LON 
vigorous meafures were adoptee! for defending it againft 
any force. General Loifon, with about 3000 men, ad¬ 
vanced againft the infurgents as far as Amirante; but, on 
being made acquainted with the determined fpirit of the 
people of Oporto, he retreated on LiSbon. Nearly the 
whole of the northern provinces of Portugal rofe in arms 
againft the French. The fouth of Portugal was reftrained 
from coming forward fo generally, or in fo open a manner, 
by their vicinity to the army of Junot, and alfo by a 
Strong and numerous French party among themfelves. 
Notvvithftanding the terror, however, of Junot, a friendly 
intercourfe was maintained between Litbon and fir Charles 
Cotton. 
The French being expelled from the northern provinces 
of Portugal, provisional juntas were formed, Similar in 
their character and functions to thofe of Spain. Of thefe, 
that of Oporto exerted itfelf with the molt zeal and effeft, 
in heightening and directing the patriotic enthufiafm of 
the people, and in the eftabliftunent of fuch orders and 
regulations -as were required by the peculiar circumftances 
of the country. Oporto, in this refpect, was the Seville 
of Portugal. The junta, having taken fuch meafures for 
railingapd fupporting an army as circumfta,nces admitted, 
naturally looked for fupport and aliiftance to England ; 
nor were their hopes disappointed. An army, under the 
command of fir Arthur Wellefley, (now field-marShal mar- 
quisWejlington,) defined for Portugal, where it ultimately 
landed, was, in the firlt inftance, offered to'the Spaniards. 
This army, confifting of about 10,000 men, let fail from 
Cork on the i-ath of July, and arrived at Corunna on the 
20th. The battle of Medina del Rio Seco had taken place 
a few days before, and the Spaniards were retreating fall 
in different diredtions; one division of them adhering 
to Cuella, proceeded to Salamanca; another 5 , under general 
Blake, made for the mountains. In confequence of this 
intelligence, combined with his instructions, fir Arthur 
Wellefley offered the aliiftance of the force under his 
command to the junta of Galicia. The junta replied, 
that they did not want men ; and that they wiflied for no¬ 
thing from the Britifh government except money, arms, 
and ammunition. Butthey expreffed their firm conviction 
that his army might be of infinite fervice both to thePor- 
tuguefe and their own nation, if it were employed to 
drive the French from Lilbon. In the north of Portu¬ 
gal, and confequently at no great diftance from Galicia, 
the French were ftill in force. Againft them, in the firlt 
place, fir Arthur might diredl his attack with every pro¬ 
bability of fuccefs, and with the certainty of relieving 
the province of Galicia, if the infurreftion at Oporto ftill 
exifted, or could be revived when he reached that city. 
Sir Arthur Wellefley, leaving Corunna, proceeded to 
Oporto. On his arrival there, the bithop, who was the 
governor, informed him that the Portuguese force was Suf¬ 
ficient to deter the French from making any attacks, or, if 
not, to repel them. Sir Arthur, however, that he might 
be the better enabled to judge what was belt to be done, 
left his forces at Oporto, in order to have a conference 
with fir Charles Cotton, oSF Lilbon; with whom he con- 
fuited about the practicability and the prudence of for¬ 
cing the entrance of the Tagus, and attacking the forts 
in the near vicinity of that capital. 
In the mean time,while he was cn-board the Hibernia, 
the admiral’s (hip, he received a letter from general Spen¬ 
cer, who "was then, with about 6000 men, 01F Cadiz. 
.This force was deftined to be employed either in co-ope¬ 
rating with the Spanifli forces under C alia nos, in their 
operations againft Dupont, or in conjunction with the ex¬ 
pedition under fir Arthur ‘Wellefley. As the junta of Se¬ 
ville did not deem the aid of general Spencer’s corps at all 
rseceffary towards the reduction of Dupont’s army, and as 
fir Arthur was decidedly of opinion that his own army, 
and that of general Spencer, could be but of little avail 
towards the expulfion of the French from Portugal 
while they afled Separately, he gave orders to general 
Spencer to join him. 
