LON 
prifoners were taken by either party, both being deter¬ 
mined to conquer or die. The lofs of the French was 
jmmenfe: it amounted in killed, wounded, and prifoners, 
according to a computation founded on the mod proba¬ 
ble data, to not lefs than 30,000 men : five of their gene¬ 
rals were killed, eight wounded,and two taken. The lofs 
of the Auftrians was alfo very great: eighty-feven officers 
of rank, and above 4000 fubalterns and privates, killed ; 
and from 2 to 3000 officers and privates wounded. 
There was a general expectation that this repulfe of 
Bonaparte would be quickly followed by more difafters, 
and that the glorious achievements of the Auftrians would 
immediately be followed up by farther fucceffes. But day 
clapfed after day, and week after week. No intelligence 
of any farther operation on one fide or other : an unequi¬ 
vocal fign that both parties were excefiively weakened and 
exhaulied. While the archduke Charles contented him- 
felf with recruiting his army by new levies, as well as 
foine garrifons in Moravia and Bohemia, and ftrengthen- 
ing his polition on the left bank of the Danube by new 
works and entrenchments, Bonaparte was allowed, for 
the fpace of fix weeks, to reftore the fpirits, and to re¬ 
inforce his army by troops called from different quarters, 
and to make every other preparation for crofting the Da¬ 
nube ; and with a greater force, and greater wifdom or 
Ikill too, derived from the experience of the two former 
battles, to attack the Auftrians. 
After the difaftrous battles of Eckmiihl and Ratilbon, 
the archduke John was recalled with his army from Italy, 
where he had at firft met with rapid fuccds, to form a 
junction or to co-operate with the main Auftrian army un¬ 
der the command of the archduke Charles on the Danube. 
He had taken Padua and Vicenza, crofted the Adige, and 
threatened Venice; but he was flopped in his career by 
Eugene Beauharnois, viceroy of Italy, who, reinforced by 
10,000 men from Tufcany, retook Padua and Vicenza, 
crofted the Brenta, drove the Auftrians from the Pavia, 
and purfued them in their retreat acrofs the Tagliamento. 
Two engagements took place, and feveral Ikirmiflies; and, 
on the 14th of June, the anniverfary of the battle of Ma¬ 
rengo, the two armies came to a third, and that a very fe- 
vere and important, engagement near Raab. The num¬ 
bers of Beauharnois’ army, according to the French bul¬ 
letins, was 35,000, and that of the archduke John 50,000. 
According to the Auftrian accounts, the combined Auf¬ 
trian army was not more than 36,000 ftrong, while that 
of the French was 50,000. The battle began about two 
o’clock in the afternoon : vidfory was long doubtful; but 
in the fpace of four hours it was decided. That part of 
the archduke’s army which confifted of the undifciplined 
troops of the Hungarian infurredfion, and formed the 
greater part of the right wing, gave way before the im¬ 
petuous attack of the French foldiers and the dreadful 
fire of the French artillery. The lofs of the Auftrians, 
according to the French, was 3000 killed and 3000 pri¬ 
foners, while their own did not exceed 900 in killed and 
wounded. The Auftrians ftated that the lofs of the French 
was 2000 killed or wounded, and 400 taken prifoners ; 
their own lofs they admitted, in killed or wounded, was 
1300 men. But it is of no importance to calculate the 
exadt numbers either of thofe engaged or tliofe loft in 
this adlion on either fide : the French were decidedly vic¬ 
torious ; the Auftrians were forced to lave themfelves by 
flight. On the 26th of May, the moft advanced parties 
of the French army of Italy came up with the moft ad¬ 
vanced ports of the grand French army, and early in June 
their jundlion was completed. The French army occu¬ 
pied a long line from Lintz to Raab. 
