L A W. 
was attainable by reafon in its prefent comipted ftate; 
fince we find, that, until they were revealed, they were 
hid from the vviidom of ages. As then the moral pre¬ 
cepts of this law are indeed of the fame original with thofe 
of the law of nature, fo their intrinfic obligation is of 
equal ftrength and perpetuity. Yet undoubtedly the re¬ 
vealed law is of infinitely more authenticity than that mo¬ 
ral fyflem which is framed by ethical writers, and deno¬ 
minated the natural law, becaufe one is the law of nature, 
exprefsly declared fo to be by God himfelf; the other is 
only what, by the affiftance of human reafon, we imagine 
to be that law. If we could be as certain of the latter as 
we are of the former, both would have an equal authori¬ 
ty j but till then they can never be put in any competi¬ 
tion together. 
Upon thefe two foundations, the law of nature and the 
law of revelation, depend all human laws ; that is to fit)', 
no human laws fhould be fuffered to contradict thefe. 
There are, it is true, a great number of indifferent points, 
in which both the divine law and the natural leave a man 
&t his own liberty; but which are found necelfary, for the 
benefit of fociety, to be reftrained within certain limits. 
And herein it is that human laws have their greateft force 
end efficacy ; for, with regard to fuch points as are not 
indifferent, human laws are only declaratory of, and aft 
in fubordination to, the former. To inltance in the cafe 
of murder; this is exprefsly forbidden by the divine, 
and demonftrably by the natural, law; and from thefe 
prohibitions arifes the true unlawfulnefs of this crime. 
Thofe human laws that annex a punifhment to it, do not 
at all increafe its moral guilt, or fuperadd any frefh obli¬ 
gation in foro confcientia to ab(fain from its perpetration. 
Nay, if any human law lhould allow or enjoin us to com¬ 
mit it, we are bound to tranfgrefs that human law, orelfe 
we mutt offend both the natural and the divine. But, 
with regard to matters that are in themfelves indifferent, 
and are not commanded or forbidden by thofe fuperior 
laws; fuch, for infiance, as exporting of wool into fo¬ 
reign countries ; here the inferior legifiature has fcope and 
opportunity to interpofe, and to make that aftion unlaw¬ 
ful which before was not fo. 
If man were to live in a ftate of nature, unconriefted 
with other individuals, there would be no occalion for 
any other laws than the law of nature and the law of God. 
Neither could any other law poftibly exift ; for a law al¬ 
ways fuppofes fome fuperior who is to make it; and in a 
ftate of nature we are all equal, without any other fupe¬ 
rior but him who is the Author of our being. But man 
was formed for fociety ; and, as is demonitrated by the 
writers on this fubjeft, is neither capable of living alone, 
nor indeed has the courage to do it. 
As it is impoftible, however, for the whole race of man¬ 
kind to be united in one great fociety, they mull neceffa- 
rily divide into many; and form feparate dates, common; 
wealths, and nations, entirely independent of each other, 
and yet liable to a mutual intercourfe. Hence arifes a 
third kind of law to regulate this mutual intercourfe, 
called the law of nations ; which, as none of thefe 
dates will acknowledge a fuperiority in the other, cannot 
be diftated by either; but depends entirely upon the 
rules of natural law, or upon mutual compacts, treaties, 
leagues, and agreements, between thefe feveral communi¬ 
ties ; in the conftruftion alfo of which compafts we have 
no other rule to refort to but the law of nature; being 
the only one to which both communities are equally fub¬ 
jeft ; and therefore the civil law very juftly obferves, that 
quod naturalis ratio inter omnes homines confituit , vocatur jus 
gentium. 
To the confideration, then, of the law of nature, the 
revealed law, and the law of nations, fucceeds that of the 
.municipal or civil law ; that is, the rule by which 
particular diltrifts, communities, or nations, are govern¬ 
ed ; being thus defined by Juftinian ; Jus civile ef quod 
quifque Jibi populus confituit. We call it municipal law, in 
compliance with common fpeech ; for though, itriftly, 
YOh. XII. No. 832. 
