LON 
from the provinces with open arms, and contributed in 
every poflible way to their relief. People of all ranks and 
characters were united in a common fympathy. Perfons 
but little fulpefted of poffeffing tender or generous feel¬ 
ings fhowed both compallion and bounty on the prefent 
melancholy occafion. A very powerful fympathy with 
the differing Portuguefe, was all’o exprelfed by the Britifli 
legiflature and nation. The houl'e of commons (April 8, 
i8ti.) voted for their relief ico,oool. and a fum, at lealt 
equal to this, was raifed by voluntary fabfcription. This 
money was very judicioufly employed in the purchafe of 
fuch things in this country as the Portuguefe were in molt 
immediate want of. 
The French army entered Coimbra on the i ft of October, 
1810, the day on which the main body of the allies left it. 
A fhow of refiftance was made by the Britilh cavalry, 
that had been left for aiding the retreat of the inhabitants. 
Mafiena, on the ad, fent forward his advanced guard to 
Condeixa, from which the allies retreated. He did not 
find the fupplies.he expedited at Coimbra. Provilions of 
every kind had been carried away or deltroyed. His 
tick and wounded be left in two entrenched convents at 
Coimbra, with a guard of only 3500 men. He could 
not fpare a greater number. “The belt guard,” he laid, 
“ was to beat the Englifh, and drive them to their {hips.” 
Not doubting, indeed, but the F.nglilh were in full flight 
to their {hips at Liibon already; though he had no maga¬ 
zines, and though 20,000 Portuguefe militia were in his 
rear; he fet out from Coimbra with the whole of his forces, 
and followed as hard as poflible on the heels of the allies, 
between whofe rear-guard and the French cavalry there 
was daily fkirmiftiing. It was not till the 14th of Octo¬ 
ber, when he reconnoitred the Englifli fortifications in 
perion, that he difcovered his miftake, and the dangerous 
predicament into which he had been led by the military 
genius of lord Wellington. 
The grand pofition of the allied army was a line of 
firongly-fortified heights, extending from Alhandra, on 
the Tagus, to Torres Vedras, about thirty miles from Lif- 
bon, and from thence to the mouth of the Siffandro. 
And behind thefe, tw o other lines of trenches and redoubts, 
extending from Ericeyra and Mafra, on the lea, to the 
Tagus. One of thefe, which was next to the fortified 
line of Torres Vedras, might be defended by 20,000 men ; 
the other, which was nearer Liibon, by half that number. 
On thefe was planted an immenfe power of heavy artillery. 
But, befides this triple line, redoubts w'ere railed at Pen- 
niche, Obidos, and other places. Many of the hills were 
fortified. On the left of the pofition, the whole of the 
coalt, from Vimeira to the mouth of the Tagus, was ftud- 
ded with redoubts, mounted with heavy artillery. On 
the right, the banks of the Tagus w’ere flanked by our 
armed boats. Mines alfo, ready to fpring, were formed 
in various places. In fhort, the whole country, from Lif- 
bon almoft to the Mondego, appeared like one fortification 
in the form of a crelcent. Within the lines of Torres Ve¬ 
dras, Ericeyra, and Mafra, defended by from 70 to 80,000 
fighting men, the allies had collected all the produce of 
the country through which they had retreated. With 
Liibon in their rear, they were abundantly fupplied with 
every thing they wanted. 
Mafiena, having reconnoitred the pofifions of the allies, 
confined his operations to the fortification of his own, the 
taking of Montejunto, and the collection of cattle, grain, 
and raifins, for the fubfiftence of his army. None of his 
movements, or changes of pofitions or detachments, had 
any other than this lalt object. This work alone was dif¬ 
fidently arduous. His quarters, which were limited on 
one fide by the Tagus, w ere ftraitened more and more on 
the north-weit by the Portuguefe militia. Colonel Tranf, 
throwing himfelf into the rear of Mafiena, entered Coim¬ 
bra on the 7th or October, and made 5000 priloners, chiefly 
lick, and the wounded in the battle of Buzaco. On the 
day following, brigadier-general Wiifon arrived there with 
Ins detachment: they had taken about 3.50 waggon-drivers 
Vol. XIII. No. 902. 
