603 
LIBERTY of the P R E S S', 
feems hitherto unable to folve. If nothing may be pub¬ 
lished but what civil authority (hall have previoufly ap¬ 
proved, power muft.always be the ftandard of truth; if 
every dreamer of "innovations may propagate his projects, 
there can be no fettlement; if every munnurer at govern¬ 
ment may diffufe difcontent, there can be no peace; and, 
jf every fceptic in theology may teach his follies, there 
can be no religion. The remedy againft thefe evils is to 
punijh the authors ; for it is yet allowed that every Society 
may punilh, though not prevent, the publication ot opi¬ 
nions which that Ibciety ftiall think pernicious. But this 
pimiflimcnt, though it may crulh the author, promotes 
the book; and it teems not more reafonable to leave the 
right of printing unreftrained, becaufe writers may after¬ 
wards be cenfured, than it would be to deep with doors 
unbolted, becaufe by our laws we can hang a thief. John¬ 
son in vita Milton. 
The reader will be curious to have the fentiments of a 
king upon this difficult problem. “ It appears to me, 
(fays Guftavus III.) on attentively confidering the tub 
ject, that the liberty of the prefs is not injurious in ge¬ 
neral, and that it cannot become dangerous but by the 
abufe of it, which fometimes is dil’played. Abufes are 
the confequence of human frailty, which blends with the 
beft inllitutions ; and, if we mull oppofe thofe which are 
in themfelves beneficial, through the fear of abufes which 
might be introduced, we ihould never ellablilh anything 
ufeful to the public. In a difunited nation, divided by 
opinions, principles, and interefts, as the Swedjfli nation 
has been, [this was in the year t 792, a fhort time before 
the king was murdered,] a lubjebi cannot be always con¬ 
flicted under the fame afpect by different parties, or at 
lead it will appear in a doubtful light. In England, the 
liberty of the prefs was prohibited when Charles I. loft 
his head on the fcaffold, and when tbe-fugitive James II. 
abandoned the throne of his anceltors to his ambitious 
fon-in-law. That people were legally in pofiefiion of 
this right at the end of the reign of William III. or at 
the commencement of that of the houfe of Hanover; a 
family who have occupied the throne with more glory and 
fecurity than any of their predeceffors. If Wilkes ex¬ 
cited fome feditious movements, we ought rather to at¬ 
tribute them to the imprudent notice which the govern- 
■xnent took of his writings, than to the momentary fenfa- 
tion which they produced, and which would have left no 
more durable impreffion than other writings of the fame 
kind. It is by the liberty of the prefs that kings learn 
the truth, which is fo carefully hidden from them, and 
often with too much faceefs. Miniflers there find the 
advantage of receiving fincere and merited praife, or the 
opportunity of explaining to the public the falfe inter¬ 
pretations which are given of their ' meafures. By the 
lame channel, in Ihort, the nation can at one time enjoy 
the confolation of complaint, and at another be convinced 
that its murmurings are ill-founded.” Works of Guf¬ 
tavus III. king of Sweden. —A better defence of the liberty 
.of the prefs could not have proceeded from the pen of a 
iubject. 
Thus far as to the aifputed point how far the prefs 
ought to be free. We come now to the main point, how 
far it is free. The editor of the Edinburgh Review ob- 
ferves, that our law in favour of the liberty of the prefs 
confi-fts in mere general expreffions, and thofe not en¬ 
grafted in ftatutes, but inferted in the works of indivi¬ 
dual lawyers, and there accompanied with qualifying 
claufes altogether vague and comprehenfive. Thus, Black- 
ftone tells us, “ Every perfon has an undoubted right to 
lay what fentiments he pleafes before the public :— but, if 
he publiflies what is improper, mifehievous, or illegal, he 
muft take the confequence of his own temerity.” Now, 
where are we to look for the authentic definition of thefe 
important words, improper, mifehievous, illegal? Alas! we 
know not. That the qualifying claufe is of a molt com¬ 
prehenfive nature, we may appeal to the fentiments of the 
moft celebrated judges and authorities. The lord chief- 
bafon Cpmyns, in his juftly-admired Digeft of the Eng- 
Jifti Law, defines a libel to be, “ a contumely or reproach, 
publifhed to the defamation of the government, cf a ma¬ 
gi ftrate, or cf a private perfon.” Now, contumely, reproach s 
and d famation, include every thing that can be conftrued 
into cenfure. No cenfure, therefore, of the government,, 
or even of a public functionary, is fare in England. We 
ftiall produce only one other authority, as being-more re¬ 
cent, and a very high one. On the trial in the caufe en¬ 
titled The King againft Cobbett, 24th May, 1804, lord 
Eilenborangh faid, “ It is no new doctrine, that if a pub¬ 
lication be calculated to alienate the affections cf the peo« 
pie, by bringing the government into difefieem, whether the 
exprefiion be ridicule or obloquy, the perfon fo conduct¬ 
ing himfelf is expoled to the inflictions o'f the law : it is 
a crime.” Now, to point out any fault in the govern¬ 
ment undoubtedly tends to bring, fo far, the government 
into difelteem. Therefore, to point out any fault in the 
government, is a liberty not allowed to the prefs by the 
law of England. 
