*0 '* L O ( 
der fcarlet cloth I only think the red colour, I then ab- 
ftraft from the cloth ; but, if I abftraft from the red co¬ 
lour, and think fcarlet as lbme material thing in general, 
my conception is by this means become more abflraEl. 
The conception body is properly no abftraft conception ; 
for, from body I cannot ab ft raft any thing, or I Ihould 
have no conception of it whatever; but I can abfcraft 
from the fize, the hardnefs, the colour, the fluidity, &c. 
The tnoft abftraft conception is that which has nothing 
in common with others, and this is the conception of 
Something ; for that which differs from it, is Nothing, and 
has coniequently nothing in common with it. 
(3.) Abftraftion is only the negative condition under 
which the univerfal validity of reprefentations can be pro¬ 
duced. The pojitive are comparifon-and refleftion. For 
by abftraftion we do not obtain conceptions ; it only per¬ 
fects them, and confines them within determinate bounds. 
Contents and Sphere of Conceptions. 
7. Every Conception, confidered as a partial Concep¬ 
tion, is contained in the reprefentation of the thing; but 
when confidered as a ground of Knowledge, i. e. as a 
mark, the thing is contained under it. In the former re- 
fpeft every conception has Contents ; in the latter, a Sphere. 
The Contents and Sphere of a conception are in an in- 
verfe ratio to each other. The more a conception con¬ 
tains tinder it, the lefs it has in it; or the more the Con¬ 
tents the fmaller the Sphere, and converfely. 
Remark. The univerfality or validity of a conception 
does not depend upon its heing a partial conception, but 
on its being a Ground of Knowledge. 
Extent of the Sphere of Conceptions. 
8 . The more things (land under a conception, and are 
thought by it, the greater is its fphere. 
Remark. Thus, as we fay of a Ground in general, 
that it contains the confequer.ce under it; ft^we may fay of 
a conception, as a ground of Knowledge, that it contains all 
thole things under it from which it was abftrafted: for 
example, the conception metal contains under it gold, fil- 
ver, copper, &c. For as every conception, as a univer¬ 
sally-valid' reprefentation, contains that which is common 
to feveral reprefentations of different things ; thus all 
thofe things which in this refpeft are contained under it 
are reprefentable by it. Indeed this conftitutes the utility 
of a conception; for, the more things are reprefented by 
a conception, the larger is its fphere. For inftance, the 
conception body has a larger fphere than the conception 
metal. 
Superior and inferior Conceptions. 
9. Conceptions are called fuperior when they have other 
conceptions under them, which in relpeft to the former 
are called inferior. A mark of a mark, or a remote mark, 
is a fuperior conception. The conception in reference to 
a remote mark is an inferior conception. 
Remark. As conceptions are called Superior and Infe¬ 
rior only relatively, it follows that the fame conception, 
in a different relation, may be at the fame time Superior 
and Inferior; for example, the conception Man in rela¬ 
tion to the conception Negro, is fuperior, but in relation 
to the conception Animal, inferior. 
Genus and Species. 
jo. The fuperior conception, with refpeft to its infe¬ 
rior, is termed Genus ; tire inferior conception, with refpeft 
£0 itrifuperior. Species,. In the fame manner as fuperior 
and inferior conceptions differ, fo do confequently Genus 
£nd Species; not in their nature, but only .with refpeft to 
aheir relation to one another in the logical fubordination. 
Highejl Genus and loweft Species, 
11. The highejl genus is that which cannot be a fpecies, 
The lo-weft fpecies is that which cannot be a genus. But, 
I c. 
according to the law of continuity, there can never be £ 
loweft fpecies, nor a loweft but one. 
Remark. If we form a feries of fubordinate concep¬ 
tions, we muft at laft arrive at a Genus which is no lon¬ 
ger a Species. For inftance, Man, Animal, Creature, Ob- 
jeft ; which laft is the higheft poffible genus, for it in¬ 
cludes even the Idea of God himfelf, who is fometimes 
the objeft of our thoughts, and from this no further ab¬ 
ftraftion can be made, without all conception vanithing. 
But in this feries no loweft conception, or fpecies, is to be 
found, becaufe fuch a one can never be determined. We 
may however admit of a comparatively-lowed conception 
by common confent, which implies that we have agreed 
not to iaveftigate deeper. Hence the following rule: 
There is a genus that can never become a fpccics, but no fpecies 
that cannot be again confidered as a genus. 
Wider and narrower Conceptions.—Rtciprccal Conceptions. 
12. The fuperior conception is alfo termed a wider con¬ 
ception, the inferior a narrozuer. Conceptions having the 
fame fphere are termed reciprocal conceptions. 
Relation of inferior to fuperior, and of wider to narrower. 
13. The inferior conception is not contained in the fu¬ 
perior, for it contains more than the fuperior. But it is 
contained under it ; becaufe the fuperior contains the 
ground ot knowledge of the inferior. Farther; one con¬ 
ception is not wider than another on account of its con¬ 
taining mors under it, for this we cannot determine, but 
becaufe it contains under it the other conception, and, be- 
fides this, Jlill more. 9 
■Univerfal Rules for the Subordination of Conceptions. 
14. With refpeft to the logical fphere of conceptions, 
we have the following Rules. 
(1.) Whatever applies to or contradifts the fuperior 
conceptions, alfo applies to or contradifts all the inferior 
conceptions contained under them. 
(2.) And converfely, whatever applies to or contradifts 
the inferior conceptions, alfo applies to or contradifts their 
fuperior conceptions. 
Remark. Becaufe that wherein things agree flows from 
their univerfal properties ; and that wherein they differ 
from their particular properties. Thus we can never con¬ 
clude that, what applies to or contradifts an inferior con¬ 
ception, alfo applies to or contradifts other inferior con¬ 
ceptions, which belong, together with it, to a higher con¬ 
ception. For inftance, we cannot fay, that what does not 
apply to men does not therefore apply to angels. 
Of the arifing of Superior and Inferior Conceptions.—Logical 
AbftraEtion and Logical Determination. 
15. By continuing logical abftraftion, higher and higher 
conceptions arife. By continuing logical determination, 
lower and lower conceptions arife. The greateft poftible 
abftraftion produces the higheft or molt abltraft concep¬ 
tion, from which no farther abftraftion can be made. 
The molt perfett determination would be a thoroughly-de¬ 
termined conception ; that is, fuch a one to which no addi¬ 
tional determinations can be thought. 
Remark. As only Angle or individual things are tho¬ 
roughly determined, confequently thoroughly determined 
Knowledge can only be thought qs Intuition, and not as Con¬ 
ception : for logical determination can never be completed 
in conceptions. (See Remark to 11.) 
life of Conceptions in the a/fira El and in the concrete. 
16. Every conception can be uied in the univerfal and 
in the particular-, (in abjlrato et in concreto.) In the ab- 
ftraft,* the inferior conception is tiled with refpeft: to its 
fuperior; in the concrete, the higher with refpeft to its 
inferior. 
Remark (1,) The terms abfiracl and concrete do not relate 
to .conceptions in themfelves; for every conception is ab« 
ftraftjj 
