L O 
ftraCl j but rather to their life ; and this ufe may have dif¬ 
ferent degrees ; that is, we may treat a conception as hav¬ 
ing more or fewer determinations. By abftraftion we 
afcend towards the conception of the higheft genus-, in the 
concrete we approach the individual. 
2. We cannot decide whether abJlraElion or concretion has 
the preference in point of ufe. For by abftraft concep¬ 
tions we determine many things a little ; by concrete con- 
ceptions'we determine a few things much. Confequentiy, 
what we gain on the one hand we lofe on the other. A 
conception which has a large fphere is fo far ufeful, that 
we can apply it to many things-, but on that very account 
it contains fo much the lefs. The conception Subftance, for 
inftance, does not contain fo much as the conception Chalk. 
3. To hit the proportion between the repreferltation in 
the abftraft and in the concrete in the fame Knowledge, 
confequentiy between the conception and its expofition, 
is to obtain the maximum of Knowledge, both w ith refpefl 
to its fphere and contents. In this point alfo confilts the 
art of Popularity. 
Seftion II. Of Judgments. 
Definition of Judgment in general. 
17. Judgment confilts of three parts ; SubjcFl, Predicate , 
end Copula. Firft, the Subjedl is the thing fpoken of; fe- 
condly, the Predicate is fomething affirmed or denied of 
the fubjeft ; and thirdly, the Copula is the verb or word 
which joins the fubjedt and predicate together. To judge 
is to comprehend a variety under a unity, or an intuition un¬ 
der a conception, e. g. Man is an Animal. Here the in¬ 
tuition Man is comprehended under the conception Animal. 
Judgments of un'derftanding are immediately clear in our 
confcioufnefs, e. g. the gra/s is green. 
Remark. As it is not the bufinefs of Logic to enquire 
into ike origin of cur conceptions, but merely to inveftigate 
the relations they ftand in one to another, it is evident 
that this fcience is nothing but Dogmatical Philofophy, 
which every where terminates in unintelligibility ; for the 
very eflence of Dogmatifm is, that it does not fearch to the 
bottom for Truth ; but is content toaffume things, and 
confider them True. A thing may, for inftance, be logi¬ 
cally poffible, but really impoftible : thus, a fpace enclofed 
by two lines may be thought, though we know that two 
lines cannot enclofe a fpace. Hence Logic has performed 
its duty when it has fhown what relations our reprefen- 
G I C. 21 
tations ftand in to one another, or that there is no contra¬ 
diction in our thoughts ; and this may be termed Criticifing 
the Form of Knowledge. But a much more important 
Duty remains to be performed, and that is to Criticife the 
Matter of Knowledge. This mull be performed by 
Transcendental Philosophy, the only fcience that is 
fully competent to fhow whether our Knowledge in point 
of Matter be intelligible, and whether it be found and 
good Knowledge ; or unintelligible, and mere fpeculation. 
—See Critical Philofophy , under Kant, vol. xi. and the ar¬ 
ticle Metaphysics. 
Matter and Form of Judgments. 
18. Matter and Form are the effential conftituents of 
every Judgment. The matter confilts of the given repre- 
Jentations, connected in the Judgment; the form in the 
determination of the mode how the various reprefenta- 
tions are connected. 
Remark (1.) As the whole real and cogitable world 
confilts only of three Things; namely, Intuition, Con¬ 
ception, and Idea; it is evident that all our Thoughts, 
Knowledge, and Judgments, can arife from nothing elfe but 
the combination of thefe three elements. In order therefore 
to obtain real Knowledge, it is abfolutely neceffary to have 
an intuition united to a conception ; that is to fay, that the 
Subject in the Judgment fhould be an Intuition, and the 
Predicate a Conception ; e. g. This tree (at which I am now 
looking, fee Def. 5.) is an oak. 
(2.) If a Judgment is to terminate in mere thought, it is 
only neceffary to have one conception united to another. This 
is mere fpeculation, and never amounts to Knowledge. 
(3.) If one Idea is joined to another in a Judgment, it 
is evident that the refult can only be an Idea. But, as 
an Idea (fee Def. 23) has nothing to do with Time and 
Space, it is evidently out of the limits of experience and 
or all Knowdedge ; confequentiy, fuch a Judgment can be 
only mere Speculation. 
ObjeEl of logical RefleElion ; i. e, the mere Form of Judgment. 
19. As Logic abftrafts from all real or objective Know¬ 
ledge ; it can neither concern itfelf with the matter of a 
Judgment, nor with the contents of a conception. It has 
therefore folely to fhow the difference of Judgments with 
refpedt to their mere form. Which may be thus exhibited 
at one view. 
JUDGMENTS of UNDERSTANDING. 
Quantity. 
Singular, 
Particular, 
Univerfal. 
Quality. 
Affirmative, 
Negative, 
Infinite. 
Relation. 
Categorical, 
Hypothetical, 
Disjunctive. 
Modality. 
Problematical, 
Alfertorical, 
Apodiftical. 
I muft now prove the completenefs of this Claffification ; 
that is, fhow that it is neither redundant nor deficient. Firft, 
if we judge of any thing, we muft either affirm or deny, or 
deny infinitely ; and no other cafe is poffible. This re¬ 
gards Judgments of Quality. Secondly, we can only af- 
lirsn or deny with refpebt to the-properties of a thing, the 
effedts of a thing,or the partsof a whole; and noother cafe 
is poffible. This refpedts Relation. Thirdly, we muft ei¬ 
ther affirm or^eny fomething of one thing, or of many, 
or of all; and no other cafe is poffible. This regards 
Quantity. Fourthly, with refpedt to Modality ; the thing 
judged of muft be either poffible, adtual, or neceffary ; 
and here alfo no other cafe is poffible. Hence it may be 
inferred that this claffification is quite complete; for it is 
out of the power of any one to add another clafs ; and if 
one be taken away the whole is deftroyed. 
Every Judgment mufi ftand under the four clajjes of Quantity, 
Quality, Relation } and Modality, at the fame_ time, 
zo. This may be elucidated in the following judg¬ 
ment, The Bird ftngs ; this is a fmgular, affirmative, hy- 
Vol. XIII. No. 88*. 
pothetical, judgment, with apodidtical certainty. Firft it 
is confidered under Quantity, as fingular; This bird fings. 
Secondly under Quality, as affirmative; for we affirm of 
the Bird that it ftngs. Thirdly, under Relation, as hy¬ 
pothetical; for Singing is an effeFt produced by the bird. 
And, laftly, it is conlidered under Modality, as apodidftical, 
or as a judgment of the greatelt degree of certainty; for 
I have the teftimony of my fenfes that the bird actually 
fings- 
Quantity of Judgments ; Univerfal, Particular, and Singular. 
21. Judgments are, with refpedt to Quantity, either Uni¬ 
verfal, Particular, or Singular. The Univerfal unite a 
whole fpecies to a conception ; for inftance, All animals 
have life. The Particular add a part or many ; for inftance. 
Some men are learned. The Singular add one individual 
thing ; as, Nevjton is the inventor of ftuxions. 
Quality of Judgments ; Affirmative, Negative, and Infinite. 
22. Judgments according to Quality are affirmative, 
negative, or infinite. In affirmative Judgments the fub- 
G jedt 
