§08 K A 
III. Of Original Reflective Judgment as a Prin¬ 
ciple of Union between the Original Theoreti¬ 
cal and the Original Practical Knowledge. 
DiffeBion of the Human Mind, according to the Principles of 
ProfeJJor Kant , 
The Human Mind confifts of Three original Faculties; 
Reason, Understanding, and Sense. Thefe confti- 
tute the Power of forming Knowledge. 
It is of the uttnoft importance that thefe faculties 
fliould be feparated diftinelly from each other, and that 
the limits and extent of the powers of each fliould be 
clearly afcertained and abfolutely determined. 
SENSE 
is the power of forming Intuitions. 
In every objeft of nature that prefents itfelf to our 
fenfes, we diftinguifli Matter and Form. Now, as we 
do not create this matter, it muft confequently be given ; 
but this neceffarily implies that there is in our Mind a fa¬ 
culty capable of receiving the given matter ; and this fa¬ 
culty is called Receptivity. In order, however, that 
we may become confciousof the matter thus received into 
the mind, it is abfolutely neceffary that we fliould exert a 
■mental attivity, which is termed Spontaneity; that is, a 
«onne£ting activity which gives unity or form f:o the re¬ 
ceived matter or variety. When the receptivity is affected 
by any given matter, the fpontaneity is forced to act, and 
to connect the received materials into a Unity ; and this 
unity is Intuition. 
All former attempts to account for the fact of intui¬ 
tion, or fenfible reprefentation, have failed, becaufe they 
either treated the whole as the effeff of the external thing, 
©r made it altogether the produce of the mind. But it 
is evidently, as above-ftated, the joint produce of the ex¬ 
ternal thing and of the mind. 
Receptivity is a totally-pafTive faculty, and is the 
diftinguifhing characleriitic of Senfe. It can only be af- 
fefted by two kinds of variety or matter, (for there are 
but two kinds of variety in general:) the firll whofe parts 
lie one without and near another, the fecond whole parts 
follow one another in Uriel: fucceflion. This circutnftance 
gives rife to a divifion of this faculty into External Senfe, 
and Internal Senfe. When the receptivity is affefted by a 
variety of the firll: defeription, and the fpontaneity has 
connected this given variety into a unity, then an Exter¬ 
nal Intuition immediately arfes , whofe diflinguifliing cha- 
rafteriftic is, that the variety of which it confifts is a 
variety of parts lying one without and near another. 
Thus, the idea which arifes in the mind in confequence 
•of any man affefting our External Senfe, by his prefence, is 
an External Perception or Intuition, becaufe the variety 
of which the phenomenon man is compofed, is a variety 
of parts lying one without and near another. When the 
receptivity is affected by a variety of the fecond deferip¬ 
tion, and the'fpontaneity has connected this given variety 
into a unity, then an Internal Intuition immediately arfes, 
whofe diftinftive mark is that it involves a variety of 
parts which do not lie one near another, but always fol¬ 
low one after the other in ftridt fucceflion. Thus the idea 
which arifes in the mind in confequence of our Internal 
Senfe, being afteiled by any emotion, paflion, or aftion, in 
man, is an Internal Perception or Intuition; for paflions 
and actions cannot be faid to form any breadth or plane, 
but have all their minutell parts ftrittly following one 
after another. 
The forms or modifications of our External and Internal Senfe 
are iuiprejfed on the varieties which they receive. The parts of 
thefe varieties, on entering the receptivity, acquire an 
entirely-new nature, and are fo blended with the conforma¬ 
tions of the receiving faculty as to bear no refemblance 
whatever to their caufes; i. e. to what they are in them- 
felves independent of the mind. For example, we fay 
that our external intuitions are extended quantities; but 
we have no ground from hence to conclude that they are 
N T. 
extended in themfelves, independent of the mind ; for ex- 
tenfion is the form of external fenfe, and is imprefled on 
the variety upon its entering the mind. It follows that 
our external and internal intuitions, which exhibit to the 
mind the varieties received, will alfo exhibit thofe modi¬ 
fications imprefled on them by the peculiar conformations 
of our external and internal fenfe. Thefe modifications 
may be viewed feparately, and will then furnifli materials 
for two particular ideas, one of which will comprehend the 
being without and near each other of the variety, and the 
other, the following one after another of the variety. The 
former modification is evidently the general form of the 
variety or matter contained in all our external intuitions, 
and is nothing more than the ufual idea we have of fpace. 
For, when we analyze our notion of Space, we find it to imply 
merely a variety in general, whofe parts lie one without and near 
another, and are intimately connefied. Hence it refults that 
Space is the form of External Sense. The latter 
modification, i. e. fucceflion, manifeitly reprefents the ge¬ 
neral form of the variety or matter contained in all our 
internal intuitions. This is the exaft idea we have of 
time. For, when we analyze our notion of Time, we find 
that it implies nothing more than a variety in general, whofe 
parts follow one after another, and are intimately connedied. A nd 
hence it alfo relults, that Time is the form of Inter¬ 
nal Sense. 
The ideas of Time and Space, are intuitions a priori, fines 
they arife immediately in confequence of our receptivity 
being affected, and the objects to which they refer lie in 
the mind antecedent to all reprefentation. They are there¬ 
fore neceffary and univerfal, and differ from intuitions a pof- 
leriori, whofe objects lie without the mind, and are diftin£t 
from it. The former are alfo called pure, and the latter 
empirical, intuitions. 
Space is continuous, that is, the end of every part of 
fpace is the beginning of another. Two parts cannot be 
detached from one another without fpace intervening. It 
is divilible in infinitum —and infinite, for there is no precifc 
fpace beyond which there is no other fpace.—Space has 
three dimenfions, length, breadth, and height. —Space or 
External Senfe gives the law of Extension to the Phe¬ 
nomena. 
Time is alfo continuous—divifible in infinitum —and in¬ 
finite.—Time has only one dimenfion, namely fuccejjion. 
—Time, or Internal Senfe, gives the law of Intension to 
the Phenomena. Time has a larger fphere than Space ; 
for whatever is in Space is in Time alfo. But we cannot 
fay, converfely, that whatever is in Time is in Space alfo; 
for in fiance, a Thought is in Time, as it has beginning, 
middle, and end ; but it is not an extended body, confe¬ 
quently not in Space. 
Time and Space abfolutely limit all our Knowledge „ 
Therefore any object which does not conform itfelf to 
the conditions of Time and Space is not knowable. We 
cannot fay of the human foul, that it is an extended body, 
determinable by degrees ; confequently we can have no 
intuition of the human foul. We can only have an idea of 
it which is produced by our Reafon. But it mufl never 
be forgotten that an idea of a thing is no knowledge of it; 
for every phenomenon, as an object of our knowledge, 
muft occupy a place in Space and fill up a portion of 
Time. 
Time and Space are fubjeflive realities.—The matter 
of intuition is fenfation, to which all intuitions muft be re¬ 
ducible. Senfation is an alteration which occurs in the 
receptivity in confequence of our being aft’efted ; and, 
when confidered in reference to an external objetl, is ex¬ 
ternal intuition ; in reference to an internal objeft, internal 
intuition. But, if confidered in reference to the fubjedl, 
that is, to our own exiftence, it is termed feeling, and is 
either external or internal.— A part is that which fills a 
fpace, and cannot be annihilated ;—a number of parts 
conftitute a variety, and, when connected into a whole 3 
produce unity, or form. 
Remark. Thus at length is this famous riddle Time 
4, -and 
