LOGIC. 
will greatly facilitate the (Indent who engages in the 
Critical Philosophy, the molt fublime fcience ever 
offered to the confideration of man. 
Should the following attempt, to render the ideas of 
Profeffor Kant intelligible to an Englilh reader, be for¬ 
tunate enough to fucceed, the time and labour fpent in 
th is undertaking could not have been bettcremployed ; but, 
fliould the endeavour totally fail, it may (till ferve to in¬ 
duce fome one better qualified, to do more ample juitice 
to the merits of this truly great Philolopher. 
68, St. James's Street, Thomas Wi roman. 
London 5 Oct. 15, 1813. 
INTRODUCTION. 
I. Of Logic in general. 
That the human Underltanding, in its right ufe, proceeds 
according to certain uniform laws, is a faCt which does 
not admit of a doubt. Thefe laws contemplated in the 
abfiraCt, without regard to their application, conltitute the 
Science of Logic. 
As Sense receives th e matter of Knowledge; and as Un¬ 
derstanding forms conceptions, that is, gives unity or 
form to the received matter, (fee vol. xi. p. 608.) it follows 
that Conception is the form of all Knowledge; Rea¬ 
son, by means of conclufions, furnifhes us with Ideas, 
as the higheft poffible claffes under which we can ar¬ 
range our Knowledge. Logic has nothing to do with the 
matter of Knowledge, for this belongs to other Sciences; 
it regards only the univerfal form of all knowledge; but 
thisjfem is properly fpeaking nothing but Thought. Logic 
therefore, as it only arranges our thoughts, is purely regu¬ 
lative. 
When we exclude all the knowledge derived from ob¬ 
jects, and attend folely to the ufe of Underflanding and 
Reafon in general, we difeover the abjolutely-necejfary laws 
of Thinking, namely thofe laws without which no thinking 
•whatever can take place. Thefe laws may be thoroughly 
conceived a priori, that is, independently of all experience, as 
they are the conditions of the ufe of underftanding in ge¬ 
neral, without diftinCtion of objeCts. Hence it follows 
that the univerfal necejj'ary laws of thinking in general re¬ 
gard only the form, and by no means the matter, of 
Thought. 
Logic, as a Science, which treats of thinking in general 
without regard to the objeCts or matter of Thought, is, 
1. The Groundwork of all other fciences, and the propa¬ 
edeutic to all ufe of underftanding. 
2. It cannot be confidered as an Organon of any parti¬ 
cular fcience, becaufe it abftrafts from all objeCts. It is 
only an univerfal Art of Reafon, to regulate our knowledge 
agreeably to the forms of underftanding, which it purifies 
and corrects, but does not extend. 
3. It is a Canon for the ufe of Undemanding and Reafon 
in general; and confifts of pure laws d priori, that is, nei¬ 
ther borrowed from the fciences, nor from common ex¬ 
perience. Logic does not enquire how the underftanding 
is conftituted, which is the bufinefs of Metaphyftcs, but 
how it fhould proceed in thinking. 
4. It is both in matter and form a Science of Reafon., 
Since it has reafon itfelf for its objeCt, its rules therefore 
cannot be derived from experience. It is a felf-knowledge 
of Underftanding and Reafon, not of their powers as con- 
ftituting objeCts, but merely of their formal laws as regu¬ 
lating our thoughts. In Logic we do not enquire what 
fort of objeCts the underftanding can know; this enquiry 
belongs to Metaphyftcs, and concerns the material ufe of 
underftanding; the objeCt of Logic is to afeertain the 
formal laws of underftanding for the purpofe of rendering 
it confident with itfelf. 
