6iO L I 
The figns of decrepitude form a finking pifture of weak- 
nefs, and announce the approaching diflblution of the 
body. The memory totally fails; the nerves become hard 
and blunted; deafnefs and blindnefs take place; the fenfes 
of frnell, of touch, and of tafte, are deftroyed ; the appe¬ 
tite fails; the neceifity of eating, and more frequently that 
of drinking, are alone felt. After the teeth fall out, 
maftication is imperfectly performed, and digeftion is very 
bad ; the lips fail inwards; the edges of the jaws can no 
longer approach one another; the mufcles of the lower 
jaw become fo weak, that they are unable to raife and 
fupport it; the body finks down; the fpine is bent out¬ 
ward, and the vertebrae grow together at the anterior part; 
the body becomes extremely lean; the Ifrength fails; the 
decrepid wretch is unable to fupport himfelf; he is obliged 
to remain on a feat, or ftretched on his bed ; the bladder 
becomes paralytic ; the ir.teftines lofe their fpring ; the 
circulation of the blood becomes flower; the ftrokes of 
the pulfe no longer amount to the number of eighty in a 
minute, as in the vigour of life, but are reduced to twen¬ 
ty-four, and fometimes fewer; refpiration is flower; the 
body lofes its heat; the circulation of the blood ceafes ; 
death follows ; and the dream of life is no more ! 
In the Memoirs of the Academy of Sciences at Berlin 
for the year 1766, M. Merian published an eflay on the 
comparative duration and intenlity of pleafure and pain 
during life, in which he made the balance preponderate on 
the fide of pain in both thefe refpefts. This decifion gave 
occafion to an eflay on the fame l'ubjeft by M. de Beguelin ; 
who begins vi ith obferving, that M. Merian ought to have 
pointed out in what manner the melancholy refult of his 
inquiry can be reconciled with the confolatory perfuafion 
that we owe our exiftence to a Being of infinite gqodnefs, 
who certainly could not intend that the fum of evil fliould 
be greater than that of good to his creatures ; he ought 
to have (hown that, notwithftanding this preponderance 
of pain, Providence defigns for us, and, when we are wife 
enough to accept of it, really confers on us, a much greater 
fum of good than of evil, of agreeable than of dilagree- 
able fenfations. 
It is jullly obferved by M. de Beguelin, that neither 
gfeat pleafures nor great pains conftitute the habitual ftate 
of man, but are very thinly fown in the path of human 
life. How many individuals are there who have never 
experienced either! The habitual ftate of man is that of 
fi,triple well-being; which, when a little heightened, be¬ 
comes pleafure, and, when a little abated, is nullity of 
fenfation, or the middle term of the fcale, of which pleat¬ 
ing fenfations occupy the one, and painful fenfations the 
other, fide. By nullity of fenfation, however, the acade¬ 
mician does not mean a ftate of perfect indifference; for 
this would be incompatible with the nature of man. From 
a ftate of pain, whatever be its degree, all with to be de¬ 
livered; yet it is obfervable that, among a hundred thou- 
land perfons, fcarcely one can be found who rufhes out of 
life in order to get rid of his bufferings; and, in this cafe, 
it is generally doubted whether he had at that moment the 
entire ufe of his reafon : whence M. de Beguelin concludes, 
that even the molt painful circumftances are not unac¬ 
companied with i'orne perceptions of good. 
It is becaufe well-being is the habitual ftate of man, 
that pleafures appear to us lefs lively than pains of equal 
.intenlity ; and that the durations of pleafure, and of pain, 
though equal with refpeft to abfolute time, feem very un¬ 
equal when compared. We confider as pleafure, only 
tl'.at degree of good which is perceptibly greater than our 
habitual ftate of well-being; whereas we include under 
the appellation of pain every ftate, in which our habitual 
well-being lofes any thing of its intenlity. 
After thefe preliminary obfervations, the ingenious au¬ 
thor mentions two queftions, which, though difficult to 
anfwer with precifion, are highly interelting. In the com¬ 
mon courfe, and among the feveral claffes, of human life, 
is the number of pains greater or lefs than that of plea¬ 
fures, fuppofing the intenfity of each to be nearly equal ? 
