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the Object is rendered diftinCt; by an Analyfis of marks 
the Conception is rendered diftinCt. In the former we 
proceed from the parts to the whole; in the latter from 
the whole to the parts. It is the bufinefs of the Philo- 
SOPHER to render given Conceptions diftinCt; and of the 
Mathematician to produce diftinCt Conceptions. 
This Analytic procedure, with which alone logic has 
to do, is the firSt and chief requifite for rendering know- 
ledge diftinCt. The more diftinCt our knowledge is, the 
stronger and more efficacious it is. We mult how¬ 
ever be careful in this Analyfis not to proceed fo far as 
at la Pc to make the fubjeCt itfelf vanish. 
With regard to the’objeCfive value of Knowledge in ge¬ 
neral, it may be arranged according to the following fcale. 
The firji degree of Knowledge is — to reprefent fomethingto 
one’s Self even without being confcious that it is a repre- 
fentation ; i. e. to reprefent neceffarily or inftinClively. 
The Second-, To perceive, that is, to reprefent fomething 
to one’s felt’ with confcioufnefs ; (perceptre.) 
The Third-, To know a thing injlipdivcly (nofeere) ; or 
to reprefent it in companion with other things in refpeCt 
to Identity and Diverfty. Animals know objects in this 
way only, but not with confcioufnefs. 
The Fourth ; To know fomething with cmfcioufncfs, (cog- 
nofeere;) this is not pofiefled by the brutes. 
The fifth ; To underltand (inteliigere) ; i. e. to form con¬ 
ceptions,” or to conceive. This is very different from com¬ 
prehending. We may conceive many things that we can¬ 
not comprehend; for instance a perpetual motion, the im- 
pofhbility of which is proved in mechanics. 
The fixtk ; To penetrate or perfpeCt (perfpicere) -, that 
is, to infpeCt fomething by means of Reafon. We fel- 
dom accomplish this thoroughly; and the more perfect 
we render our knowledge as to its matter, the more we di¬ 
minish it in quantity. 
The Seventh-, To comprehend (comprehenderc) ; that is, 
to infpeCt by reafon a priori in a manner fufficient for our 
purpole. All comprehending is merely relative, i. e. fuf¬ 
ficient to a certain purpofe; for we cannot comprehend 
any thing abfolutely. Nothing can be more comprehen¬ 
sible than mathematical demonstrations ; for example, that 
All lines within a circle are proportionals ; and yet nothing 
can he more incomprehensible than that fo Simple a figure 
Should poffefs fuch wonderful properties. The field of 
the intelligible is therefore much greater than that of the 
.compnhevjible. 
J>. Logical Pe fa . ion as to Modality.— Certainty. — Con¬ 
ception of holding for True in general—Modes of. holding for 
True.-—To be of Opinion—to believe—to be certain. — Convic¬ 
tion and Perjuafion.—Rcfervation and Sufpcnjion of Judgment. 
—Preliminary Judgments. — Prejudices, their Jources and 
chief kind's. 
Truth is an objedive Property of Knowledge; the Judg¬ 
ment by which fomething is reprefented as true; that is, 
its relation to an understanding, and confequently to a 
particular fubjeCt, is the fubjeCtively holding for true. 
Holding for true is either certain or uncertain. The cer¬ 
tain holding for true is joined with the confcioufnefs of 
uecefiity ; the uncertain with the confcioufnefs of contin¬ 
gency, or the pofiibility of the contrary. The latter is 
either objectively or Subjectively insufficient, or it is ob¬ 
jectively insufficient but SubjeCtively fufficient. The for¬ 
mer is termed Opinion ; the latter Belief. 
There are three kinds or modes of holding for true : 
To be of Opinion, to believe, and to be certain. The firji is a 
Problematical judgment, the fccond Ajjirtorical, and the third 
■ApodiBical, 
Thus for example, the’taking immortality Cor true is 
merely Problematical, when we are only of opinion that we 
may be immortal.; hut AJfertorical, if we really believe that 
we are fo ; and, lafliy, ApodiBical, when we are certain that 
th re mult be another life after this. 
There is an elYential difference between Opinion, Belief, 
and Certainty ; which we Shall here fully explain. 