The liberty of the prefs is, indeed, the moft ineftima- 
ble fecurity of that of a people, becaufe it gives that tone 
to the public feelings on which all liberty muft ultimately 
reft. But how is it that we have learned to deem it one 
of our conftitutional rights ? A great deal is faid 
about it in pamphlets; a great deal is laid about it in el- 
lays on government; it is an acknowledged privilege 
every-vvhere but in Weftminiter-Hail. M. de Lolme tells 
us, that he was ftruck at not being able to hear of any 
law which enafted the liberty of the prefs, till it occur¬ 
red to him that it exifted becaufe-it was not forbidden. 
But, with a little more inquiry, this ingenious foreigner 
might have found law enough againft this foi-difant rights 
though none for ir. The truth is, the liberty of the prefa 
does not extft, nor ever did exift, in England, but by conni¬ 
vance ; and by the actual practice of the Engiilh courts-, the- 
indulgence itfelf (viz. the connivance) has been reduced 
within very narrow limits. It is as difficult for the moft 
adroit pamphleteer to arraign public meafures, without 
blaming public men, as for Shakefpeare’s 'Jew to take hit) 
pound of flefti without a drop of blood; and, if this is the 
fulleft extent of the privilege, vve may fafely pronounce, 
that fari quee fentias will be as much a phantom of right in 
praBi'ce, as it has always been in law. Ed. Rev. ix. 365. 
And indeed authors moft inclined to Itrengthen to ex- 
cefs the fprings of authority have not, when men of dif- 
cernment, failed to come to the fame conclufion. “That 
th e Utter of the law,” fays Mr. Hume, “as much as the 
moft flaming court-ierrnon, inculcates pafiive obedience, 
is apparent.” “The laws of this country,” fays Mr- 
Burke, “are for the moft part conftituted, and wifely fo, 
for the general ends of government, rather than for the 
prefervation of out particular liberties. Whatever, there¬ 
fore, is done in fupport of liberty, by perfons not in pub¬ 
lic trail-, or not ailing merely in that trail, is liable to be 
more or lefs out of the ordinary courfe of the law'; and 
the law itfelf is fuflicient to animadvert upon it with great 
feverity. Nothing, indeed, can hinder that fevere letter 
from crufhing us, except the temperaments it may receive 
from a trial by jury.” Thefe paifages merit no ordinary 
attention. In the latter, more is meant, by a great deal, 
than meets the ear. The letter cf the law would crulh 
liberty, fays Burke, but juries five it. They can only do 
fo, then, by counteracting the law ; by breaking it. And 
the fum of the matter is, that juries fave liberty from being 
crufhed, by delivering verdicts contrary to law. Bur, 
is this actually the cale ? or, if it were, is it definable or 
neceflary that it fhould be fo ? The nation, as lord Li¬ 
verpool on a recent occafion very jultly oblerved, had the 
protection of juries in the time of Henry VIII. and 
Charles II. but found them a very feeble obftacle to the 
inroads of arbitrary power. And, with regard to the pro¬ 
tection which it is pretended that the liberty of the prefs 
receives from juries, another circumftanee of decifive in¬ 
fluence is to be conlidered. It is not by common juries, 
feleCled under extraordinary fecurities for impartiality 
of choice, but byfpecialjuries, leleCted under no adequate 
a. feciiritka-. 
