10 
LOG! C. 
requires therefore a higher degree of attention, and a 
greater exertion of the intellectual powers. 
Many perfons condemn all fubtilly , becaufe it lies beyond 
their reach. But, confidered in itfelf, it is always an ho¬ 
nour to the Underftanding; and, when applied to ob¬ 
jects worthy of examination, it is even highly meritorious. 
When more intellectual attention and effort is bellowed 
upon an object than is neceil'ary to its attainment, this is 
a fruitlefs labour, and leads to fubtilties which are indeed 
difficult, but ufelefs, (nuga dificilis.) As the Jhicl is op- 
pofed to the vague, fo is the fubtile to the common. 
From the nature of error as above defended, namely, 
falfehood with the appearance of truth, the following im¬ 
portant rule, for the truth of knowledge, arifes. 
Error cannot be confidered as abfolutely'unavoidable, 
though it may be fo relatively. There are many cafes 
■where we are compelled to judge, even at the rifque of 
erring. In order to avoid error, we muff endeavour to 
difeover and explain the appearance from whence it fprings. 
But very few philofophers have accompliihed this ; they 
have only endeavoured to refute the errors themfelves, 
without pointing out the appearance from whence they 
originated. The difeovery and folution of the appearance 
■is however much more beneficial to truth than the imme¬ 
diate expofure of the errors themfelves; for this does not 
•Itop their fource, nor prevent the very' fame appearance, in 
other cafes, from leading us again into error. Though 
our error may have been fhown to us, there hill remains a 
doubt, however faint, that we might yet be able to juftify 
it, folong as the appearance itfelf, which laid the founda¬ 
tion of the error, is not removed. 
It is befides an aft of fairnefs to explain to him who 
has erred the appearance which caufed the error; for no one 
will allow that he has erred without fome appearance of 
truth, which might perhaps have deceived a more pene¬ 
trating mind, becaufe here fubjeftive grounds came under 
confideration. 
An error, where the appearance is obvious to common 
fenfe, is called an abfurdity. The reproach of abfurdity 
is always perlonal, and ought always to be avoided, efpe- 
cially when we are refuting error. For to him who main¬ 
tains an abfurdity, the appearance itfelf is not obvious, al¬ 
though it is the ground of an obvious falfehood. We 
jnuft firlt point out the appearance 10 him; and, if he kill 
periifts, he is indeed abfurd, and nothing more can be 
done with him ; for he thereby Ihows liimfelf to be not 
only incapable, but aftually unworthy, of all further ex¬ 
planation and refutation. Strictly fpeaking, there is no 
demonftrating to any one that he is abfurd ; for here all rea- 
foning would be ufelefs. In proving an abfurdity, we no 
longer addrefs ourfelves to a man who remains in error, but 
to one who is attentive to reafon. In that cafe the abfur¬ 
dity no longer exiits. 
An abfurdity may be termed fuch an error as has not 
even an appearance to excufe it: for, as a grols error, it (hows 
an ignorance in common affairs, and a want of common 
©bfervation. 
Error in principle is more prejudicial than in its mere 
accidental occurrence. The companion of our own 
judgments with thofe of others, is an external teft 
of truth, fince what is fubjeBive is not the fame in 
all men, conlequently the appearance may be thus de¬ 
tected. The difagreement of the judgments of others 
with our own may be confidered as an external mark of 
error, and as a hint to us to re-examine our judgments ; 
but not as a reafon for immediately rejecting it. For we 
may' perhaps be (till right in the matter, but only wrong 
in the manner-, that is, in the mode of treatment. 
Common Senfe is of itfelf indeed a touch-done by which 
we may difeover the defects of the fpeculative ufeof Rea¬ 
fon. When we find the correCtnefs of the fpeculative ufe 
of Reafon fanCtioned by common fenfe, this is termed to 
orient one's Je/fi in thinking. 
The universal rules and conditions reauilite for avoid¬ 
ing error are; i. To think for ourfelves; a. To confide? 
ourfelves in thought as in the place of others; 3. Always 
to think confidently. The maxim of felf-thinking is called 
an enlightened, that of affuming in thought the fituation of 
others an enlarged, and that of thinking confidently a con¬ 
fidential or conclusive, mode of thinking. 
C. Logical Perfection of Knowledge as to Quality. — Clear nefs. 
— Conception of a Mark in general ; different Kinds of Marks. 
Determination of the Logical EJfence of a thing, and Dif- 
tinBion between this and the Real EJfence.—DiJHnBnefs a high 
Degree of Clearnefs.—JEjlhetical and Logical DijhnBneJs. 
Difference between Analytic and Synthetic DjlinBnefs.—Scale 
of the Value of Knowledge. 
Human Knowledge confidered on the Part of Under- 
danding is difeurfive ; that is, it makes that to be a ground 
of Knowledge which is common to many things; confe- 
quently it arifes by means of marks. We know things 
therefore only by means of marks. 
A mark is that in a thing which conjlitutes a part of the 
knowledge of that thing ; or, which is the fame, it is a partial 
reprefentation confidered as a ground of knowledge f the whole 
reprefentation. All our conceptions are conlequently 
marks; and all thinking is nothing eife but a reprelenting 
by marks'. 
Every Mark is, 
1. A reprefentation in itfelf, 
2. It belongs, as a partial conception, to the whole re¬ 
prefentation of a thing, and is therefore a ground of 
knowledge of the thing itfelf. 
All marks, confidered as grounds of knowledge, are ei¬ 
ther of an internal or an external ufe. The internal ufe 
confilts in Derivation, for the purpofeof knowing t(ie thing 
by means of marks as grounds of knowledge. The exter¬ 
nal ufe confilts in Comparifon, whereby we compare one 
thing with another according to the laws of Identity and 
Diverfity. 
There are many fpecific differences with refpeCt to marks, 
upon which the following claffification of them depends. 
1. Analytic and Synthetic marks, (which regard 
the origin of a conception;) the former are partial concep¬ 
tions of a real conception, (which are already thought there¬ 
in.) The latter, on the other hand, art partial conceptions 
of the merely-podible whole-conception, (which can only 
arife by the fynthefis of many parts.) All Rational con¬ 
ceptions are Analytic, and all Empirical conceptions are 
Synthetic. 
2. Co-ordinate and Subordinate marks, which re¬ 
gard the relation of one conception to another. Marks 
are called Co-ordinate when each of them is reprefented as an 
immediate mark of the thing. Their connection produces 
an entire conception, and is termed an aggregate ; which 
however, with refpeCt to fynthetic empirical conceptions, 
can never be completed, but refembles an unlimited 
right line, to which more can always be added. Marks 
are called Subordinate when one is reprefented only by 
means of another in the thing. Their connection is termed 
a feries, and one mark implies the other. This feries of 
fubordinate marks is finite on the part of the grounds (« 
parte ante), becaufe at laft we arrive at fimp/e conceptions. 
which are infolvablc, and admit of no further analyfis. 
O11 the part of the conlequences {a parte pcjl), it is infinite, 
becaufe we have indeed a highest Genus, but have not 
a lowest Species. 
In the Synthefis of every new conception by the aggre¬ 
gation of co-ordinate marks, extenfive difiinBnefs is produced. 
By the Analyfis of conceptions, in the feries of fubordinate 
marks, intenfive difiinBnefs is generated. This latter dif- 
tinCtnefs, as it neceffarily tends to the folidity and con- 
clufivenefs of knowledge, is highly important in philofo- 
phy. But in metaphyiics it is carried to the liighelt per¬ 
fection. 
3. Affirmative and Negative marks. By theformer 
we know what a thing wj by the latter what it is not. 
Negative 