Since logic is a fcience of Reafon d priori, and a Canon 
for the ufe of Underftanding and Reafon, it differs effen- 
tially from Esthetics, which, as a mere critic of tafte, 
have no canon (Laws), but only a Normal (a mere pattern 
or rule for judging), which confifts in univerfal agree¬ 
ment. Afihetics contain the agreement of knowledge with 
the laws of Sense. Logic the rules of the agreement of 
knowledge’ with the laws of Understanding and Rea¬ 
son- AEllhetics have only empirical principles, and can 
therefore never become a Science, becaufe their rules are 
derived a pofieriori, that is, entirely from experience; and 
it is only by the comparifon of objects that the empirical 
laws, according to what we oblerve the beautiful in nature, 
are rendered general, 
Now, when we comprife all the effential marks which 
belong to a.complete determination of the Conception 
of Logic, we obtain the following definition : 
Logic is a Science of Reafon both in matter and form; 
a fcience a priori of the neeejfary laws of thinking, not with 
regard to particular objcCls, but to all objeCls in general ; there¬ 
fore, a Science of the right ufe of Underfunding and of Reafon 
in general, not subjectively, i. e. according to empirical 
( pfycological) principles, flowing how the undemanding is ac- 
cufiomed to think ; but objectively, i. e. according to princi¬ 
ples a priori, which determine how it ought to think. 
II. Chief Divifons of Logic.—Mode of treating it.—Ufe and 
concife Hifory of this Science. 
Logic is divided into 
1. Analytic and Dialectic. 
The Analytic unfolds, by diffeCtion, all the a£ts of rea¬ 
fon which we exercife in thinking in general. It is there¬ 
fore an analyfis of the Form of underftanding and reafon; 
and is properly termed the Logic of Truth; becaufe it 
comprifes the necefl’ary laws of all (formal) truth, without 
which our Knowledge, whatever be its objeCt, is in itfelf 
untrue. It is therefore nothing more than a Canon for the 
judging a 61 , (a rule for the formal correCtnefs of our 
Knowledge.) 
When we employ this merely theoretical and univerfal 
doctrine in a practical manner, i. e. as an organon, it be¬ 
comes a Dialectic, a I.ogic of Appearance, (ars fophifica 
difputaloria.) This Dialectic arifes entirely from a negli¬ 
gence in the ufe of the Analytic, being fatisfied with the 
mere appearance of truth, inftead of the real truth, which 
can only be obtained from an examination of the objeCt. 
We accordingly divide Logic into two parts ; Analytic, 
which furnifhes the formal criterion of Truth ; and Dia¬ 
lectic, which contains the marks and rules which de¬ 
note that fomething is repugnant to the formal criterion 
of Truth, notwithftanding it has every appearance of 
agreement with it. Dialectic in this fenfe however has 
its advantage as a Catharticon of the underftanding. 
2. It is cuftomary to divide Logic into, Natural or Po¬ 
pular, and Artificial or Scientific 5 (Logica naturalis, Logics 
fcholaftica, five artificialis). 
But this divifion is inadmiftible; for Natural Loric*. 
or the Logic of common fenfe, is properly no Logic at all, 
but an anthropological fcience, which has only empirical 
principles, referring merely to the rules of the natural ufe 
of Underftanding and Realon, which can only be known 
in the concrete without the confcioufnefs of them in the 
abfiraEl. 
The artificial or fcientific alone deferves the name of 
Logic, as a fcience of the neceffary and univerfal laws of 
thinking, which can be known completely a priori, inde¬ 
pendently of the natural ufe of Underftanding and Rea- 
fon ; although it can only at firft be difeovered by the na¬ 
tural ufe of thefe powers. 
3. A ftill farther divifion of Logic is that into Theoreti¬ 
cal and PraClica'-, but this divifion is alfo unwarrantable. 
Universal Logic, which as a mere Canon abftraCts 
from all objects, can have no practical part; for this would 
be a contradiction in terms. Practical Logic prefuppofes 
the knowledge of a certain kind of objeCts, to which it is 
applied. We might therefore term every fcience a Prac¬ 
tical Logic ; for every one muft contain a form of thinking. 
Univerfal Logic, confidered as practical, can be nothin » 
more than a technic of learning in general. An organon 
of the fcholaftic method. 
According to this divifion, therefore, Logic would 
hav$- 
