L O ' 
Moral Unbelief is the rejeftion of that which, although 
it never can be known, is ftill morally neceffary to be pre- 
fuppofed, in order that Reafon fliould be confident with it- 
felf. This moral unbelief arifes from a want of moral in¬ 
centives. The ftronger the moral feeling, the more firm 
and lively is the belief in thofe things which we are 
compelled to afl'mne and prefuppofe in a Pradical point of 
view for the fake of the moral intereft. Belief , therefore, af¬ 
fords no conviction like Evidence, which can be commu¬ 
nicated and command univerfal alTent; but, as it refts en¬ 
tirely upon fubjeElive grounds, it is as convincing and fatif- 
fattory to the lubjett as any knowledge could pofhbly be. 
3. To be certain, is to bold famething for true from grounds 
that are both objedively and fubjedivcly fufficient. Certainty 
is either empirical or rational, according as it is grounded 
in Experience or in Reafon. This dittinftion refers to the 
only two fources from whence all our Knowledge fprings, 
namely, Experience and Reafon. 
Rational certainty is divifible into Mathematical and Philo- 
fcphical : the former is intuitive, the latter difcurfwe. Ma¬ 
thematical certainty is all'o termed Evidence, becaufe intuitive 
Knowledge is clearer than difcurfve. Though the Mathe¬ 
matical and Philofophical Knowledge of Reafon are 
equally certain, the kind of certainty in them differs. 
Empirical certainty is original, when it is procured by 
our perfonal experience: it is derived, when it is obtained 
from the experie-nce of others; which latter is ufually 
termed hiforical certainty. 
Rational certainty is diftinguilhed from Empirical by 
the confcionfnefs of the Neceffity that always accompanies 
it. It is confequenily apodidical, while empirical certainty 
is only AJJ'ertorical. We are rationally certain of that, 
which we might have known without any experience. 
Our Knowledge may concern objeds of experience, and 
yet its certainty may be both empirical and rational at 
the fame time; fince an empirically-certain pofition may 
be known alfo by principles a priori. Rational certainty 
cannot be attained in all fubjeds; but, where it can, it 
is to be preferred to empirical certainty. 
All certainty is either immediate or mediate ; that Is, re¬ 
quires proof, or is incapable of proof. Let never fo much 
of our Knowledge be mediately certain, that is, certain be¬ 
caufe it is demonllrated ; there is always at the bottom 
fomething indemonfrable, or immediately certain ; for all 
our knowledge firff fprings from immediately-certain poftions. 
The proofs upon which all immediate certainty of 
Knowledge depends are either diredl or indirect-, which 
latter are alfo called Apogogical. When I prove a Truth 
by its grounds, I give a direct proof of it; but, when I 
conclude the Truth of a pofition from the falfity of its 
oppofite, this is an apogogical proof, which requires that 
the pofitions be Contradictorily or Diametrically oppofed. 
For two merely contrary poiitions may both be falfe. A 
proof which is the ground of Mathematical certainty is 
termed a Demonf ration, and that which is the ground of 
Philofophical certainty an Acroamatical proof. 
From the preceding remark upon the nature and kinds 
of holding for true, we may draw this general conclufion ; 
that all convidion is either Logical or Pradical. When vve 
know that the holding for true is fufficient, and that we 
are ftill free from all fubjedive grounds, then we are con¬ 
vinced Logically, or from objedive grounds ; that is to fay, 
The objed is certain. 
A fufficient holding for true from Subjedive grounds, 
which in a pradical reference is as valid as the objedive, is 
Pradical Convidion, though not Logical. And thus Practi¬ 
cal Conviction, or the Moral Belief of Reafon, is often more 
firm than Knowledge itfelf. For in Knowledge we ftill 
attend to the oppofie reafonings; but in Belief we do not, 
as it does not arife from objective grounds, but entirely 
from the moral intereft of the fubje6t. This Pradical 
Convidion is therefore the true moral belief of Reafon ; and, 
although it never can become Knowledge, it cannot be 
invalidated by any Knowledge whatever. 
