606 K A 
which are imprcjjed upon it by external objefts. Kant admits 
no principle to form a part of his fyftem, that is not fuf- 
ceptibleof apodhftical certainty, or complete demonftration. 
No invention, no dilcovery, in fact no circnmftance 
that has occurred fince the creation of the world, (direct 
revelation excepted,) can tend fo much to humanize and 
to moralize mankind, as this Philofophy of the immortal 
Kant, ■which aRually attains the J'ummit of all human cultivation. 
Pofterity cannot fail to do ample jultice to the merits of 
this truly great man, who has paved for them the only way to 
all true knowledge. It is, however, hardly to be expected 
that the philofophers of the prefent day will adopt this 
critical cajl of mind , fince it can only be done by the facri- 
ficc of long-eftabiilhed prejudices. “ In our days” fays 
Kant, “things worthy of being known augment very 
much. Our capacity will foon be too weak, and our life 
too fhort, to enable us to comprehend even the molt eflen- 
tial part of them. We are p re fen ted with an abundance 
of riches, to make room for which, we mull throw away 
a great deal of ufelefs lumber, which it would have been 
better we had never been occupied about.” The confo- 
ling reliance upon the judgment of pofterity acquires 
great ftrength from the reflection, that the ultimate end 
of this profound philofophy is the eftablilhment of a per¬ 
fect fyftern of Morals, upon the immutable bafts of Pure 
PraRical Rea/on. And, as Morality will always intereft 
mankind in a greater degree as Reafon becomes more en¬ 
lightened, pofterity mult ever have the advantage of the 
prefent generation. 
The Critic of Pure Reason, the work which com¬ 
prehends this vaft fyltem, in order to lead the mind to a 
knowledge of itfelf, begins from the Dogmatical Jlation, 
where we imagine that we know the things as they are in 
tiiemfel ves; and then proceeds to the Critical Jlation, where 
we difeern the fare which tke mind has in producing know¬ 
ledge ; that is, the ^original ufe of undemanding. Although 
this procedure is bell adapted to the object which the Cri¬ 
tic has in view, yet it is attended with fome degree of un¬ 
avoidable obfeurity. The Critic undertakes the deduction 
of the Twelve Categories of Nature, the Six Ideas of Reafon, 
and Time and Space. It then enquires by what right thefe 
notions are applied to objects of experience, fince they are 
not derived from experience ; and gives for anfwer, That 
this ufe of them is unavoidable,fince thefe fundamental notions ori¬ 
ginate in the JlruRure of the human mind itfelf-, or, in other 
words, in Reason, Understanding, and Sense. It 
is, however, very remarkable, that this problem can¬ 
not even be conceived until after its folution ; which is 
the true caufe that renders this work fo difficult to be 
underftood. 
As this elementary work confifts of one chain of clofe- 
ly connected reafoning, it mull be wholly comprehended, 
or no part of it can be underftood. Notvvithftanding thefe 
feeming difficulties, the attentive reader of the Critic, by 
perfevering in the ftudy of it to the end, will not fail to 
comprehend its arguments. He will alfo find ample re¬ 
ward for his labour, and will even ultimately coincide in 
opinion w'ith Profeffor Beck, who fays ; “ In foort, all this 
is fo eafy to me, that I engage to render the fecrets of the Critical 
Philofophy perfcRly intelligible to one of the fowejl apprehenjion , 
and to convince him fully of its dodirinesN 
It is now upwards of thirty years fince the Critic of 
Pure Reafon was firfl publifhed, and yet this work does not 
appear to be much known in England. Sixteen years have 
elapfed fince a favourite pupil of Profeffor Kant (Mr. 
