K A 
will difcover fome hidden troths that may be highly be¬ 
neficial to mankind. 
When tiie learned of this country Avail think proper to 
encourage a correct tranflation of the Critic of Pare Reafon, 
they will be able to judge for themfelves of its merits, 
and this philofophy will then no longer continue to 
be mangled and.diftorted by attempts to reprefent it 
through the medium of mere fcraps and extracts; which, 
for want of due connexion, cannot be underltood, and 
mult therefore appear abfurd. The article Critical Phi/o- 
fophy in the Encyclopcedia Britanica is compofed entirely 
in this way, and the commentator upon it commits him- 
lelf in the molt unpardonable manner by fumming up a 
final condemnation, inftead of inviting to a thorough in- 
veltigation of the fyftem. Such condudt is unbecoming 
a Britilh Philofopher. 
The examination of Charles Villers’s “ Philofophie de 
Kant," as given in the Edinburgh Review for Jan. 1803, 
mult not be miltaken for a review of the Critical Philolo- 
phy, as explained by Kant in his great work entitled Cri¬ 
tic of Pure Reafon. Monf. Villers evidently had no other 
intention in writing that excellent work than to induce his 
countrymen to ftudy the Critical Philofophy in the ori¬ 
ginal works of its immortal author. It would, however, 
lie too much to expect, that fo ferious a talk as this fhould 
be undertaken for the purpofe of a mere literary review ; 
though it mult be confefl'ed that the ingenious Reviewer, 
in his inveftigation of an abitrufe fcience, has difplayed 
fo much wit, that we cannot but wifh his fubject had 
been more fuited to his admirable talents. 
Dr. Rees, in his New Cyclopaedia, article “Kantism," 
(jult publilhed,) Ipeaking of the Critical Philofophy, fays, 
“ It is now, even in its birth-place, much negleEled ; and will pro¬ 
bably in another half-century fall into utter oblivion .” It is 
highly probable that Dr. Rees lias formed this conclufion 
from the circumltance of all communication with the 
northern part of the continent being entirely cut off, by 
which he is left utterly ignorant of the prefent Hate of the 
philofophy in its birth-place. He proves his own utter igno¬ 
rance of its Principles by venturing upon fuch a judgment. 
It were better to have laid, “ In another half-century Eu¬ 
clid's Elements of Geometry will probably be funk into utter ob¬ 
livion, and for ever effaced from the memory of Man /” 
The attentive reader, who has fuccefsfully liudied the 
Critic of Pure Reafon, will find himfelf at length com¬ 
pelled to acquiefce in the conclufion, That the Critical Phi¬ 
lofophy is the only - true Philofophy, and that no other can arife 
at any future period to dijturb its Principles. This is indeed 
even lei's to be apprehended than the difcovery of a new 
fet of Axioms for the Elements of Geometry. The 
founder of this Philofophy, in confirmation of the above 
conclufion, has the following remarks, in the preface to his 
Metaphyfics of Morals, page vii.of the Englilh tranflation. 
“ It founds arrogant and felf-fufficient, and appears to be 
an infult upon thofe who have not yet renounced their ob- 
folete dogmas and fuperannuated lyftems, to affirm that, 
prior to the Critical Philofophy, there was no philofophy at 
all. But, before we condemn this feeming ulurpation, we 
ought firft to decide, whether there can be more than one phi¬ 
lofophy. Different modes of philofophizing and of recur¬ 
ring to the firlt principles of reafon have indeed been adopt¬ 
ed with more or lei's fuccefs, in order to found a fyltem 
upon them ; and many fuch attempts were requifite to lead 
the way to the prefent, each of which, in this refpedt, had 
its merit. But, as there is only one human reafon objec¬ 
tively contemplated, fo there can be but one true fyjlem of phi¬ 
lofophy founded upon principles, however varioufly, and often 
difcordantly, we may have philofophized upon the very 
fame pofition. The Moralifl juftly afferts, that there is but 
one virtue, but one dodtrine of it, i. e. only one fyftem 
that connedts all moral duties by a Angle principle. The 
Chemijl fays there is but one cbemiftry, (Lavoifier’s.) The 
Phyfician, that there is but one principle for the fyftem of 
clalling difeafes, (that according to Brown.) Yet all this is 
afferted without leflening the merits of the earlier Moralilts, 
N T. 607 
Chemifts, and Phyficians; for, notwithftanding all the older 
fyftems become exploded by the adoption of the new, yet, 
without the benefit of their dilcoveries, and even unluc- 
cefsful efforts, we never Ihould have attained the unity of 
the true principle of all Philofophy in one fyjlem. If any one 
announces a Philolophy as his own creation, lie implies 
that ‘ before this no philojopky at all exjled ;’ for, Ihould he al¬ 
low that there had been another (and a true one), there 
would then be two different true philofophies, which is a con- 
tradidlion. If then the Critical Philolophy profeffes to be 
ike firfl and only Philofophy, this is no more than all have 
done, will do, nay mult do, who projedt a philofophy ac¬ 
cording to a plan of their own.” 
