14 
L O "G I C. 
former, it is perhaps not our intention to examine ftriftly 
whether it be true or not. 
Preliminary judgments are very necelTary, nay, indeed 
indifpenfible to the ufe of undemanding, in inveftiga- 
tion and meditation ; for they ferve to lead the under- 
ftanding® and to furnifh it with the various means necef- 
fary to its enquiries. 
When we meditate upon an objeft, we mud always form 
a preliminary judgment, and anticipate the Knowledge 
we are to derive from it; and, when we endeavour to in¬ 
vent, or make difcoveries , we nuift always form fome pre¬ 
vious plan to prevent our thoughts from wandering at 
random. Hence, by preliminary judgments may be un- 
derftood maxims to direct our inveftigations. They may 
alfo be termed Anticipations, iir.ce we anticipate our 
judgment of a thing before we arrive at it definitively. 
Such judgments have therefore an excellent ufe ; and rules 
might even be given agreeably to which we ought to judge 
previoufly of objefts. 
Preliminary Judgments are to be diffinguiffied from pre¬ 
judices. Prejudices are preliminary judgments laid down 
as principles. Every prejudice is to be confidered as a 
principle of erroneous judgment. We muft therefore dif- 
tinguiffi the falfe knowledge which fprings from a preju¬ 
dice, from the prejudice itfelf, which is its fource. For 
inftance, the interpretation of dreams is in itfelf no pre¬ 
judice, but an error, which originates in the generally- 
received Rule, that, that which fometimes comes true always 
comes true, which is in itfelf a prejudice. 
Prejudices are fometimes true as preliminary judgments; 
only it is wrong to lay them down as principles, that is, 
as definitive judgments. This miftake is caul'ed by tak¬ 
ing fubjeftive grounds for objective, from a want of that 
reflection which ought always to precede judgment. We 
can admit much Knowledge w ithout inveliigation ; for 
inftance, all immediately-certain pofitions. Here we need 
not examine the conditions of their truth ; yet we can¬ 
not and ought not to judge of any thing without reflec¬ 
tion, that is, without comparing our Knowledge with 
the faculty from whence it fprang, namely, Sense or Un¬ 
derstanding. If then we attempt to form judgments 
without this neceflary reflection, even where no inveftiga- 
tion is required. Prejudices arife, that is, principles of 
judgment from fubjeCtive grounds, which are falfely taken 
as objective ones. 
The chief fources of prejudice are. Imitation, Habit, and 
Inclination. 
Imitation has an univerfal influence upon our judgment; 
for it is a ftrong reafon to hold fomething for true, that 
it has been declared fo by others. Hence the prejudice, 
that what every body fays mujl be true. Thofe prejudices 
which are founded in Habit, require a length of time be¬ 
fore they can be completely eradicated, as the Mind 
meets with many hindrances in weighing oppofite reafons 
before it can relinquish its habit, and adopt an entirely- 
new mode of Thinking. But, if a prejudice of habit is 
alfo founded in imitation, it is then indeed extremely 
difficult to cure. A ’prejudice of imitation may be con¬ 
sidered as a pronenefs to the Mechanifm of Reafon, inftead 
of an aClive exertion of its proper freedom. 
Reafon is an aBiveprinciple, which ought to take nothing 
upon credit, or from the mere authority of others ; and 
indeed, in its pure ufe, not even from experience. But 
the idlenefs of much the greater part of mankind induces 
them rather to tread in the footfteps of others, than exert 
their own underftandings. Were this universally the cafe, 
there would be an end to improvement, and the world 
would ever remain in the fame flate. It is therefore 
highly neceflary and important, not to educate youth, as 
is ulually done, upon the principle of mere imitation. 
There are many things which induce us to adhere to 
the maxim of Imitation, and thereby render Reafon a 
fruitful foil of prejudice. Amongft thefe may be rec¬ 
koned the following : 
i. Formula s Thefe are rules which ferve as patterns 
for imitation. They are alfo exceedingly ufeful as gnSd?sr 
in intricate cafes. The clearett heads have therefore en¬ 
deavoured to difcover them. 
