L O G I C. 
PART I. 
ELEMENTS of PURE UNIVERSAL LOGIC. 
Se6Iion I. Of Conceptions. 
Of Conception in general, and the difference between Concep¬ 
tion and Intuition. 
1. All Knowledge, that is, all reprefentations referred 
with confcioufnefs to an object, are either Intuitions or 
Conceptions. An Intuition is an individual reprefentation 
(reprtefentatio fingularis). A Conception is a univerfal 
(reprasfentatio per notas communes) or a reflcCtive repre¬ 
sentation (reprasfentatio difcurfiva). Knowledge confid¬ 
ing of Conceptions only, (without Intuitions,) is called 
Discursive or Historical Knowledge ; for here we 
do not immediately refer our representations to the ob¬ 
ject's which produced them, but are content to take them 
upon the teftimony of others. 
Remark (i.) All union of Conceptions, without Intuitions, 
produces merely Thought ; but never Knowledge, which 
abfolutely requires the Intuition. 
Remark (2.) Conception is oppofed to Intuition-, for it is 
a univerfal reprefentation which is common to many ob¬ 
jects. Intuition, on the other hand, is the immediate im- 
preffion of a Angle thing. We can have no Intuition 
without Senfation, and no Senfation without the exiftence 
of fome external body touching our fenfes. Intuitions, 
therefore, imply the exiftence of the external world. 
(3.) It is mere tautology to talk of univerfal or com¬ 
mon Conceptions. This fault arifes from the improper 
divifion of Conceptions into univerfal, particular, and 
fmgular. The Conceptions themfelves cannot be thus 
divided ; this divilion regards only their ufe or appli¬ 
cation. 
Matter and Form of Conceptions. 
2. In every Conception there is to be diftinguifhed mat¬ 
ter and form. The matter of the Conception is its objeCt , 
the form is its univerfality. 
Empirical and Pure Conceptions. 
3. A Conception is either pure or empirical The former 
is that whofe matter Wes originally in the mind ; the latter 
is that whofe matter is derived from experience. 
An Idea is a Conception of Reafon, whofe objed 
never can be found in experience. 
Remark (1.) Empirical Conceptions Spring from the 
fenfes by the comparifon of objects of experience, and 
receive from the Underftanding merely the form of uni- 
verfality. The reality of thefe Conceptions refts upon 
aftual experience. Whether there be pure conceptions of 
underfunding .which arife independently of all experience, 
it is the hufmefs of Metaphyfics to inveftigate. 
(2.) Ideas or Conceptions of Reafon can never lead to 
real obje'ts, becaufe all real objects mull be comprifed 
in a prjfble experience. They ferve, however, by means 
of Reafon, to ftimulate the underftanding in experience, 
by fhowing that the objects we have experienced are not 
all that are poffible, and that the principles of poffibility 
do not apply to tlu- things in themfelves, nor to objeCts 
of experience as things in themfelves, but merely as phe¬ 
nomena. 
An Idea contains an Archetype of the ufe of undemand¬ 
ing; for example, the Idea of the Univerfe, which is not 
neceifary as a conflituti-ve principle for the empirical ufe 
of underfeanding, but only as a regulative one, for the 
fake of its concatenation. An Idea is therefore to be 
confidered as a neceifary fundamental Principle of clari¬ 
fication, either that it may be objectively completed, or 
confidered as unlimited. Nor can an Idea be obtained by 
compofition ; for the whole is here confidered before the 
parts. There are, however, Ideas which admit of ap¬ 
proximation. This is the cafe with the Mathematical 
Ideas, which effentially differ from the Dynamical, which 
19 
are heterogeneous ; the former differ only in quantity, but 
the latter in kind. 1 
We can never give objective reality to Theoretical Ideas, 
or prove that they po fiefs it; except indeed to the Idea 
of Liberty, and this only becaufe it is the condition of 
the Moral Law, whole reality is an axiom. The .reality 
o_l the Idea of God can never be dernonitrated in a theore¬ 
tical point of view ; nor can it ever be got rid of in a 
practical one; for it would imply that there could be an 
EffeCl without a Caufe. 
Given (a priori or a poferiori) and produced Conceptions. 
4 - All Conceptions, with refped to their matter, are ei- 
1 ther given (conceptus dati), or produced (cone,plus fac- 
titii). The former are eit tier given a priori or a poferiori. 
All Conceptions given a poferiori, i. e. empirically, are 
Experimental Conceptions-, thole which are given a priori, 
are termed notions. 
Remark'. The form of a Conception, as a difeurfive re- 
prefencation, is always produced. 
Of the Logical Origin of Conceptions. 
5. The origin of Conceptions, as to mere form, refts 
upon refeCiion, and upon abfraCHon from the difference 
oi things, which are denoted by certain reprefentations. 
Hence the Queftion, What acts of Underftanding are re- 
quifite to beget Conceptions from given reprefentations ? 
Remark (1.) As Univerfal Logic abftrads from all mat¬ 
ter of Knowledge and of Thought, it can confider a 
Conception only with re Sped to its form, that is, Subjec¬ 
tively, not how it, as a mark, determines an objed, but 
merely as to its reference to feveral objeds. Univerfal 
Logic does not enquire into the origin of Conceptions ; 
nor how Conceptions arife as Reprefentations ; but merely 
how given Reprefentations become Conceptions in our 
thoughts, whether thefe Conceptions contain fome- 
thing derived from experience, or imagined, or taken 
from the nature of Underftanding. This logical origin 
of Conceptions, an origin as to mere form, confifts in re¬ 
flection , by which a reprefentation common to feveral ob¬ 
jeds is produced. This form is requilite to Judgment. 
Logic, therefore, only confiders the difference of refiedion 
in Conceptions. 
(2.) The origin of Conceptions with refped to their 
Matter, according to which a Conception is either empiri¬ 
cal, arbitrary, or intelkClual, is inveiligated in Meta- 
phyfics. 
Logical ACls of Comparifon, Reflection, and AbftraClion. 
6 . The logical ads of Underftanding which produce 
Conceptions with refped to their Jorm, are, 
(>•) Comparifon, i. e. the comparing reprefentations 
with one another, in reference to a unity of confciouf¬ 
nefs ; i. e. dilcovering the difference of things. 
(2 ) Reflection, i. e. confidering how different reprefen¬ 
tations can be comprifed in one confcioufnefs, i. e. dif- 
covering the agreement of things ; and laftly, 
(3.) AbJlraCtion, i. e. the excluiion of all that in which 
the given reprefentations differ, or leleding all thofe 
marks which are found in each individual. 
Remark ( 1.) In order to beget Conceptms from given 
Reprefentations, we mult be able to compare, to refeCl, and 
to abflraCl ; for thefe three logical operations of Under- 
ftanding are the neceifary and univerfal conditions of Con¬ 
ception in general. For inftance, I fee a fir, a willow, 
and a lime ; firlt I compare thefe objects together, and I 
perceive that they differ from each other with relk^d to 
their trunks, their branches, their leaves, See . r next 
refeCl upon that in which they agree, or which is com¬ 
mon to them, namely, a trunk, branches, and leaves. 
Laftly, I abfraCl from the lize, figure, &c. of their dif¬ 
ferent parts; and in this manner I obtain the Conception 
of a Tree. 
(2.) The more differences of things are omitted in a con¬ 
ception, the more abltrad it becomes for example, if un- 
