4 LOGIC. 
have a Dogmatical and a Technical part. The former might 
be termed Elementary Doctrine, and the latter Doc¬ 
trinal Method. The practical or technical part of 
Logic would be a logical art with refpeft to arrangement, 
terminology, and diltinftions, for the purpofe of affifting 
the underftanding in its exercife. But in both parts, the 
technical as well as the practical, not the leaft attention 
fhould be paid either to the objefts or the fubjeft of 
thought. In the latter refpeft logic might be divided into 
4. Pure and Applied. Logic. 
In Pure Logic we leparate the underftanding from the 
other faculties of the mind, and confider only what this 
faculty performs by itfelf. Applied Logic confiders the 
underftanding mixed with the other faculties of the mind, 
which influence its operations, and divert it from its pro¬ 
per courfe ; fo that it does not proceed according to thofe 
law's of whofe rightnefs it mull be itfelf the foie judge. 
Applied Logic cannot with propriety be termed Logic. 
It is a pfycological fcience, wherein we confider how 
thinking has ufually proceeded, not how it ought to pro¬ 
ceed. Finally, it teaches wdiat we mull do, in order to 
make a right ufe of our underftanding, under the multi¬ 
plicity of fubjective hindrances and reftraints. We may 
alfo learn from it what promotes the right ufe of under¬ 
ftanding, how it may be aflifted or how logical miftakes 
and errors may be corrected. But ftill it is no propadeutic ; 
(for Pfychology, from which every thing in Applied Logic 
mull be derived, is a branch of philolophy to which Lsgic 
mu ft be the propadeutic. 
It is indeed faid, that technical logic, or the manner 
of conftrufting a fcience, mull be learned from applied 
logic. But this is completely erroneous; for this would 
be erefting an edifice before we had provided the mate¬ 
rials. That is to fay, giving a form where the matter is 
wanting. Every fcience mull have its technic. 
5. Laltly, with refpeft to the divifion of Logic into that 
of Common Seifc and that of Speculative Reafon, it mull here 
be remarked, that this fcience can by no means admit of 
Inch a divifion. 
Logic is not a fcience of fpeculative Reafon, or it would be 
an Organon for other fciences, and not a mere propadeutic 
which treats of the ufe of Underftanding and Reafon in 
general. 
As little can Logic be a produEl of Common Sen/e. Com¬ 
mon Senfe is. that power which dilcovers the laws of 
knowledge in the concrete. But Logic is a fcience of the 
laws of thinking in the abfraEl. 
With refpeft to the mode of treating of Logic, it may 
be either fcholafic or popular. 
It is fcholafic when it is fuited to thofe who are quali¬ 
fied and deiirous to inveftigate it as a Science. But it 
is popular when it ftocps to the capacities and wants 
of thofe who do not lludy Logic as a fcience, but wifli 
only to ufe it in order to clear up their underftanding. 
In the fcholaftic treatment, the laws niuft be reprefented 
in their univerfality , or in the abfraEl. In the popular 
they mu ft be Ihown in their particularity, or in the con¬ 
crete. The fcholaftic mode of treatment is the founda¬ 
tion of the popular; for no one can treat a fubjeft even 
in a popular manner who is not able to treat it funda¬ 
mentally. 
From what we have already faid of the nature and end 
of Logic, we can now judge of this fcience, and of the uti¬ 
lity of Undying it by a true and determinate ftandard. 
Logic is certainly no univerfal art of inventing, no Or¬ 
ganon of Truth; nor is it an Algebra, by whole afliltance 
hidden truths can be brought to light. 
It is however ufeful, and indeed indifpenfable, as a 
Critic cf the Form of Knowledge, or for judging both of com¬ 
mon and fpeculative reafoning, not to teach them, but to 
Tender them correft and .confift&nt with themfelves. For 
the logical principle of Truth is, the agreement of the Undtrfand- 
irfy with its own univerfal laws. 