DON. 2 l 2() 
that had been left behind the French army at Coimbra 
for collecting provifions. General Wiifon, with a de¬ 
tachment of infantry and cavalry, procec-jed jfouthward 
by Condeixa, and occupied the road between Coimbra and 
Leyria. The Portuguefe garrifons of Penniche and Obi¬ 
dos, and the Britifli cavalry, carried on an inceffant and 
deftruitive warfare on the rear and the right of the French. 
The detachments fent out to hunt about for provifions, 
were fo clofely watched by the Portuguefe militia and the 
Britilh cavalry on the fide of Obidos and Ramalhal, that 
Mafiena could not be faid to be in pofiefiion of any other 
territory in the whole country than that on which bis ar¬ 
my was polled. Not lefs than 6000 men were conftantly 
employed in conducting, not waggons, but fmall carts, 
carrying ammunition, provifions, and officers’ baggage, to 
the French. At fir ft they found wheat and miller; the 
wheat they feparated from the hulk and boiled ; the millet 
they roalted. But this fupply of grain was foon exhausted, 
or, at lealt, became fo fcarce, that none of the common 
foldiers had any of it; they lived on horned cattle, dried 
grapes, and other fruit. Flefti, for want of any thing fa¬ 
rinaceous, they ate immoderately ; and, what was a very 
diftreffing privation, they had no fait. Few cattle remained 
at the end of OCtober; infomuch that the foldiers be¬ 
gan in November to eat the fleih of liorfes and mules. They 
were not only in extreme diftrefs for want of provifions; 
they were in great want of flioes; many of them were 
barefooted. The following placard was ftuck up in a 
confpicuous place by a French foldier: “ A French fol- 
dier ffiould have the heart of a lion, the itomach of a moule, 
and the humanity of a brute.” 
The longer the French general lay inactive in the front 
of the Britifli lines, the more his difficulties increafed. 
The heavy rains falling at that feafon of the year, rendered 
it impoffible for him to bring up his heavy artillery. 
From the fame caufe the Mondego had overflowed its banks. 
He was hemmed in on every fide. To attack the allies, 
polled as they were, would have been madnefs ; to retreat 
northwards, extremely hazardous, if not altogether im¬ 
poffible. The hardfliips and fufferings of the army, for 
want of provifions, have already been defcribed. In thefe 
circumftances lie had only a choice of difficulties. To en¬ 
deavour, by enlarging his quarters, to maintain himlelf 
on the right bank of the Tagus, until lie ftiould re¬ 
ceive a reinforcement of men, together with a fupply of 
{tores and provifions, or to make a defperate attempt to 
crofs the Tagus, and fupport himlelf in the Alentejo ; 
which, however, he could not have done for any great 
length of.time, as that province is but a poor country. 
He made a fliow, however, for occupying the attention 
of the allies by the conftruction of boats, pontoons, and 
flying bridges, of intending this; while, at the fame time, 
he moved farther up the river, exchanged Alentqueer for 
Santarem, which lie ftrengthened by adding art to the ad¬ 
vantages which it enjoyed by nature, and even by laying 
its environs under water. The French pofition formed 
a triangle, of which Santarem and the Tagus were the 
bafe; the Zezere one of the legs, and a chain of moun¬ 
tains the other. Bridges were thrown acrols the Zezere, 
and a body of troops was ftationed at Punhete, which was 
fortified. I11 November and December, the cavalry, g or 
10,000, were difperfed in cantonments along the right of 
tile Tagus, fo far as the borders of Upper Beira. Re¬ 
doubts were conftruCted at different points on the fame 
fide of the river. Thus the circle Mafiena had to depend 
on for lubfillence was fcinewhat widened, and lie looked 
forward to the reinforcements and lupplies which he ex¬ 
pended from Drouet and Gordonne on the one hand, and 
from Mortier on the other. Drouet’s corps, 12,000 ftrong, 
with a large convoy, arrived early in December; and, fome 
weeks after, that under Gordonne, nearly equal in number. 
Towards the end of that month, detachments from the 
army of Mortier, and that of Soulr, to the number of 12 
or 14,000, having quitted Andalufia, were on their march 
on the left of the Tagus, through Eitremadura, 
3 N 
There 