Qf the clafs of pains, and that of pleafures, which con- 
f e; 
tains the greater number of genera and fpecies ? Without 
prefuming to decide on thefe queftions, the author believes 
that, if they could be accurately inveftigated, the ifl'ue of 
both would be on the fide of pleafure; efpecially if they 
were confined to thofe pleafures and pains which we de¬ 
rive from nature. In fupport of this opinion, he obferves 
that the former are friendly, and the latter inimical, to 
the phyfical conftitution of fentient beings; and this leads 
him (we think, juftly) to fuppole that infinite goodnefs 
has ftrewed the path of life with a much greater number 
of pleafures than of pains, and has given us a much greater 
diverfity of the former'than of the latter. The fupreme 
Being has made us fufceptible of feveral different fenfa¬ 
tions at the fame time; which, by their heterogeneity, 
frequently weaken the continued imprelfion of pain. 
Time and employment are known to heal the deepelt 
wounds of affiidiion ; and even the molt wretched find re¬ 
lief from converfing on the circumftances of their diltrefs. 
In Ihort, it is a conftant law. of nature, which is nothing 
more than the primitive regulation of the Creator, that 
there fliould be an unremitting tendency to the preferva- 
tion of beings in general, and to repair whatever injuries 
they may receive from foreign caufes ; but can this law' 
be faid to aft with refpeft to mankind, if the number of 
their pains exceeds that of their pleafures? 
In order to fet this argument in a ftronger light, M. de 
Beguelin takes a more particular view ot thofe pleating 
fenfations which enter into the habitual ftate of moil men : 
thefe arife from .a confcioufnefs of exiftence; the enjoy¬ 
ment, if not of perfeft, yet of tolerable, health ; the alter¬ 
nate fuccefirpn of aftion and reft ; the gratification of the 
appetites of nature; curiofity ; the attachments prompted 
by intereft; the relations and affeftions of focial life; the 
defire of acquiring and of communicating knowledge; a 
variety of occupations and employments, whether of bu- 
finefs or of amufement, which exei'eife and improve the 
faculties both of body and mind; together with a confci¬ 
oufnefs of difficulties overcome, and of duties-performed; 
and, laitly, hope, which anticipates future'enjoyment. All 
thefe fources of pleafure are intimately connefted with 
our nature, and are common to the greateft part of man¬ 
kind in every period and condition of life. Our author 
has not mentioned factitious enjoyments, becaufe, with 
thefe he mult have contrafted factitious privations, which 
probably exceed them in number; nor would it be fair to 
place that good or that evil, which derives its exiftence 
folely from the irregularity of the imagination, in the 
fame clafs with the pleafures and pains allotted to us by 
the condition of our nature. 
Perhaps it may be alked, if our pleafures be really more 
numerous than our pains, why are there fo few who would 
be willing to re-commence the career of life through which 
they have already palled ? for it is a common remark of 
old people, that they do not wilh to go through life 
again. The academician anfwers this objection by ob- 
ferving, that the activity of the human mind is fuch as to 
require a continual fucceflion of new ideas; and that na¬ 
ture has implanted,in us a conftant tendency to new Hates 
of being, each differing, from the preceding, and which 
gradually lead to that perfection which finite beings can¬ 
not attain at once. We are formed, not for a ffationary 
condition, not to re-commence the circumftances through 
which we have already palled, but to be conftantly ad¬ 
vancing in our career toward new and higher modes of 
exiftence. Another caufe is, that the condition fuppofed, 
in the notion of re-commencing our life, is, that all the 
circumftances through which we muff pal's are already 
known to us. Hence neither curiofity is interefted, nor 
hope excited ; no new objefts can be attained; nor have 
we the liberty of preventing or of avoiding the pains 
through which we know that we mult pafs; hence the expe¬ 
rience, the knowledge, and the abilities, which we have ac¬ 
quired, would be loll on 11s; and we could have no other 
profpect than that of being, at the end of our fecond ex¬ 
iftence, exaftly at the lame point from which we had fet 
out. Remove this condition; and molt men would be 
glaft, 
