire fphere. They determine 
therefore the relation of each judgment to the whole fphere; 
aijd thereby, at the fame time, the relation which thefe dif- 
jun&ive members have to one another. One member there¬ 
fore determines every other only fo far as they jointly ftand 
in connexion as parts of a whole fphere of knowledge, out 
of which , in a certain reference, nothing can be thought. 
Peculiar Character of DisjunCiive Judgments. 
29. The peculiar character of Disjunctive Judgments, 
whereby they fpecifically differ from all other, and parti¬ 
cularly from Categorical, confifts in this, that the mem¬ 
bers of disjunction are altogether problematical Judgments, 
of which nothing elfe can be thought, but that they, as 
parts of a fphere of knowledge, are each the others com¬ 
plement to a whole; and, taken all together, are equal to 
the fphere of the whole. Hence it follows, that in one 
of thefe problematical judgments the truth muff be con¬ 
tained ; or, which is the fame thing, that one of them mufl 
be affertorical-, becaufe the fphere of the whole knowledge 
under the given conditions, comprehending nothing more 
than thefe members of disjunction, and they being op- 
pofed to one another, one of them only can be True. 
Remark. In a categorical judgment, the thing whofe re- 
prefentation is confidered as a part of the fphere of ano¬ 
ther reprefentation, is thought as being contained under 
this, its fuperior conception ; confequently we here com¬ 
pare, in the fubordination of the fpheres, the part of a part 
with the whole. But in DisjunCiive Judgments we proceed 
from the whole to all the parts together. What is con¬ 
tained under the fphere of a conception, muft be con¬ 
tained under fome one of the parts of this fphere. Agree¬ 
ably to this, the fphere muft be arranged. If I, for in- 
ftance, form the following Disjunctive judgment; A learned 
man is either an Hijlorian or a Philofopher ; I thereby deter¬ 
mine that thefe conceptions complete the fphere of learn¬ 
ed ; but are by no means parts of one another. The com¬ 
panion between Categorical and DisjunCiive judgments, may 
be rendered intuitive, thus, 
In the Categorical Judgment, Kant is Mortal-, let x re¬ 
prefent the intuition Kant ; this is contained under b , 
which reprefents the Conception Man ; and this again is 
contained under a, which reprefents the Conception 
Mortal j 
In 
