103 
H INDO 
The force under the command of major-general (now 
fir Arthur) Wejlefley, which had occupied, during) the 
negociafion with the confederated chieftains, an advanced 
petition in the Deccan, confxfted of 16,023 men, and was 
deftined to oppofe the combined army under the command 
of Scindia, ported at Julgong, near the foot of the Adjun- 
tee Pats. This army was Supported by a force at Moodgul, 
a town about fourteen marches from Hydrabad, fituated 
between the rivers Kiftna and Tungebadra, under the 
command of major-general .Campbell, which confuted of 
4277 cavalry, 820 European, and 1935 native infantry, with 
its proportion of ordnance; it protected, effeftually, the 
dominions of the nizam, as well as the polfefhons of the 
Englilh within the peninfula, from the intuit or fpoliation 
of the iouthern Mahratta feudatories. 
Colonel Murray, of the 84th regiment, was placed in 
the command of the force in Guzerat, amounting in .the 
whole to 7352 men: part of which was difpofed in gar- 
rjfoning Surat, Brodera, Cambaye, Kouah, Songhur, 
Puriieah, and (eventually) Baroach; one portion of the 
remainder was rtationed in front of the Guickwar’s capital, 
. in order to protect his dominion; and the other, of 2094 
men, took a ftrong pofition fouth of the river Taptee, 
between Songhur and Surat, with the defign, as opport unity 
lhould occur, of annoying the enemy in that quarter. 
On the eartern fide of Hindooitan, lieutenant-colonel 
Campbell, of the 74th regiment, wqs entrufted with the 
command of a feleclion of veteran troops from the armies 
or Bengal and Madras,' confirting of 5216 men, which was 
deftined for the conqueft of the province of Cattack, part 
of the .territories of the rajah of Berar ; and for that pur- 
P.ofe, was affembled at Ganjam, in the northern circars. 
It this acquifition were made, the only maritime territory 
of the Mahratta ftates on that fide of the peninfula would 
be fecured from all interco.urfe with the French; a ftrong 
barrier added to the Bengal frontier ; and the intercourle 
ot that government and Madras fecured from interruption. 
The main body of the Bengal army was affembled 
tinder the commander-in-chief of the Britilh forces in India 
(general Lake) at Cawnpour, in the north-weftern fron¬ 
tier of the province of Oude, amounting, in its various 
details, to 10,500 men. In fupport of this force, 3500 
troops were affembled at Allahabad, and for the purpofe 
of invading the diftrift of Bundelcund ; about 2000 men 
were alfo collected at Merzapour, to cover the city of 
Benares, and to guard the partes in that quarter; and 
various meafures of defence, which our limits will not 
allow us to particularife, were adopted to protect the 
whole frontier of the Britifii dominions in Bengal and 
Bahar, from Merzapour to Midnapour. In fumming up 
the different details, it will be found, that the whole 
force employed againft Scindia, and the rajah of Berar, 
in the beginning of Auguft 1803, amounted to 54,913 
men. Such armies fet in motion nearly in the fame time, 
from fo many diftaht parts, embracing fo wide, a field of 
action, belonging to the fame power, and directed againft 
the fame enemy, were never before ieen in Hindooitan, 
fully equipped for the field in the ihort fpace of four 
months. 
It may here be proper to mention, that on the 6th of 
Auguft, the very day on which general Wellefiey was 
apprifed of colonel Collins having left the camp of Scindia, 
the nizam breathed his iaft, and was peaceably fucceeded 
by his eldeft fon, Mirza Secunda Jehan, as foubahdar of 
the Deccan, who afeended the mufnud on the following 
day. The prefervation of tranquillity at Hydrabad, at 
this important crifis, muft be aferibed, principally, to the 
pofition of the armies of general Wellefiey and colonel 
Stevenfon, and of the force under general Campbell at 
Moodgul. 