On the 4th of July the different divifions were called 
in, and the whole of the French army concentrated in and 
about the ifland of Lobau. Never did the ftrength and 
refources of Bonaparte’s mind, whether in planning cam¬ 
paigns, or giving orders for battle, or improving to his 
own advantage every occurrence or accident in the heat 
#f adlion, appear in fo linking a light as during the fo- 
D O N. 19,3 
lemn paufe that intervened between the battles of A (pern 
and Efsling, and the great and decifive engagement that 
took place there fix weeks after. The firft ftep towards 
an afcendancy over other men, is to acquire the perfect 
command of one’s felf. Bonaparte commanded his own 
paffions, reftrained the natural fire and impetuofity of his 
temper, affumed not only a calm but cheerful afpedl, and 
fet himfelf to recover and raife the fpirits of his difcom- 
fited army by a feries of bulletins, in which he made no 
fcruple to vilify the Auftrians, whole fucceffes he affedled 
to afcribe to the great fwelling of the river, which he 
ftiled General Danube. He exaggerated the Ioffes which 
the Auftrians had fuftained from the opening of the cam¬ 
paign to the battle of Raab; congratulated them on the 
jundlion that had been formed with-the army of Italy; 
and confidently predidled complete fuccefs in his in¬ 
tended attack, as general Bertrand (he faid) would foon 
triumph over the only general at all formidable to the 
French, namely General Danube. In an incredibly-ffiort 
time, general count Bertrand raifed three bridges between 
the ifland he occupied and the left bank of the river. In 
order to protedl them againft fire-fliips, llockadoes, raifed 
on piles, were placed 250 fathoms higher up the river. 
Befides thefe bridges formed on piles, a bridge of boats 
was conftrudled. Each of the bridges was covered and 
prote&ed by a tete-de-pont [a bridge-head] 160 fathoms 
long, formed of redoubts, and furrounded by palifadoes, 
chevaux de frife, and ditches filled with water. Maga¬ 
zines of provifions, 100 pieces of cannon, and 20 mortars, 
W’ere llationed in the ifland of Inder-Lobau. In the mean 
time the Auftrian army was ftrongly entrenched on the 
left bank of the Danube. 
Befides the bridges juft mentioned, another was thrown 
over to the left of the Danube, from a (mall ifland on the 
fide of the river oppofite to Efsling, not with a view of 
facilitating the paffage of the French, but of diverting the 
attention of the Aultrians from that quarter where it was 
really intended. The manoeuvre fucceeded. On the 
night of the 4th of July, when the Auftrians were expell¬ 
ing an attack on their right, a heavy lire was opened upon 
the village of Enzerfdorf, which l’upported the left wing of 
their army. In the fhort fpace of two hours the French army 
crofted the river, and appeared in the morning of the 5th 
drawn up in order of battle, on the Auftrian left flank. In 
confequence of this mafterly difpofition, the archduke was 
obliged to change his front, and quit his entrenched camp, 
or to march forth and give battle to the enemy on ground 
which the enemy had chofen. Bonaparte, inltead of be¬ 
ing confined as before within the limits of a number of 
fmall villages, where he had to fight corps to corps, divi- 
fion to divifion, column to column, and even man to man, 
(a fpecies of warfare in which the Auftrians were fully a 
match for the French,) had now the vaft plain of Enzerf¬ 
dorf on which to manoeuvre; and, what was of all the 
moft important confideration, he had rendered it impolfi- 
ble for the archduke, in cafe of a defeat, to fail back upon 
Hungary, and to effect a junction with the army under 
the command of his brother the archduke John. 
The forenoon of the 5th was palled principally in ma¬ 
noeuvring, the refultof which was, that the archduke was 
compelled to give up his entrenchments, and the whole 
of the old field of battle from Enzerfdorf to Alpern, and 
to abandon the country between Enzerfdorf and V/ag- 
rain. On the morning of July 6th the battle was re¬ 
newed,' each of the two armies afting upon their refpec- 
tive and oppofite lyltems. Bonaparte had palled the night 
in accumulating his force towards the centre. The arch¬ 
duke, on the contrary, weakened his centre, in order to 
lecure and augment the ftrength of his two extremities, 
where was planted a great proportion of his artillery. 
This difpofition of the Auftrian army appeared fo ftrange 
(according to the French bulletin) to Bonaparte, that he 
fufpe£ted at firft fome ftratagem ; but he foon perceived 
that it was a blunder, and immediately took advantage of 
it. The battle had become general in every part of the 
