C LOG I 0. 
«?nce in later times, was perfeftly known to Ariftotle, and 
was diftinftly delineated by him as a method of invefti¬ 
gation that leads to certainty or truth ; and 2illy, That 
Ariftotle was likewife perfedtly acquainted, not merely 
with the form of induction, but with the proper materials 
to be employed in carrying it on—tafts and experiments. 
We are therefore led to infer, that all the blame of con¬ 
fining the human mind for fo long a time in chains by the 
forms of fyllogifm, cannot be fairly imputed to Ariftotle; 
nor all the merit of enlarging it and fetting it free, afcribed 
to lord Verulam. The vaft extent of Ariftotle’s learning 
and knowledge, and the lingular flxength and penetration 
of his mind, having naturally encouraged him to under¬ 
take a complete analyfis of all its powers, the doftrine of 
fyllogifm became of courfe a constituent and neceffary part 
of his comprebcnfive fyltem. And if fucceeding philofo- 
phers, attracted by its ingenuity and beauty, havedeferted 
the fubltance in purfuit of the thadow, the pernicious con- 
fequences of this delufion cannot jultly be referred to 
him.” 
In the preface to this Arabic treatife, we have the follow¬ 
ing definition of its fubjeft: “ In the language of logicians, 
examination or infpeftion is the contemplation of the thing 
known, to obtain a knowledge of the thing unknown ; that 
is to fay, the contemplation of the known perceptible, 
and the known demonftrabie, to obtain a knowledge of 
the unknown perceptible and unknown demonstrable 5 
and, as miftakes often happen in this inveftigation, there 
is indifpenfably required iome general rule to preferve the 
mind from falling into an error in the procefs of thinking. 
This rule is logic. From this difcuflion, therefore, it ap¬ 
pears that the nature of logic may be defined, a general 
rule which guards the mind againlt errors in thinking.” 
The work is divided into two parts, the firft treating of 
Definition, and the fecond of Demon fir aticn. Part I. is 
fubdivided into four left ion s: 1. Of Exprefiion ; 2. Of 
Ideas formed by the Intellect; 3. Of the Five Univerfal 
Ideas called Predicables; 4. Of the different kinds of De¬ 
finitions. Part II. is arranged in five feftions: 1. Of Pro- 
pofitions ; 2. Of Syllogifm ; 3. Of Induftion ; 4. Of Ana¬ 
logy; 5. Of the Divilion of Syllogifms according to their 
Matter. 
The feftion on Syllogifms being quoted by Mr. B. in 
the paffage we have tranfcribed from his introduction, as 
a proof that Ariftotle was acquainted with the method of 
pure inveftigation, we fhall give it entire: “A fyllogifm 
is a fentence compofed of propofitions, and in fuch a 
manner, that there neceflarily arifes from this compofition 
another fentence. Know then, that, having finifhed our 
Inveftigation of propofitions, on the previous knowledge 
of which all reafoning or demonftration depends, I fhall 
slow confider demonftration.—Demonftration, or reafon¬ 
ing, is the procefs of inferring fomething from the ftate of 
one thing to prove the ftate of another; and this is of 
three kinds, viz. Syllogifm, Induftion, and Analogy. 
Syllogifm is that in which an inference is drawn from a ge¬ 
neral rule or clafs to a fubordinate part or individual be¬ 
longing to that clafs; which mull of courfe partake of its 
general nature, or character. This fpecies of argument af¬ 
fords certainty or truth. Take for example, “The world 
Is changeable, and every thing liable to change was cre¬ 
ated;” thus they obtain the conclufion that the world did 
not exift from eternity, that is, was created. Be it then un- 
derftood, that two fentences combined, from the nature of 
which there neceflarily arifes a third, conftitute what is 
called keeaufe , or fyllogifm ; and the third fentence thus 
obtained is called neteejeh , that is, the conclufion. The 
fubjeft and predicate contained in the conclufion of the 
fyllogifm defcribed is called the maddeh, that is, the matter 
of the conclufion ; and the order in which they are placed 
conftitutes what is called heiyet, that is, the form or figure. 
