8 LOGIC. 
deficient in hiftorical Knowledge. Hiftoncal Knowledge 
without determinate bounds is Polykijlory. It is liable to 
render men vain. Unlimited fpeculation is Polymalliy. 
The extenfion both of Speculative and Hiftorical Know¬ 
ledge without determinjite bounds is termed Panfophy. 
In Hiftorical Knowledge is included the fcience of the 
implements of learning; Philology , or a critical Know¬ 
ledge of literature and languages. 
The mete Polyhiltor is a Cyclops in literature who 
Wants one eye, namely, the eye of philofophy. A Cy¬ 
clops in Mathematics, Hiftory, Natural Hiftory, Philo¬ 
logy, and Languages, is a fcholar who is great in each of 
thefe departments, but confiders all philofophizing upon 
them as fuperfluous. 
The Humanijl, by an acquaintance with the ancients, 
combines Science with Tafte, poliflies our rudenefs, and 
promotes a fpirit of communication and urbanity, in 
■which indeed Humanity conlifts. If we would feparate 
the mere Philologer from the Humanift, they may be thus 
diftinguifhed. The former feeks in antiquity the imple¬ 
ments of learning, the latter materials for forming tire tafte. 
The Pedant cultivates the fciences merely for the fchools, 
and thereby limits their uft ; the mere fajhionable writer 
fubordinates them to the purpofes of general communi¬ 
cation, and thus reftricts them in their matter. 
A juft precifion in forms is profoundnefs, i. e. fcholaf- 
tic perfection. Pedantry is therefore an affedted pro¬ 
foundnefs; and the fajhionable fyle, courting the fandtion 
of Tafte, is nothing but an affected popularity. For this 
extreme politenefs feeks only to flatter the reader, and to 
prevent his being offended even by a Angle expreflion. 
To avoid Pedantry, we mult poffefs an extenfive Know¬ 
ledge, not only of the fciences-themfelves, but of their 
application. Hence the true Scholar alone can free him- 
felf from Pedantry, which always characterizes a man of 
confined abilities. 
In endeavouring to give to our knowledge the two per¬ 
fections, fcholaftic folidity and popularity, without fall¬ 
ing into the affedtation of either, we mult diredl our at¬ 
tention firft to the fcholaftic perfedtion of our Knowledge, 
and afterwards confider how to render this knowledge truly 
popular, that is, eafy of communication; for, in feeking 
to pleafe the multitude, we nnift not facrifice fcholaftic 
precifion, without which all fcience would become trifling. 
In order to acquire a truly popular ftyle, we fliould 
fcudy the fineft works of the ancients, and thofe of the 
moderns who have enjoyed the greateft intercourfe with 
the polite world, without which popularity is not to be 
attained. 
The fchools have their prejudices, as well as common 
fenfe; each may therefore ferve to corredt the other. 
Hence it is important to try our Knowledge upon the un- 
derfrandings of men who are not biaffed by any School. 
That perfedtion of knowledge which renders it eafily 
and univerfally communicable may be termed its exten- 
fvenefs. 
All kinds of Knowledge ftand in a certain natural 
connedtion. If, in endeavouring to extend our know¬ 
ledge, we do not obferve this connection, it will become 
mere Rhapfody. It is advifeable, therefore, to form fome 
plan by which the fciences may be arranged iuitably to the 
objedts we have in view, and to as to render their attain¬ 
ment more ealy. If we eltablilh to ourfelves a chief fci- 
isnce as our main objedt, and confider all other knowledge 
only as the means to its attainment, we thus give to our 
knowledge a fort of fyftematic charadter. In order to 
proceed according to a well-regulated and adequate plan 
in extending Gur knowledge, we mud endeavour to be¬ 
come acquainted with the connedtion of the different 
fpecies of knowledge. It is the Architectonic of the fci¬ 
ences, which furnifhes us with a Syftem, according to 
Ideas in which the fciences are confdercd as a whole, of know¬ 
ledge interejling to mankind. 