317 
that exprefilon denotes the particular cuftoms of one (In¬ 
gle municipium, or free town, yet it may with fufficient 
propriety be applied to any one ftate or nation which is 
governed by the fame laws and cuftoms. 
Municipal law, thus underllood, is properly defined 
to be a rule of civil conduEl preferred by the fupremc power in 
a fate , commanding what is right, and prohibiting what is 
wrong. According to Demolthenes, “the origin and ob¬ 
ject of laws is to afeertain what is juft, honourable, and 
expedient ; and, when that is difeovered, it is proclaimed 
as a general ordinance, equal and impartial to all. This,” 
he adds, “is the origin of law, which, for various reafons, 
all are under an obligation to obey, but efpecialiy becaufe 
all law is the invention and gift of reafon, the refolution 
of wife men, the correftion of every offence, and the ge¬ 
neral compact of the ftate : to live in conformity to which 
is the duty of every individual in fociety.” Orat. 1. cont. 
Ar'tfog. 
1. Law, confidered as a rule, is not a tranfient fudden 
order from a fuperior to or concerning a particular per- 
fon ; but fomething permanent, uniform, and univerfal. 
Therefore a particular aft of the legifiature to confifcate 
the goods of Titius, or to attaint him of high treafon, 
does not enter into the idea of a municipal law; for the 
operation of this aft is fpent upon Titius only, and has 
no relation to the community in general ; it is rather a 
fcntence than a law. But an aft to declare that the crime 
of which Titius is accufed (hall be deemed high treafon ; 
this has permanency, uniformity, and univerfality, and 
therefore is properly a rule. It is alfo called a rule , to dif- 
tinguifti it from advice or counfel, which we are at liberty 
to follow or not, as we fee proper, and to judge upon the 
reafonablenefs or unreafonablenefs of the thing advifed; 
whereas our obedience to the law depends not upon our 
approbation, but upon the maker's will. Counfel is only- 
matter of perfuafion, law is matter of injunction; coun¬ 
fel aftsonly upon the willing, law upon the unwilling alfo. 
It is alfo called a rule , to difiinguifti it from a compact 
or agreement ; for a compact is a promiie proceeding from 
us, law i3 a command directed to us. The language of a 
compact is, “I will, or will not, do this;” that o( a law 
is, “Thou (halt, or (halt not, do it.” It is true there is 
an obligation which a compact carries with it, equal in 
point of confcience to that of a law'; but then the origi¬ 
nal of the obligation is different. In compacts, we our- 
felves determine and promife what (hall be done, before 
we are obliged to do it; in laws, we are obliged to aft 
without ourfelves determining or promifing any thing at 
all. Upon thefe accounts law is defined to be “a rule.” 
I, Municipal law is alfo “a rule of civil conduct." This 
diftinguifiies municipal law from the natural or revealed ; 
the former of which is the rule of moral conduct; and 
the latter not only the rule of moral conduct, but alfo of 
faith. Thefe regard man as a creature ; and point out 
his duty to God, to himfelf, and to his neighbour, confi¬ 
dered in the light of an individual. But municipal or ci¬ 
vil law regards him alfo as a citizen, and bound to other 
duties towards his neighbour, than thofe of mere nature 
and religion; duties, which he has engaged in by enjoy¬ 
ing the benefits of the common union ; and which amount 
to no more, than that he do contribute, on his part, to 
the fubfiftence and peace of the fociety. 
3. It is likewife “a rule preferibed." Becaufe a bare re¬ 
folution, confined in the bread of the legillator, without 
manifefting itfelf by fome external iign, can never be pro¬ 
perly a law. It is requifite that this refolution be noti¬ 
fied to the people who are to obey it. But the manner in 
which this notification is to be made, is matter of very- 
great indifference. It may be notified by univerfal tradi¬ 
tion and long practice, which fuppofes a previous publi¬ 
cation, and is the cafe ot the common law of England 
and of Scotland. It may be notified viva voce, by officers 
appointed for that purpofe; as is done with regard to 
proclamations, and fuch afts of parliament as are appoint¬ 
ed to be publicly read in churches and other affera- 
4 M blies. 