If the matter and figure of the conclufion appear in the 
premifes of the fyllogifm, then that fyllogifin is called 
conditional;, becaufe the conditional particle kiken mull 
be included in it. Take for example, * { Whenever th« 
fun fnines, day muft exift but the fun fliines, which 
gives the conclufion, “Then day exifts,” which is mate¬ 
rially and formally contained in the preceding fyllogifm. 
But, if the conclufion be not materially and formally ex- 
prefled in the premifes of the fyllogifm, then it is deno¬ 
minated ikterami, that is, fimple or categorical; whether 
it be abfolute or conditional. The fubjedl considered in 
the conclufion of a fimple fyllogifm is called ajrur, that is, 
the minor; and the thing predicated of the fubjeft is called 
akbar, that is, the major; and the propofition which con¬ 
tains the minor is called fururi, minor propofition; and 
the propofition which contains the major is called akburi, 
or major propofition; and the term with which the fubjeft 
and predicate of the conclufion are both compared is called 
the middle term, or kuddi ojit, or oft, Sec. Sec. &c.” We 
may juft mention, that this oriental treatife of logic is of 
no high antiquity, as is evident from its adducing “the 
miflions of the prophet Mahommed and Jefus Chrift,” as 
inftances of traditions which cannot be luppofed to be 
falfe. _ 
It is certainly unreafonable to negleft the ufeful parts 
of logic, becaufe many, who have written concerning it, 
have obfeured and perplexed it by a profufion of myltical 
and elaborate arrangement: indeed, to ufe the words of a 
writer upon this fubjeft, “ to difeard logic, becaufe it might 
afiilt the views of the fqphiftical, is as filly as to prohibit 
good bills of exchange, becaufe they may give occafion to 
forgery and fraud.” 
Of all the human fciences, that concerning man is cer¬ 
tainly the moil worthy of man, and the moft neceflary 
part of knowledge. We find ourfelves in this world fur- 
rounded with a variety of objefts ; we have powers and 
faculties fitted to deal with them, and are happy or mifer- 
able in proportion as we know how to frame a right judg¬ 
ment of things, and fliape our aftions agreeably to the 
circumftances in which we "are placed. No ftudy therefore 
is more important than that which introduces us to the 
knowledge of ourfelves. Hereby we become acquainted 
with the extent and capacity of the human mind; and, 
learning to diftinguifh what objefts it is fuited to, and in. 
what manner it muft proceed in order to compafs its 
ends, we arrive by degrees at that juftnefs and truth of 
underftanding, which is the great perfection of a rational 
being. 
The logic at prefent taught in our univerfities is com- 
prifed in a fmall volume bearing the name of Mr. Profef- 
for Duncan, of Marifchal-college, Aberdeen. As this 
book is in the hands of almoft every one who has any 
fondnefs for fuch purfuits, we (hall, inltead of copying 
what is fo well known, prefent to our readers what has ne¬ 
ver before appeared in an Englifii drefs,—an Univerfal Logic 
founded on the difeoveries of Immanuel Kant; for it is 
only by comparing new difeoveries with the older fyftems 
that the fciences are ultimately perfected. We prefent 
this treatife in the fame form in which we received it. 
UNIVERSAL LOGIC. 
Prefatory Remark. It is an unfortunate circamftance, 
that that Science, whofe province it is to teach us to think 
and reafon corfeftly, (hould be fo much funk in eftimation 
at the prefent day. The fault does not lie in the fcience 
if elf, but in the manner in which it has been taught; for it 
mull be confefled that we have no work calculated to con¬ 
vey a diftinft idea of the value of this feienee. So many 
confiderations foreign to Logic have always been introduced 
into it, and it has been fo much confounded with erroneous 
fpeculations in other fciences, that no Univerfal Logic could 
poffibly be produced. The great difeoveries of the im¬ 
mortal Kant, however, have at length enabled us, not only 
to confine logic within its proper limits, but to give to 
this important fcience its due rank as one among the very 
few that are capable of attaining a permanent form 
which no time or circumftance can ever change. This 
s will 