Nitfcli) laudably attempted to plant this philofophy in Bri¬ 
tain ; the learned of this country have negledfted however 
to avail themfelves of this advantage. Since the publica- 
tion of the Critic in the year 1781, it has had innumera¬ 
ble commentators in Germany. It was tranflated into 
Latin in 1796, by Frederic Gottlob Born ; but no 
tranflation of it has appeared in Englifti. And, what 
is ftill more remarkable, that very elegant modern writer 
Dngald Stewart is lb perfectly unconfcious of what 
his contemporaries have done, in the very fame de¬ 
N T. 
partment of fcience In which he has laboured with fb 
much diligence and induftry, as, in his Elements of the Phi- 
lofophy of the Human MJnd, 3d edit. j8o8, page 71 and 72, 
when treating of “ Natural Prejudices ,” to fay “ It feems 
now to be pretty generally agreed among philofophers, 
that there is no inftance in which we are able to perceive 
a necejfary connexion between two fucceftive events; or to 
comprehend in wliat manner the one proceeds from the 
other, as its caufe. The natural bias of the mind is lbrely 
to conceive phyfical events as fomehow linked together ; 
and material fubitances as pofTefTed of certain powers and 
virtues, which fit them to produce particular effects. That 
we have no reafon to believe this to be the cafe, has been 
fliown in a very particular manner by Mr. Hume, and by 
other writers ; and mult, indeed, appear evident to every 
perfon, on a moment’s reflection. It is a curious quejlion, 
what gives rife to the Prejudice ?” 
Kant lias long fince demonftrated in the cleared manner 
that every Philofophy of the Human Mind, which does not 
define Subjlance, Caufe and EjfeEl, Time and Space, Sic. mufl 
inevitably lead to contradiction. Yet, notwithftanding this, 
the reality of the notion of Caufe and EJfeR is not only 
called in queftion, but it is termed a prejudice, and an 
enquiry is let on foot at the prefent day to difeover the ori¬ 
gin of this prejudice. What is to be expected from fuch 
a Philofophy of the Human Mind! Surely not univerfal 
evidence-, and all Philofophy which hopes to eftablifh itfelf 
upon any thing fhort of this principle is good for nothing. 
It is greatly to be lamented that fo penetrating and acute 
a reafoner as Dngald Stewart fliould have proceeded in the 
old track of Philofophy, though the points on which he 
doubts have been placed beyond difpute for more than 
thirty years. 
Since the publication of the work above alluded to, 
this indefatigable author has favoured the public with 
an elegant volume in quarto, entitled “ Philofophical Ef- 
fays; 1810.” It is painful to remark, that even in this work 
liis cultivated mind is ftill labouring under the prejudices 
of the Dogmatical Philofophy. He is indeed a charafter 
diftinguifhed for his powerful talents and uncommon 
flretch of thinking, by which he is entitled to the admi¬ 
ration of mankind ; but ftill more fo from his fincere 
love of Truth, and laudable endeavour tp promote the in- 
eltimable ftudy of the Philofophy of the Human Mind, 
whofe object and value he fully appreciates. But his fuccefs 
in this praifeworthy undertaking mull even to himfelf be 
tinClured with doubts and perplexities which he cannot fa- 
tisfatlorily remove ; much lei’s can he expert, however in¬ 
genious, amufing, and frequently inftruftive, his labours 
may prove, that they fhould be univerfally convincing ; and 
this fatal circumftance arifes from a want of that indif- 
penfible requifite, a folid foundation upon which to raife the 
f’uperftruClure of his Philofophy. This volume contains 
a formal pledge to the public of his intention to fulfil the 
promife contained in his “ Elements,” namely, to give a 
complete analyfis of the Powers and Faculties of the Hu¬ 
man Mind. The performance of this talk mull unavoidably 
terminate in his own dilfatisfaflion, and in the difappoint- 
ment of the world, unlefs he can refute Kant’s Theory of 
the Mind. Indeed there is no other path in which he can 
proceed with the hope of fuccefs but to inveftigate the Kan- 
tefian Theory, and either refute it altogether, or acknow¬ 
ledge its immutable Truth. For, until thele two great men 
can coincide in one unftiaken fentiment refpecting what is 
to be underftood by the Elements of the Human Mind, the 
fcience itfelf cannot boaft of univerfal evidence. It may fair¬ 
ly be prefumed in favour of the inveltigation of the Kante- 
iian principles by fo great a philofophical genius asDugald 
Stewart, that he will not have to complain that his “ labour 
has ended in a fentiment of regret at the time and attention which 
he has mifemployed in a hopelefs and ungrateful tafk.'" Fop, 
Ihould he prove himfelf capable of refuting or even of in¬ 
validating Kant’s Theory, he will find that in this under¬ 
taking he will have cleared away a holt of doubts and dif¬ 
ficulties 5 and molt probably, in the courfe of his enquiry. 