Finally, with regard to the Hiftory of Logic, we (hall 
wterely obferve, that the prefent fyltein .of logic is derived 
from Ariftotle’s Analytic. That philofopher may indeed 
be confidered as the Father of Logic. He taught it as an 
Organon, and divided it into Analytic and Dialeftic. His 
mode of teaching was extremely fcholaftic, as he attempted 
to develope the molt general conceptions upon.which lo¬ 
gic is founded. Unfortunately we derived but little be¬ 
nefit from this logic, becaufe almoft every thing in it ter¬ 
minated in fubtilties. We have however learned from it 
the different judging afts of Underitanding and Reafon. 
Since the time of Ariftotle, logic has received no ad¬ 
dition to its matter; nor indeed does its nature admit of 
it. But it may improve in accuracy, in precifion, and in 
clearnefs. There are but few fciences which can at¬ 
tain a permanent ftate that admits of no further change. 
Amongft thefe are Logic and Metaphyfcs. Ariftotle omitted 
none of the powers of the underitanding ; <ve are only- 
more accurate, more regular, and more methodical. Lam¬ 
bert’s Organon was expefted confiderably to extend the 
fcience of Logic ; but it only contains more fubtile di- 
vifions, which, like all fubtilties, tend to fliarpen tfte un¬ 
derftanding, but are of no eflential ufe. 
Leibnitz and Wolff are among the modern philofophers 
who have contributed to bring univerfal logic into no¬ 
tice. It cannot properly be faid of Malebranclie and 
Locke, that they have touched upon the fubjeft; fince 
they treated of the Matter of Knowledge, and of the origin 
of our conceptions. It muft be confeffed that the Uni¬ 
verfal Logic of Wolff is the bell we have. Baumgarten 
concentrated Wolff’s Logic; and on this account he has 
great merit. 
With refpeft to Crufius, he certainly did not reflect fuf- 
ficiently upon the natureoflogic,and unfortunately mixed 
metaphyfical principles with it. Thus has logic exceeded 
the bounds of the fcience. 
We do not now require any new difcoveries in logic, 
fince it treats merely of the Form of thinking. It is ex¬ 
tremely important to fix the abfolute limits oi the fciences, 
in order to prevent their principles from being confounded. 
By this precifion we are now able to leparate Logic en¬ 
tirely from Philofophy. The former contains the formal rules 
of Thinking, without regard to the matter of Thought. The lat¬ 
ter comprehends the matter as well as the form of Know¬ 
ledge ; and may be termed the highelt maxim of Reafon 
in the choice of its ends. It is the only fcience which 
can procure us complete inward fatisfaftion ; for it clofea 
as it were the circle of Knowledge, reduces the fciences to 
perfeft order, and gives them thorough conneftion. Its 
highelt problems are comprifed in the following quel- 
tions : 
1. What can I know ? 3. What may I hope ? 
2. What ought I to do ? 4. What is Man ? * 
The firft queltion is anfwered by Metaphyfics ; the fecond 
by Morals-, the third by Religion-, and the fourth by An¬ 
thropology. It muft however be remarked, that Philofophy 
is never to be learnt; we muft only learn by it to philo- 
fophize. 
III. Knowledge in general. — Intuitive and Difcurfive Know¬ 
ledge.—Intuition and Conception, the Difference between them . 
—Logical and /Ejlhctical PerfeElion Sf Knowledge. 
All knowledge has a twofold reference. Firft, a refer¬ 
ence to the objeEl-, and, fecondly, to the fubjeEl. In the 
formev it refers to the Representation; in the latter to 
Consciousness, which is the univerfal condition of all 
knowledge. Properly fpeaking, ConfciouJ'nfs is a Repre- 
fentation of a Reprefentation, or that a Reprefcntation has 
taken place. 
In all knowledge we muft diftinguilh the Matter, i. e. 
the objeft ; and the Form, i. e. the mode in which the 
objeft is known. See vol. xi. p. 608. If a lavage, for 
inllance, lees a houfe at a diftar.ee, the ufe of which he is 
unacquainted with, he forms to himfelf a reprefentation 
ot the very lame objeft which the civilized man reprele.nts 
to himfelf, who knows it to be a habitation for man. 
This knowledge differs in the two individuals with re- 