2. Sayings: Which exprefs an important truth, with 
great accuracy ; fo that it feems impoffible to convey it 
in fewer or better words. 
3. Sentences: That is, propofitions which are adopted, 
and frequently laft for centuries ; from the ftrength of 
thought which they contain, the refult of a matured 
judgment. 
4.. Canons. Thefe are general rules which ferve as the 
groundwork of fciences, and denote fomething fublime 
and deeply confidered. They may alfo be expreffed in a 
fententious manner, which renders them much more 
pleafing. 
5. Proverbs. Thefe are popular rules of common fenfe 
to denote popular judgments, which ferve only the vulgar, 
and are not met with among people of refined education. 
From the three preceding general fources of prejudice, 
and chiefly from imitation, arife many particular ones; 
among which we fliall notice the following, 
1. Prejudices of Authority. 
a. Prejudice in favour of Ike Authority of Perfons. In mat¬ 
ters which depend upon experience and teftimony, to reft 
our Knowledge upon the authority of others is by no 
means a prejudice ; for, as we cannot experience every 
thing ourfelves, the authority of other perlons muft be the 
foundation of our Judgment. But, if we make thp au¬ 
thority of others the foundation of our holding for true 
in Rational Knowledge, this is indeed a prejudice, for 
Rational Truth is valid, even though it be anonymous. 
Hence the queltion is not Who has faid it? but What has 
been faid? There is but one Truth ; and, if we take the 
trouble, we fliall difcover it. It is of no importance to „ 
Knowledge to be nobly defeended ; and yet it is extremely 
common to refpedt great authorities, and to concur in 
their judgments without examination. 
b. Prejudice in favour cf the Authority of the Multitude . 
It is the vulgar who are chiefly inclined to this prejudice. 
For, fince they cannot judge of the Merit, Capacity, and 
Knowledge, of a Angle perfon, they rather abide by the 
judgment of the many, on the fuppofition that what every 
body fays muft be true. However, this prejudice influ¬ 
ences them only in matters of experience; for in religious 
affairs, in which they are themfelves interefted, they truft 
to the judgment of the learned. It is befides worthy of 
remark, that the ignorant are prejudiced in favour of 
learning, and the learned in favour of common fenfe. 
When the learned, after having nearly pafled through the 
circle of the fciences, do not find that fatisfaftion which 
fliould reward their labours, they begin at laft tolofe their 
confidence in learning, efpecially with refpeft to thofe 
fpeculations, the conceptions of which cannot be rendered 
fenfible, and whofe foundations are wavering ; as for in- 
liance, in Metaphyfics. However, as they ftill believe 
that the Key to the certainty of the defired Knowledge is 
fomewiiere to be met with, they look for it in Common 
Scnfe, having fo long fought for it in vain in fcientific in- 
veliigation. But this hope is very deceitful; for, when 
the cultivated Power of Reafon can do nothing with re- 
fpedt to a certain Knowledge, the uncultivated will certainly 
not fucceed better. In Metaphyfics, the appeal to the 
decifions of common fenfe is befides wholly inadiniffible, 
becaufe here nothing can be admitted in the concrete. 
But in Morals the cafe is certainly different; here, not 
only all rules may be given in the concrete, but Practical 
Reafon reveals itfelf in general more clearly and correctly 
by means of Common Senfe than by means of Speculative 
Reafon. Therefore Common Senfe, on fubjefts of Mora¬ 
lity and Duty, frequently judges with more correftnefs 
than Speculative Reafon. 
c. Prejudice in favour of the Ancients. We have cer¬ 
tainly great reafon to judge favourably of antiquity; but 
we often carry our admiration of the ancients too far, and 
thus raiie the relative value of their writings to an abfo- 
lute 