Conviftion is oppofed to Perfuafion , which is a holding 
Vol. XIII. No. SS+, 
5 I C. 13 
for true upon infufficient grounds, where we are uncer¬ 
tain whether they are merely Subjedive or both fubjedftive 
and objedrive. 
Perfuafion frequently precedes Conviftion. In much of 
our Knowledge we have only a fort of confcionfnefs, 
which does not enable us to judge whether the grounds 
of our holding for true are objective or fubjeCtive. 
Hence,, to arrive at Conviftion from mere perfuafion, we 
muft fir ft refed to what faculty a certain Knowledge be¬ 
longs, and then invejh'gate whether the grounds are fuffi- 
cient or infufficient. Many perfons are content with Per¬ 
fuafion ; fome arrive at Reflection; but very few proceed 
to Inveltigation. Whoever knows what is requifite to 
certainty, will not eafil/ confound perfuafion with con¬ 
viction; and confeouently will not be eafily perfuaded. 
There is always a ground which determines our afl'ent j 
and this may be both objective and fubjeCtive ; but it is 
feldom analyzed. 
Though all Perfuafion is, as to form, falfe, in as much 
as it gives to an uncertain Knowledge the appearance of 
certainty; yet, as to matter, it may be true. Here iS 
differs from Opinion, which is alto an uncertain Knowledge, 
but is always confidered fueb. 
The ftrength of a belief may be put to the teft by Wager 
or by Oath. The former requires a comparative, the fat¬ 
ter an abfolute, fufficiency of objective grounds. Bur, 
in Rational belief, where there are no objective grounds, 
a fubjeCtive fufficiency of grounds is equally valid. 
We frequently ufe the expreffions to adopt, to fufpend, 
to defer, and to abandon, a Judgment. Thefe expref¬ 
fions feem to imply that there is fomething arbitrary in 
our Judgments. The queftion then is, whether the Will has 
any infucnce upon our Judgments. 
The will has no immediate influence upon our holding 
for true ; this would be highly abfurd. 
Had the will this influence upon our conviction, we 
fhould conftantly form to ourfelves the chimera of a 
happy ftate, and always confider it as true. 
As, however, the will either ltimulates the underftand- 
ing to the inveltigation of truth, or withholds it, vve mult 
admit that it has an influence upon the exercife of under- 
ftanding, and thus mediately upon conviction itfelf, which 
depends upon this exercife. With relpeCl to the referva- 
tion of Judgment, this confifts in the determination not to 
fuffera mere preliminary judgment to become a definitive 
one. A preliminary judgment is one, in which there are 
more grounds for than againlt the truth of a thing, but 
which grounds are not fufficient to an immediate and de¬ 
terminate Judgment. A Preliminary Judgment is there¬ 
fore a Problematical Judgment, with the confcioufnefsr 
of its being merejy problematical. 
The fufpenfion of a Judgment may occur from two mo¬ 
tives ; either for the purpofe of inveftigating the grounds 
for a definitive judgment, or to avoid judging altogether. 
In the former cafe the Sufpenfion is called Critical (fuf- 
penfio jtidicii indagatoria), in the latter Sceptical (fufpenfio 
judicii fceptica). For the fceptic relinquifhes judgment 
altogether ; while the true philofopher merely fufpends 
his judgment, becaufe he has not yet fufficient grounds to 
hold fomething for true. 
To fufpend our judgment upon principle, requires the 
underitanding to be verfed in judging, which is the cafe 
only as we advance in years. Indeed to withhold our af- 
fent is always difficult; fometimes becaufe the underltand- 
ing is eager to judge and enrich itfelf by Knowledge, and 
frequently becaufe we feel an inclination to fome things 
in preference to others. Whoever has been often 
obliged to recall his affent, and has thereby become cau¬ 
tious and prudent, will not be apt to judge too haftily, for 
fear he fliould be compelled again to retradt. This recan¬ 
tation is always mortifying, and renders us millruftful of 
all our Knowledge. 
We may ftill further remark, that to leave a judgment 
in doubt is different from leaving it in fulpenfe. In the 
latter cafe we retain an intereft in the thing; in the 
E former* 