In another place, fpeaking of the ridicule that has been 
lavilhed upon this philofophy by thole who have milcon- 
ceived its tendency, he lays ; “ If however, as ShafteJbury 
afferts, it is no contemptible teftof the truth of a dodtrine 
(efpecially of a practical one), that it withftands ridicule, 
the critical philol'ophers'will perhaps in time have their 
turn, and in the end laugh the moji, when they fee the pa¬ 
per fyftems of thole, who for a long time made a great fi¬ 
gure, fuccellively falling in ruins, and deferted by all their 
adherents;—a fate which inevitably impends over them.” 
The tranfition from the Dogmatical to the Critical mode 
of thinking mult eventually become univerlal; the Cri¬ 
tical principles being founded upon pure truth ; and no 
one hereafter will be dignified with the title of Philofo- 
pher but the Critical Philofopher. What is to be under¬ 
ltood by a Critical Philofopher is admirably deferibed by 
Profefior Beck of Halle, one of the pillars of the Tran- 
fcendental Philolophy, and who, Kant lays, is among the 
very few that have plunged into the depths, and caught 
the true fpirit, of this philolophy. In the preface to "his 
“ Principles of Critical Philofophy," page Ixi. of the Englilh 
tranflation, Proteflor Beck lays, “ That which con- 
llitutes the Critical Philofopher, and according to my judg¬ 
ment the only true Philolopher, is the fpirit of tranfeen^ 
dental philolophy; and Kant’s great merit is the having 
been the author of this. The objedt of this fcience is to 
fhow the foil, in which all conceptions mull have their root, 
unlel’s they are to be univerlally void, i.e. that we are not 
to underhand ourlelves in them. But that which mull 
above all things be remarked is, that tranfcendental philo¬ 
fophy mull not be apprehended by means of conceptions, 
but originally, as it is the foundation on which all con¬ 
ceptions bottom. It is here laid of the Categories , that 
they are original modes of reprefentation, and that the 
underjlanding conjoins originally in them. This affertion is 
all'o a pojlulate, whofe fenfe can only be come-at in the 
original conjundtion of underftanding itfelf. Critical 
Philolophy depends folely upon this pofition : We do not 
know the things as they are in themfelves, but only as they ap¬ 
pear to us. If nothing were intended to be exprefled by 
this, but that the objedts are different from their repre- 
fentations, this dilcovery would not indeed merit much 
admiration; but this polition lays,, that the conjunction 
we place in the things, e. g. in the pofition. An object 
has quantity, (fills a fpace,)—relts on an original, intellec¬ 
tual, conjunction (the original adt of drawing of the ima¬ 
gination named Space). This introfpedlion into the na¬ 
ture of the Categories is of the greatelt importance. The 
Categories of Nature conftitute the tranfcendental of all the¬ 
oretical Knowledge. The Category Moral Liberty is, in 
the fame manner, the balls of all practical Knowledge and 
of Morality itfelf. The Category the formal Conformity-to- 
end of Nature is, finally, a tranfcendental principle on which 
all reflection and the procedure of judgment in experience 
relts, fo far as it feeks for rules in order to be able to think 
objedts. This conception of the tranfcendental of our 
Knowledge is, therefore, the principle of the divifion of 
tranfcendental philolophy into three parts.” 
I. Of the Foundation of all Theoretical Kkow- 
lege. 
. II. Of the Foundation of all Practical Know¬ 
ledge. 
III. Of 