J I c. 
To be of Opinion is to hold fomething for true from rea¬ 
sons which are both fubjeCtively and objectively infuffi- 
cient, and may be considered as a preliminary Judgment, 
(Ju’o conditione fnjpenfwa ad interim;) which we cannot well 
difpenfe witn ; We muft firSt be of opinion before we 
adopt and maintain the truth of any thing, always taking 
care not to hold Opinion for any thing more than mere 
opinion. AlmoSlail our knowledge begins with opinion. 
Now where can mere Opinion properly have place? In 
none of thofe fciences which contain Knowledge a priori. 
Therefore neither in the Mathematics, in Metaphyfics, nor in 
Florals-, but merely in empirical Knowledge/in Pkyfics, in 
Pfycology, and the like. For to be of opinion a priori is in 
itfelf an abfurdity. Nothing can be more ridiculous than 
to be merely of opinion in the Mathematics-, here, as well 
as in Metaphyfics and in Morals, we muft actually demon¬ 
strate our Knowledge or confefs our Ignorance. Very 
great injury accrues to the fciences from our merely be”- 
ing of Opinion where we ought to be certain. Matters 
of opinion always allow the pofiibility of the oppofite be¬ 
ing proved ; as for instance, with regard to the ether 
which is fuppoSed to fill celeStial Space, there exift oppofite 
Opinions. This deperfds" upon our faculties being con¬ 
fined within certain limits. 
To Believe, is to hold fomething for true upon grounds 
which are indeed objectively insufficient, but Subjectively 
fufficient. Belief relates to objects that never can be 
known, nay, of which we cannot form an opinion, or even 
pretend that they are probable. But, as belief is a fub- 
jectively-fufficient holding for true, we ought to be certain 
that our mode of conceiving objects of belief involves no 
contradiction, and that in a moral point of view the op¬ 
pofite can never be proved : for example, I may be fully 
■certain that nobody can refute the position There is a 
God ! for from whence Shall he obtain his arguments ? 
Objects of belief are therefore, 
FirSt, Not objeBs of Empirical Knowledge. What is called 
Hifiorical Belief is, ftriC'tly fpeaking, not Belief, fince it may 
become Knowledge by means of the intuition from whence 
it originated. The holding for true upon testimony does 
not differ either in degree or kind from the holding for 
true from our own experience. 
Secondly, Not objeds of Rational Knowledge ; that is. 
Knowledge a priori; neither Theoretical, as Mathematics 
and Metaphyfics; nor Pradical, as Morals. 
Neither Mathematics nor Metaphyfics in the leaft allow 
of uncertainty or belief; for every thing in. them muft be 
absolutely demonstrated, or nothing at all is accomplished. 
In the practical field, or in Morals, belief is equally inap¬ 
plicable, for we muft be perfectly certain whether the ac¬ 
tion we are about to perform is Right or V/rong ; that is, 
conformable to duty or contrary to duty, permitted or not 
permitted. In morals nothing muft be determined upon 
even at the rifque of offending the Moral Law. 
Thirdly, Such objeds only arc matters of Belief with refped t« 
which the holding for true is neceffarily free ; that is, where it 
is absolutely impoffible to eftabliSh the truth from grounds 
taken from the objed, becauSe.it is beyond the reach of our 
faculties ; as God, the Soul, Immortality, See. Yet it is 
equally impoSIible for us to relinquish Such objeCts. We 
are therefore conftrained to believe them entirely from 
Jubjedive grounds. This belief is however not inferior to 
any Knowledge, although it never can become Knowledp-e. 
The certainty that is obtained from Knowledge implies 
only that our fenfes have been impreifed by given matter, 
and that the Understanding has been aCtive in giving it a 
form-, and thus an external fact has occurred in our con¬ 
fcioufnefs; whereas, in the confcioufnefs of the certainty 
that ariSes from belief, we difeern that our Reafon has been 
engaged in forming deductions, which, if logically cor¬ 
rect, produce as much conviBicn in our minds as the telii- 
mony of the Senfes. Thus for example, who dares to 
doubt of the validity of the Moral Law, or disregard 
the dictates of conscience, and Still call himfelf a rational 
being? 
Moved 
