L A W. S19 
thing that is right and jufl, and have always a degree of that which was originally fet up by the general confent 
patriotifm, or public fpirit. In arifocracks there is more and fundamental aft of the fociety ; and Inch a change, 
wifdom to be found than in the other forms of govern- however effefted, is, according to Mr. Locke (who per- 
ment; being compofed, or intended to be compofed, of haps carries his theory too far), “at once an entire difTo- 
the molt experienced citizens; but there is lefs honefty lution of the bands of government; and the people are 
than in a republic, and lefs ftrength than in a monarchy, thereby reduced to a date of anarchy, with liberty to con- 
A monarchy is indeed the molt powerful of any, all the llitute to themfelves a new legiflative power.” 
linews of government being knit and united together in Having thus curforily conlidered the three ufual fpecies 
the hand of the nrince ; but then there is imminent dan- of government, and our own Angular conftitution felefted 
ger of his employing that ftrength to improvident and 
oppreflive purpofes. 
Thus thefe three fpecies of government have all of them 
their feveral perfeftions and imperfeftions. Democracies 
are ufually the bed calculated to direft the end of a law ; 
ariftocracies, to invent the means by which that end lliall 
be obtained ; and monarchies, to carry thofe means into 
execution. And the ancients, as was obferved, had in 
general no idea of any other permanent form of govern¬ 
ment but thefe three: for, though Cicero declares himfelf 
of opinion, ejfe optime conffitutam rempublicam, qiue ex tribus 
gcneribus Hits, regali, optima, et populari, fit modice confufa ; 
yet Tacitus treats this notion of a mixed government, 
formed out of them all, and partaking of the advantages 
of each, as a vifionary whim, and one that, if effefted, 
could never be lading or feeure. But, happily for us of 
this ifland, the Britilh conftitution has long remained, 
and we truft will long continue, a (landing exception to 
the truth of this obfervation. For, as with us the execu¬ 
tive power of the laws is lodged in a Angle perfon, they 
have all the advantages of ftrength and difpatch that are to 
be found in the moft abfolute monarchy; and, as the legil- 
lature of the kingdom is intruded to three diftinft powers, 
entirely independent of each other; firft, the king; fe- 
condiy, the lords fpiritual and temporal, which is an arif- 
tocratical alfembly of perfons felefted for their piety, their 
birth, their wifdom, their valour, or their property ; and, 
thirdly, the houfe of commons, freely c ho fin by the peo¬ 
ple from among themfelves, which makes it a kind of de¬ 
mocracy ; as this aggregate body, aftuated by different 
fprings and attentive to different intereffs, compofes the 
Britifh parliament, and has the fupreme difpofal of every 
thing, no innovation can be attempted by either of the 
three branches, but will be withftood by one of the other 
two, each branch being armed with a negative power fuf- 
ficient to repel any new meafure which it (hall think in¬ 
expedient or dangerous. Here then is lodged the fove- 
reignty of the Britifh conftitution ; and lodged as benefi¬ 
cially as is pofiible for fociety. For in no other fhape 
could we be fo certain of finding the three great qualities 
of government fo well and fo happily united. If the fu¬ 
preme power were lodged in any one of the three branches 
Separately, we muft be expofed to the inconveniences of 
either abfolute monarchy, ariftocracy, or democracy; and 
fo want two of the three principal ingredients of good 
polity, either virtue, wifdom, or power. If it were lodged 
in any two of the branches, for inftance, in the king and 
houfe of lords, our laws might be providently made and 
well executed, but they might not always have the good 
of the people in view ; if lodged in the king and com¬ 
mons, we fliould want that circumfpeftion and mediatory 
caution, which the wifdom of the peers is to afford ; if 
the fupreme rights of legiflature were lodged in the two 
houfes only, and the king had no negative upon their 
proceedings, they might be tempted to encroach upon the 
royal prerogative, or perhaps to abolifh the kingly cilice, 
and thereby weaken, if not totally deftroy, the lj,re«gth 