Upon information being conveyed to major-general 
Wellefiey, then ftationed with his forces at Walkee, 
within a ihort diftance of Ahmednagur, (a ftrong fort 
belonging to Scindia, about eight miles from Poonah,) 
that the negcciation with the confederated Mahratta 
O S T A N. 
chieftains was broken off, he immediately took the field ; 
and two days after, (the 8th of Auguft 1803,) proceeded 
towards Ahmednagur, the fortified town belonging to 
which was, on the lame day, attacked and carried by 
efealade. On the 10th, batteries were opened againft the 
fort, and on the 12th, it lurrendered at dilbretipn. The 
poifeffion of this fortrefs at once fecured the commu¬ 
nication with Poonah, and afforded a depot for fupplies 
of provisions and military ftores. Immediately upon its 
capture, general Wellefiey proceeded to take poffeffion 
of the diftriifts dependant thereon, yielding an eftimated 
annual revenue of 634,000 rupees, and placed them under 
the management of a Britilh officer. General Wellefiey 
then put a refpeetable garrifon into Ahmednagur, and 
, moved towards the Godavery river, which he crofted on 
the 24th of Auguft. On the 29th, he arrived at Auran¬ 
gabad; 
In the mean time, the confederates had entered the 
territories of the nizam, by the Adjuntee Pals, with a 
large body of cavalry, having, parted between colonel 
Stevenfon’s corps (which had moved eaitward towards 
the Badowly Ghaut) and Aurangabad, and reached, un- 
molefted, a fmall fort called Jalnapour, the capital of a 
diftrifl of the fame name, about forty miles eaft of Au¬ 
rangabad ; but they no fooner heard of general Wellefiey 
having entered that city,'than they immediately advanced 
to the fouthward and eafryvard, with the intention, as it 
was believed, of crofting the river Godavery, and advancing- 
to Hydrabad. In this project, however, the enemy was 
fruftrated by the judicious movements of general W ellefley, 
who continued to proceed to the eaftward, along its left 
bank, which meafure obliged him to return to Jalnapour, 
and afforded the Britifn commander means to cover two 
valuable convoys in the road to the army from Moodgul. 
During thefe operations, .colonel Stevenfon returned from 
the eaitward on the 1 ft of September, and the'next day 
attacked and ftormed the fort of Jalnapour, from whence 
the enemy had previoufiy retired to the northward. For 
feveral fuccefiive days, this officer endeavoured to force 
the confederates to a general aftion, but without fuccefs. 
Hi's fpirit and activity were, however, amply rewarded on 
the gth, in the night of which he fucceeded in beating 
up their camp. 
The united Hindoo chieftains now determined on a 
change in their operations, and moved northward towards 
the Adjuntee Pafs, near which they were joined by a de¬ 
tachment of regular infantry fubjected to French difei- 
piine, under the command of M. Pohlman, and of M^Du- 
pout, confifting of fixteen battalions, with a large and 
well-equipped artillery, in the whole amounting to 10,400 
men. The whole of their force was now concentrated 
between Bokerdun and JafEerabad. On the 21ft of Sep¬ 
tember, the divifions under general Wellefiey and colonel 
Stevenfon, being united at Budnapour, it was determined 
that they fhould move, feparately, towards the enemy, 
and attack him on the morning of the 24th. With this 
view, the two corps marched on the 22b, colonel Ste- 
venlon by the weftern route, and general Wellefiey by ■ 
that of the eaft, round the hills between Budnapour and 
Jalna. Early on the morning of the 23d, the latter 
divifion reached Naulnair, at which place intelligence was 
received, that the combined force of Scindia and Bhoonfla 
were encamped at about fix miles diftance from the ground 
which general Wellefiey intended to occupy. 
With that decifion and promptitude which have ever 
diftinguifhed general Wellefley’s military exploits, he 
immediately determined -upon attacking the enemy, with¬ 
out waiting for the junction of colonel Stey.enlon’s corps 
on the following morning. Had he afted otherwife, the 
confederate chieftains, in purfuance of the defenfive 
fyftem they had adopted, would probably have withdrawn 
their guns and infantry in the courfe of the night of the 
23d, and thus have eluded a general a&ion, which was 
fo much to be defired. The meafure of attack, therefore, 
was directed by prudence as well as courage. 
Having 
