K A 
N T. 
fcience in which he was not a proficient. The confe- 
quence of having fucli a happy memory was, that lie let 
no value on an extenfive library. As he could acquire 
the contents of books by reading them once or twice, the 
books themfelves were rather burthenfotne to him than 
otlierwife. He accordingly made a contract with a book- 
feller, to fend him all new books in (beets, which he 
read through in that form, and generally returned after¬ 
wards. To the love of truth he was ardently devoted ; 
and liberality of fentiment was the refult. He wilbed to 
eftablifh all human knowledge on the firm bafis of reafon ; 
and therefore rejected all principles as vifionary, which 
did not admit of a fundamental explication. With re- 
fpeCt to religion, he confidered it as an inherent quality of 
the foul, which pants after fome higher objeCt than this 
tranfitory exigence ; that therefore it demands no proof 
from without, but flows of itfelf from within ourfelves. 
He was a citizen of the world ; but, at the fame time, a 
friend to peace and good order. He acknowledged the 
equal rights of all men, as originally born free but lie de¬ 
precated every violent effort to acquire that freedom, and 
in his own conduct always teftified due refpeCt and fub- 
miflion to eftabliflied authorities. Both by precept and ex¬ 
ample, he inculcated the ftriCteft and pureft integrity and 
morality. He was a moft decided enemy to falfehood of 
every kind. He never could endure to hear an untruth 
even in jell; and in his own language, he was fcrupulous 
to avoid every thing that could convey a falfe idea of 
liimfelf. Nothing could draw him into a temporary re¬ 
nunciation or qualification of his l’entiments; but, wher¬ 
ever a free declaration of his opinions was not found 
agreeable, he was careful never to appear. He wifiied, in 
all his actions, to fliow himfelf to the world limply as he 
was, unvarnifhed by any falfe art whatever ; and he even 
condemned the attempt to conceal one’s merit under a 
forbidding appearance.. He had a high fenfe of his own 
dignity, as an individual in the fcale of exiftence ; and he 
had no lefs refpeCt for every man, as an independent and 
thinking being, and evinced thefe fentiments by a re- 
fpeCtful deportment towards all, For merit under every 
form, and in every perfon, whether of his own or con¬ 
trary fentiments, he teftified the moft unequivocal ef- 
teem. In private life, he was affable, courteous, friend¬ 
ly, and benevolent to enthufiafm. Every reader of his 
•writings, on becoming perfonally acquainted with him, 
was agreeably furprifed to find the abftrufe and deep 
thinker in the fociable and lively companion. He was 
the life of every company in which he mixed: and mirth, 
difcourfe, and wit, never flagged when he was prefent. 
Much as he liked to converfe on matters of philofophy, 
he carefully avoided thofe topics in mixed companies : 
here lie loft the philofopher in the man of the world, 
and (j^oke with freedom on drefs, politics, public occur¬ 
rences, or houfe-keeping, as the males or females of the 
fociety turned the difcourfe. It was his cuftom to re¬ 
tire to reft at nine o’clock in the winter, and ten in the 
fummer; rifing at five o’clock in the former, and at four 
in the latter feafon. By this commendable and healthy 
practice, daily exercife on foot, ferenity of mind, tempe¬ 
rance in eating and drinking, conftant employment, and 
cheerful company, he protracted his life to the advanced 
period which we have already mentioned. In perfon lie 
was of the middle ftature, and of a remarkably flender 
and delicate make. His countenance was expreflive of 
the labour and refearch he had bellowed in the production 
of the numerous abftrufe works we have mentioned. 
