L A W. 
333 
Such are, i. Capitulations, by virtue of which a body of 
troops, a fortrefs, a town, a province, or a country, lub- 
tnits to the enemy on certain conditions. 2. Arrange¬ 
ments concerning paffports, fafe-condufls, fafe-guards, the 
neutrality of certain places, provinces, and the like. 3. 
Sufpenfions of holtilities for a certain time, fuch as take 
place between the befiegers and befieged after an expedi¬ 
tion, and between armies after a battle. 4. Truces. 
Truces, inafmuch as they include fufpenfions of holti¬ 
lities, import, in general, a cefl'ation of all holtility, and 
a delilling from all enterprifes which the enemy would 
have been able to hinder the execution of, if no truce 
had exifted. Truces, properly fo called, whether made 
for a definite or indefinite time, imply an obligation on 
the parties to revoke them, before they recommence hof- 
tilities; and, according to a generally-received practice, 
this revocation ought to take place three days at leaf!; be¬ 
fore the re-commencement thereof. 
When a general truce is agreed on for feveral years, 
fuch a truce differs from a peace in this refpefl only; that 
the difpute, for which the war was undertaken, remains 
undecided, and that, the truce once expired, both parties 
may again have recourfe to arms, without the ceremonies 
that ufually precede a war. It is, however, very rarely 
that fuch truces are made, though there are fome exam¬ 
ples ; fuch as the truce between Spain and the United Pro¬ 
vinces in 1609, for twelve years: and between the empe¬ 
ror, France, and Spain, in 1684, for twenty years. 
The manner of treating with the enemy is as follows, 
z. According to modern practice, when the befieged hoi It 
a flag of truce, (a white flag,) they are underflood to afk 
thereby for a ceflation of holtilities, and for a parley, in 
order to capitulate. In that cafe, after the beliegers have 
anfwered their fignal, holtilities immediately ceafe on 
both fides, and perfons of confidence are fent to treat, 
e. When a veffel hoifts a flag of truce, it is confidered 
that fhe has furrendered. 3. In conformity to long-elta- 
blifhed cultom, the drums and trumpets, (which for fome 
centuries paft have, on thefe occafions, fupplanted the an¬ 
cient heralds,) as well as the perfons fent to treat, bear¬ 
ing the ufual fignals of peace, are allowed to pafs in fafety 
to the enemy, and, while with him, to enjoy an entire in¬ 
violability; that is, provided they do nothing beyond 
their functions, and contrary to the laws of war. 4. 
Paffports and fafe-condudls are granted on both fides to 
thofe who are fent to treat, in order that they may pafs 
unmolefted through the territory or camp of the enemy. 
All the conventions entered into in the courfe of the 
war are full as-obligatory as if they were made in time 
of profound peace. Were it otherwife, it would be ridi¬ 
culous to make fuch conventions; and it would moreover 
be impoflible to treat with an enemy at all, and confe- 
quently impoffible to terminate a war. In fliort, fuch 
conventions are as facred as treaties; and a deviation 
from the former, can never be jullifiable, but in cafes 
that would juftify a deviation from the latter. 
Hojiages are alfo fometimes delivered for the fulfilment 
of conventions ; and, if the contracting party breaks his 
engagements, it is allowable to treat his holtages with le- 
verity, but net to take their lives, unlefs for lome crime 
that they have committed, or by way of retaliation. 
4. Allies. The forces of a fovereign may be under 
the necefiity to join and aft with thofe of another: fome¬ 
times in the performance of pofitive treaties of alliance, 
and fometimes in confequence of a particular conneftion 
exilling between him and fuch power; or he may do it 
from his own choice: in none of which cafes does he act 
againlt the law of nations, if the caule he efpoufes be not 
unjult. To a fovereign fo fituated there arife two forts of 
rights and obligations: 1. Relative to the power whom 
he alfilts. 2. Relative to the enemies of that power. 
