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Ipeft to its form. Til the one it is a mere intuition, in the 
other an intuition joined ton conception ; that is, real Knowledge. 
All real Knowledge may be termed intuitive, as it relts 
Upon intuition, which immediately refers to the object, with ¬ 
out the mind. But, the moment our fenfitive faculty is 
imprelfed by an external objeft, the Underjlanding inftantly 
forms a conception of this objeft, and ranks it under its 
proper clafs: Thus, when we lee a Tree, we proceed by 
intuition in the examination of its peculiar qualities, the 
leaves, bark, See. and we determine this Tree to be an 
Oak, by uniting this particular intuition to our concep¬ 
tion of an oak. It is then real Knowledge ; and this is the 
procefs the mind purfues in forming Knowledge. For, 
the inftant the intuition is placed in the conception, I be¬ 
come clearly confcious of the determinate object, and of 
the Knowledge which I have obtained from it. This 
Knowledge has now become actually my property by the 
exertion of my mental activity. It is a Reprefentation, 
■which I not only retain in memory, but can reproduce in 
my imagination as often as I pleafe, either to communicate 
it to others, or to further my own progrefs in Knowledge. 
Thus, having frequently been imprelfed by St. Paul’s Ca¬ 
thedral, and having with clear confcioufnefs arranged the 
intuition of its various parts under their refpeClive concep¬ 
tions, as the number of the columns, the turrets, the dome, 
&c. I may now fay that I poffefs an accurate Knowledge 
of that edifice, which is real Knowledge fiored up in my 
mind, and which I can communicate to others either ver¬ 
bally or by giving defigns of the various parts. But here 
we mud particularly remark, that Knowledge fo commu¬ 
nicated is never' real Knowledge to the individual that re¬ 
ceives it; for it evidently wants the molt effential part, 
namely, the Intuition. Therefore this Knowledge can only 
be called difcurfwe, as confiding only of conceptions, how¬ 
ever accurately they may have been formed or faithfully 
deferibed. Nothing can be more evident than the im- 
poflibility of communicating the intuition, which can only 
be obtained by placing ourlelves within the reach of the 
object, and fuffering our fenfitive faculty to be imprelTed by 
it. All communicated knowledge is therefore properly 
enough termed Dijcurjive or Hijlorical Knowledge. Its in¬ 
separable condition is veracity in the Hiftorian ; otherwife 
what is confidered as Knowledge may in faff be mere 51 - 
lufion. Who is there that will not fay, he knows that 
the gallant Wellington defeated the French at Vittoria; 
confiding implicitly in the accounts given by that great 
general. Without this condition, his brilliant achieve¬ 
ments might be confidered as mere romance by all thofe 
who have hac no intuition of them, nor in any manner wit- 
nelfed their truth. The firlt requifite of difeuriive Know¬ 
ledge is its pofllbility, the fecond its probability : for, that 
which contradicts itfelf cannot be' true. 
The difference in the form of Knowledge depends upon 
ft condition which conftantly accompanies all knowing, 
namely upon Confcioufnefs, which is fufceptible of degrees. 
I may either have a clear or an obfeure confcioufnefs. 
As confcioufnefs is the effential requifite of the logical 
form of Knowledge, Logic can have nothing to do with 
obfeure reprefentations. Logic does not teach us how 
our reprefentations arife, but merely how they accord 
with logical forms. Neither can it treat of mere repre¬ 
fentations, and of their polfibility; this it leaves en¬ 
tirely to Metaphyfics. It is occupied only with the laws of 
thinking 5 that is, with Conceptions, Judgments, and Conclufions. 
Upon thefe, all thinking depends. Doubtlefs fomething 
takes place before a Reprefentation acquires the form of a 
Conception ; and this is nothing more than the Intuition 
from which every conception mud originate ; (fee vol. xi. 
p. 609.) or it can have no meaning whatever. 
Although no knowledge whatever is pollible without 
thinking, yet thinking alone can never conftitute Know¬ 
ledge. We here find that mentalforms without matter ne¬ 
ver amount to Knowledge, but remain mere thought-, and 
that, in order to poffefs Knowledge with clear confciouf- 
iiefs, the matter muft be given, to which alon« thefe forms 
Voi,. XIII. No, 883. 