WQh. XIII. No. 89S. 
DON. 1S1 
The Englifli general, having made himfelf acquainted, 
as accurately as he could, with the numerical Strength and 
difpofition of the French army, determined to carry his 
forces.into Mondego-bay, where he would be able to ef¬ 
fect a landing, and form his army into order, without 
any oppofition from the enemy; while, at the fame time, 
he Should be aftitied and fupported by the Portuguefe 
army which had advanced to Coimbra. Before he landed 
the troops, he received advice from the Britifh govern¬ 
ment, that 5000 men, under general Anftruther, were 
proceeding to join him; and that 12,000 more, under fir 
John Moore, would fpeedily be difpatched for the fame 
purpofe. He was alfo informed of the furrender of Du¬ 
pont; and that the army of junot was coniiderably weak¬ 
ened by the neceftity of fending about 6000 men, under 
general Loifon, to quell an infurreCtion that had broken 
out in the fouth of Portugal. This information induced 
fir Arthur to difembark his troops without delay. Soon 
after the difembarkation was effected, the corps under ge¬ 
neral Spencer alfo landed ; and 011 the 9th of Auguft the 
advanced guard marched forward on the road to LiSbon. 
On the 12th the army'reached Legria. On the 15th the 
advanced guard came up with a party of the French at 
Obidos, where a flight action took place, occafioned prin¬ 
cipally by the eagernefs of the Britifli to attack and pur¬ 
sue the enemy. On the 16th the army halted ; and on the 
next day the general came to the determination of attack¬ 
ing the French under general La horde at Roleia. The 
enemy was defeated, but retreated in good order. By 
this victory the road was cleared to Lilbon. On the day 
after the battle the Britifh army moved to Lourinha, to 
proteft the landing, and facilitate the junction, of the 
troops under general Anftruther; and on the aift they 
relumed their march. 
General Junot, duke of Abrantes, having been in¬ 
formed of the large reinforcement expeCted under the 
command of fir John Moore, determined to attack the 
British'army before tire-reinforcement Should arrive. For 
this purpofe he left Lilbon with nearly the whole of the 
forces under his command, and came up with fir Arthur 
on. the morning of the 21ft of Auguft at the village of 
Vimeira. A hard-fought battle enlued. The French, 
with fixed bayonets, attacked the Britifli with their ufual 
impetuofity: they were driven back by our troops with 
the bayonet. They renewed their attacks, in' differ¬ 
ent columns, again and again; and were as often driven 
back with cooler intrepidity and greater ftrength of arm. 
At I a St they fled from the charge. In this battle the 
French loft 13 pieces of cannon, 23 ammunition-waggons, 
and about 3000 in killed, wounded, and milling; Our 
lofs in killed, wounded, and miffing, amounted to nearly 
a thoufand. 
After the difpofitions for the battle of Vimeira had been 
made, fir H. Burrard arrived at the feene of aCtion, but 
declined to take upon himfelf the command of the army. 
On the 22d, fir Hew Dalrymple, who had been called 
from his Situation of lieutenant-governor of Gibraltar, to 
take the command of all the different corps Sent by the 
British government into Portugal, reached Cintra, the place 
to which the Britifli army had moved after the battle. 
Within a very few hours after his arrival, a flag of truce 
came in from Junot, propofing a ceSlation of hostilities, 
in order that a convention might be lettled, by which the 
French Should evacuate Portugal. 
When intelligence was received in England, that, in 
the words of fir Arthur Wellefley, “ the whole of the 
French force in Portugal, under the command of the duke 
of Abrantes in perlon, had fuftained a Signal defeat 
there was an universal expectation, that it would be fol¬ 
lowed up with other victories, and ultimately lead to 
Some folid advantage. That Such an advantage had in 
faCl been obtained, was firmly believed, when, on the ar¬ 
rival of the next difpatches from.the army, the firing of 
the Park and Tower guns was heard, and that too, at a 
time of night very unufual, if not quite unprecedented. 
2 A But 