With r dps cl to the intenjivenefs, that is. the intrinfc va¬ 
lue and importance, of knowledge ; vfe may offer the fol¬ 
lowing remarks : 
All fuch knowledge may be termed logically important , 
which promotes logical perfedtion according to Form. For 
inftance, every mathematical pofition, every clearly-de¬ 
fined law of nature, every juft philofophical explanation. 
Pradtical importance we can never forefee, but muft wait 
until it is afcertained. 
We muft not confound importance with difficulty. 
Knowledge may be difficult without being important, and 
converfely. Hence the difficulty determines nothing ei¬ 
ther for or againft the importance of knowledge. This 
depends upon the multiplicity of its confequences. The 
more confequences our knowledge has, that is, the more 
ufes it is applicable to; the more important it is. 
Whenever Knowledge has no important confequences, it 
is termed a Sophifm : fuel), for inftance, was the Philofo¬ 
phy of the Schools. 
B. Logical Pcrfedlion of Knowledge as to Relation. — Of 
Truth.—Material and formal, i.e. logical. Truth.—Criteria 
of logical Truth.—Falfehood and Error.—Appearance as the 
J'ource of Error.—The means to avoid Error. 
A chief perfedtion of Knowledge, indeed the effential 
and indifpenfible condition of all itsperfedlions, is Truth. 
Truth, it is faid, is the agreement of Knowledge with 
its object. According to this merely nominal explanation, 
therefore, Knowledge, in order to be confidered as true, 
muft agree with its objedt. But I can only compare the 
objedt with my Knowledge of it, by knowing the ob¬ 
jedt. Knowledge muft therefore confirm itfelf; which 
however is far from being fufficient to Truth. For, aa 
the objedt is without, and Knowledge is in the Mind; 
we can never do more than judge whether our Knowledge 
of an objedt agrees with our Knowledge of an objedt. 
Such an explanation in a circle, the ancients termed 
Dialele-, and the Logician has always been reproached by 
the Sceptic for this Defect; a charge which is well founded ; 
for the folution of the problem is abfolutely impoffible. 
The Queftion now arifes whether we poffefs fure uni- 
verfal Criteria of Truth. For this is the meaning of tha 
Queftion, What is Truth ? 
In order to be able fully toanfwer this important quef¬ 
tion, we muft clearly diftinguifli in our Knowledge, what 
belongs to its Matter, and which refers to the cbjedl, 
from what concerns the mere Form, as being the condi¬ 
tion without which Knowledge would be no Knowledge 
at all. With refpedt to this Diftindtion between the Ob¬ 
jective or Material and the Subjective or Formal 
reference, the above queftion is divided into the two fol¬ 
lowing : 
Is there, i, a Univerfal Material ; and, 2, a Univerfial 
Formal, Criterion of Truth ? 
A univerfal material criterion of Truth is impoffible; it 
is adtually a contradidtion in terms. For, as a univer¬ 
sal criterion applicable to objedts in general, it mult 
wholly abftradt from all difference of objedts in particular j 
and yet at the ftune time as a Material criterion refer 
precifely to this difference, in order to determine whe¬ 
ther a Knowledge agrees with the particular objedt to 
which it refers, and not with the conception of an object 
in general : which indeed is faying nothing at all. But 
in this agreement of a Knowledge with the determinate 
objedt to which it is referred matcrialTruth entirely confills. 
For, Knowledge which with refpedt to one object is true 
may with refpedt to another be falfe. It is therefore ab- 
furd to require a univerfal material criterion of Truth, 
that abftradis from all difference of objedts, and yet at the 
fame time does not abftradt from this difference. 
But, with refpedt to the queftion concerning univerfal 
Formal criteria cf Truth, the anfwer is eafy, that there are 
undoubtedly fuch. For formal truth confilts entirely in 
the agreement of Knowledge with itfelf, completely ab- 
ftradting from all objedts in general and from all differ¬ 
ence- 