GIG, $ 
can be applied. Hence Reprefentation does not amount to 
Knowledge, notwithftanding it is always prefuppofed. 
All difinfl reprefentations, to which alone logical rules 
can be applied, may be diftinguilhed according to their 
clearnefs and obfeurity. When we are conjcious of the whole re¬ 
prefentation, but not of the parts which compofe it, the repre¬ 
sentation IS OBSCURE. 
We will elucidate this firft in Intuition. Suppofe, for 
example, we fee an Edifice at a diltance ; in order to be 
confcious that the objeft perceived is a houfe, it is requi¬ 
fite that we (hould have diftinft reprefentations of the 
parts which compofe this building, fuch as the windows, 
doors, &c. for, if we do not fee the parts of the houfe, we 
certainly cannot fay we fee the Houle itfelf. We are 
confcious of the whole reprefentation, but not of the parts 
of which it is compofed ; .confeqnently our reprefenta¬ 
tion of this objeft is an obfeure reprefentation. 
To illuftrate this in Conception. Let us take the Concep¬ 
tion of the Beautiful. Every one has a conception of 
beauty. This conception has various marks; in the firlt 
place, the beautiful objeft mult affe6t our fenles ; fecond- 
3 y, it mult pleafe univerfally, &c. But, if we cannot difi- 
tinguilli thefe and the other marks of the Beautiful, our 
conception of it is obfeure. 
Some have’termed an obfeure reprefentation, a confufed one ; 
but this is incorreft; for the oppoiite of confufion is not 
dijlinBnefs, but order. It is indeed true that dillinftnefs is 
the effeft of order, and obfeurity the effect of confufion. 
Therefore all confufed knowledge is at the lame time obfeure ; 
but the converle of this polition does not hold good, for 
obfeure knowledge is not always confufed ; for inftance, 
that which contains no variety of which we are confcious; 
here indeed it may be laid that there is no order , but at 
the fame time there can be no confufion. 
This applies to all fmple reprefentations, which never can 
become diJlinB-, not becaufe there is any confufion in 
them, but becaufe they contain no variety. They mult 
therefore be called obfeure, but not confufed. For inftance, 
a mathematical point. 
And even in complex reprefentations, in which a variety 
of marks may be diftinguilhed, the want of diftinftnelY 
may arife, not from confufion, but from the weakness 
of consciousness. A thing may be formally diftinft, 
i. e. I may be confcious of the variety in the reprefentation, 
but the matter will be indiftinft, if the degree of con- 
feioufnefs be fmall, though every thing in it be in perfect 
order. This is the cafe in abJlraB reprefentations. 
DijlinBnefs is of two kinds. Firlt, Senfible DiflinElncfs. 
This confifts in the confcioufnefs of the variety in the in¬ 
tuition. I fee, for inftance, the milky way as a whitiflt 
ftripe. The rays from the feveral ftars which compofe it 
muft neceflarily ftrike my eye; but the reprefentation of 
them is only rendered diftinft by means of the telefcope, 
which difeovers to me the individual ftars that compofe 
the milky way. 
Secondly, IntelleElual DifinBnefs. Dillinftnefs of con¬ 
ception or of underltanding is the faculty of forming con¬ 
ceptions. See vol. xi. p. 609. This depends upon an 
analyfis of the Conception with regard to the variety which 
it involves. Thus for example, in the conception of Virtue 
are contained as marks, firft, the conception of Freedom of the 
will ; fecondly, the conception of Dcpendance upon the Moral Law ; 
thirdly, the conception of JubjeEting all our inclinations to this 
law of our will. If we analyze in this way the conception 
of Virtue into its conftituent parts, we thereby render it 
diftinft. But this dillinftnefs adds nothing to the con¬ 
tents of a conception ; it only clears it up in point of form. 
When we refleft upon the two effentially-different 
fources of knowledge, Sense and Understanding, the 
difference between intuition and conception prefents itfelf. 
All knowledge thus confidered is either Intuition or 
Conception. The former originates in Sense ; the lat¬ 
ter in Understanding. The logical difference between 
Underltanding and Senfe confifts in this, that the latter 
furr.ifnes nothing but intuitions, the formes nothing but 
Cr conception:. 