of the executive power. But the conllitutional govern¬ 
ment of this ifland is fo admirably tempered and com¬ 
pounded, that nothing can endanger or hurt it, but de- 
ftroying the equilibrium of power between one branch of 
the legiflature and the reft. For, if ever it fliould hap¬ 
pen, that the independence of any one of the three fnould 
be loft, or that it fliould become fubfervient to the views 
of either of the other two, there would foon be an end of 
our conftitution. Tlie legiflature would be changed from 
and compounded from them all, we proceed to obferve, 
that, as the power of making laws cor.ftitutes the fupreme 
authority, fo, wherever the fupreme authority in any ftate 
refides, it is the right of that authority to make laws ; that 
is, in the words of our definition, to preferibe the rule of civil 
aElion. And this may be discovered from the very end and 
inftitution of civil dates. For a ftate is a collective body, 
compofed of a multitude of individuals, united for their 
fafety and convenience, and intending to aft together as 
one man. If it is therefore to aft as one man, it ought 
to aft by one uniform will. But, inafmuch as political 
communities are made up,of many natural perfons, each 
of whom lias his particular will and inclination, thefe fe¬ 
veral wills cannot by any natural union be joined toge¬ 
ther, or tempered and difpofed into a lading harmony, fo 
as to conffitute and produce that one uniform will of the 
whole. It can therefore be no otherwife produced than 
by a political union; by the confent of all perfons to fub- 
mit their own private wills to the will of one man, or of 
one or more aflemblies of men, to whom the fupreme au¬ 
thority is intruded; and this will of that one man, or af- 
femblage of men, is in different dates, according to their 
different constitutions, underftood to be law. 
Thus far as to the right of the fupreme power to make 
laws ; but farther, it is its duty likewifc. For, fince the 
refpeftive members are bound to conform themfelves to 
the will of the ftate, it is expedient that they receive di- 
reftions from the ftate declaratory of that its will. But 
it is impoflible, in fo great a multitude, to give injunctions 
to every particular man, relative to each particular aftion ; 
therefore the ftate eftablithes general rules, for the perpe¬ 
tual information and direftion of all perfons in all points, 
whether of pofitive or negative duty ; and this, in order 
that every man may know what to look upon as his own, 
what as another’s; what abfolute and what relative duties 
are required at his hands; what is to be efteemed honed, 
diflioneft, or indifferent; what degree every man retains 
of his natural liberty, and what he has given up as the 
price of the benefits of fociety; and after what manner 
each perfon is to moderate the ufe and exercife of thofe 
rights which the ftate afligns him, in order to promote 
and fecure the public tranquillity. 
From what has been advanced, the truth of the former 
branch of our definition is (we truft) fufficiemly evident; 
that Municipal law is a rule of civil conduEl, prejeribed by the 
fupreme power in a fate. We proceed now to the latter 
branch of it; that it is a rule fo preferibed, commanding 
what is right, and prohibiting what is wrong. 
Now, in order to do this completely, it is firft of all 
neceftary that the boundaries of right and wrong be efta- 
bliflied and afeertained by law. And, when this is once 
done, it will follow' of courfe, that it is likewife the bufi- 
nefs of the law, confidered as a rule of civil conduit, to 
enforce thefe rights, and to reflrain or red refs thefe wrongs. 
It remains therefore only to confider, in what manner the 
law is faid to ascertain the boundaries of right and wrong; 
and the methods which it makes to command the one and 
prohibit the other. For this purpofe, every law may be 
faid to confift of feveral parts : i. Declaratory ; whereby 
the rights to be obferved, and the wrongs to be efehewed,., 
are cleiyly defined and laid down. 2. Directory; where¬ 
by the fubjeft is intruded and enjoined to obferve thofe 
rights,and to abftain from the commiffion of thofe wrongs. 
3. Remedial ; whereby a method is .pointed out to reco¬ 
ver a man’s private rights, or redrefs his private wrongs 3 
to which may be added a fourth, ufually termed the Junc¬ 
tion 