An alliance may be Amply defenjive, but it is generally 
ojjcnfxve at the fame time. An alliance is Amply defenjive, 
when the allies promife to allilt each other, in cafe either 
Ihould be attacked firft, or be in danger of an attack from 
V.QL.XII. No. 833. 
fome other power. It is rffenfve and defenjive when they 
promile to allilt each other, not only in cale of a firfl at¬ 
tack, but.even fliould either of them make the firft attack 
on fome other power. Both forts of alliances are either 
general or particular. They are general, when they ex¬ 
tend to all wars in which either of the allies may be en¬ 
gaged ; and particular, when directed againft a particular 
power, or confined to a particular war. 
Alliances are formed iometimes before, and fometimes 
after, the beginning of a war. As to their duration, it 
is fometimes for a definite, and fometimes for an indefi¬ 
nite, l'pace of time ; and fometimes for ever. The allies 
either promife a fpecitic number of troops or veffels, or 
both ; or they promife a certain aid in money; or to aflift 
each other with all their forces; or, finally, to make a 
common caule. 
Subfdies mull be diftinguilhed from alliances. A treaty 
of l'ublidy is a convention by which one power engages, 
in confideration of a certain fum or fums of money to 
bring into the field a certain number of troops, to be in 
the pay and fervice of another power: the time for which 
fuch troops are to remain in fuch fervice is fometimes de¬ 
terminate, and fometimes not. A power often receives 
a fubfidy, in confideration of which it engages to keep a 
certain number of troops in readinefs for fervice, and 
fometimes only to augment its own forces. And fome¬ 
times treaties of l'ublidy have no other objeft than to en¬ 
gage a power, in confideration of a fum of money, to re¬ 
main neuter. 
At the breaking out of a war, difputes frequently arife 
among the allied powers concerning the fulfilment of their 
treaties of alliance. Sometimes the power from which 
the promifed aid is folicited denies or calls in queltiou 
the exiftence of the cafe for which the treaty was made, 
(cafus foederis-,) and fometimes alleges exceptions, which 
dilpenfe with the fulfilment: thus the promifed aid of al¬ 
lies has been often folicited in vain. If the promifed aid 
be given when demanded, it is then to he fhown in what 
manner the war is to be carried on: and here there is an 
eflential diltimflion between a war which the allies carry 
on in common, and a war in which one of them does no 
more than furnilh the other with a number of auxiliary 
troops. In a war carried on in common, 1. The allies 
aft in concert in the appointment of a commander-in- 
chief; in planning the principal military operations; and, 
in fliort, in all the arrangements concerning the war. 2. 
The allies ought to divide between them the booty and 
conquefts made by their common arms. 3. The right of 
pofliminium ought to be ftrietly obferved between them. 
No ally is jultifiable in making a fe-parate peace, or de¬ 
claring himfelf neuter; unlefs, 1. that necefiity obliges 
him lo to do; 2. that the other ally has firft failed of his 
engagements; or, 3. that this ally refufes to make peace, 
though the enemy offers to conclude one on equitable 
terms. Still lefs is one ally juftifiable in joining the 
enemy of the other; and this natural obligation not to 
defert an ally, is ulually confirmed inexprels terms in trea¬ 
ties of alliance. 
In a war in which one ally does no more than furnilh 
the other with a number of troops, the former takes the 
name of auxiliary, and the latter that of principal, in the 
war. Auxiliary troops, though molt commonly paid by an 
auxiliary power, are generally at the entire dilpoliticn of 
the principal. The auxiliary has no right to any ihare in 
the booty or conquefts; and the principal has the foie 
right of making peace, provided the auxiliary be included 
in it: the rights of both the principal and auxiliary 
powers however depend, in great part, on the treaties of 
alliance between them. 
Subfidiary troops are thofe fent by one power to the aid 
of another, in confequence of a treaty of iubfidy made be¬ 
tween them: fuch troops, unlefs the treaty contains rq- 
ftrictions to the contrary, are entirely at the command of 
him to whole aid they are lent; nor can he to whom they 
belong claim any Ihare in the booty or conquefts, or any 
4 Q right 