Some accounts that we have read defcribe his countenance 
as full of dignity, and his blue eyes expreflive of benevo¬ 
lence ; but a gentleman who vifited him at Konigfburg, 
who is a great admirer of his philofophy, and has written 
a Sketch of his Life, declares, that “ his eyes, as well as 
the other features of his face, were a reproach to phyfiog- 
nomyand in confirmation relates the following anec¬ 
dote : A certain traveller fliowed the celebrated Lavater 
two portraits, which he had never feen before, the one 
Vql. XI. No. 780, 
605 
the portrait of a famous (or rather infamous; highway¬ 
man, who was broken upon the wheel, the other the por¬ 
trait of Kant, and afked which of the two he luppofed 
to be the philofopher’s. Lavater, after having looked at 
them for fome little time, took the highwayman’s portrait 
to be Kant’s, and faid, “There can be no doubt in this 
cafe ; for here one fees profound penetration in the eye, and 
that capacious forehead which denotes the man of deep 
reflection ; here is depicted the mind that can combine 
caufe and effeCt, that can feparate caufe from effeCt; here 
is analyfi9 and fynthefis. Now (continues he) the cairn 
thinking villain is fo well expreffed in the other (Kant’s 
portrait, which Lavater took to be the highwaymah’s), 
that it needs no comment.” Kant himfelf ufed to relate 
this anecdote with great glee. 
Being defirous of prefenting our readers with fome ac¬ 
count of Profeflor Kant’s philofophical principles, we are 
happy in having been favoured with the following fketch, 
which we prefent in the fame form in which we re¬ 
ceived it. 
AbjlraEl of the Critical Philofophy . 
It is remarkable, that our countryman David Hume 
fliould have been the caufe of the difcovery of this cele¬ 
brated philofophy. This circumftance reflects great 
honour upon England ; and confirms the high character 
flie has obtained in the philofophical world.’—Her Newton 
eftabliflied the hypothefis of Copernicus, and proved his 
fuppofitions to be matters of faCt. Her Hume, by his 
aftonifhingly deep and acute reafoning on the Angle idea 
of Caufe and Effett, forced that extraordinary philofopher, 
Immanuel Kant, to the difcovery of the whole of his fyf- 
tem of Tranfcendental Philofophy ; by which alone he was 
able fully to an fiver Hume’s doubts. This circumftance 
has eftabliflied Metaphyfics as a fcience that may vie with 
Geometry in the clolenefs of its realonings and in the fuf- 
fisiency of its proofs. 
Hume proved, beyond contradiction, that the idea of 
Caufe and EfftEl is not derived from experience; and thence 
concluded that this notion is the fpurious offspring of the 
imagination. For want of elucidation on this point, he 
remained a confirmed fceptic. The contemporaries of 
Hume entirely overlooked the aim at improvement he had 
in view ; which was to difcover the origin of this impor¬ 
tant notion. His opponents, Reid, Beattie, Ofwald, and 
even Prieftley himfelf, were unable to throw theleaft light 
upon the fubjeCt. The perfevering and immortal Kant 
however foon difcovered that Hume’s dilemma arofe from 
his not forming to himfelf an idea of the whole of hi# 
problem ; but merely inveftigating a part, the folution of 
which was impoflible without a comprehenfive view of 
the whole. He perceived that the idea of Caufe and Ejf'eSt 
is far from being the only one which is applied to expe¬ 
rience with the confcioufnels of its neceflity, yet without 
being derived from experience. He endeavoured in the 
firft place to afcertnin the precife number of the extraor¬ 
dinary ideas thus circnmftanced ; and, having fucceeded 
in this to his perfect fatisfaCtion, he found himfelf actu¬ 
ally in polfeflion of the whole of thofe conneding ads of 
the Mind, which conftitute the very Understanding it¬ 
felf; and upon this foundation he ereCted his fcience of 
Tranfcendental Philofophy, which poffeffes as much internal 
evidence as the Elements of Euclid. 
This fcience will be found to be entirely new, in the 
ftriCteft fenfe of the word. All former efforts in Meta¬ 
phyfics were attempts to make the Mind conform itfelf to 
the objects of our Knowledge; which always failed in fa- 
tisfying the demands of Reafon. But Kant difcovered, that 
the external objeEls mujl abfolutely conform themfeh'es to the na¬ 
ture of our Mental Faculties, in order to become objeCls of our 
confciovfnefs. This faCt deltroys the poflibility of our ob¬ 
taining any knowledge of the things in themfelves ; confe- 
quently direCts our attention to the only fources from 
whence knowledge can be derived. Thefe fources are, Firft, 
The JlruBure of the Human Mind. Secondly, The Jenfations 
7 P which 
