K A 
and Space, winch has fo long puzzled the world, finally 
folved, and forever put at.reft. Every fchool-boy will 
hereafter be afhamed of St. Auguftine’s celebrated contra- 
diXion, “ Quid Jit. Tempus, fi nemo queer at a me, fcio ; fi quis 
iaterraget, ne/cio and will only wonder liovv any one 
could pofftbly be fo ignorant of the forms of his intuitive 
faculty. 
This explanation of Sense, or the firft degree of men¬ 
tal fpontaneity, completely limits and determines the 
power of this faculty. And hence it unequivocally fol¬ 
lows, that Senfe has no other Jliare in the produBion of Know¬ 
ledge, than that of receiving one or other of the va rieties above 
deferibed, which conjlitute the very matter of Knowledge, and 
of connecting this variety into a unity, which is Intui¬ 
tion or individual representation, and which refers im¬ 
mediately to its.obj.e6h 
Sense therefore can only form external and internal In¬ 
tuitions. But, as the immenfe number of intuitions 
which are formed by Senfe, were every one to receive a 
different appellation, would not only overload the me¬ 
mory, but abfolutely choke up the road to knowledge; 
we are provided with a faculty which abftraXs the com¬ 
mon properties from a number of individuals, and thereby 
claffes and reduces them into a certain order. 
UNDERSTANDING. 
is the power of forming Conceptions. 
This faculty is the fecond degree of mental fpontaneity : 
and what is here principally to be remarked is, that it 
poffeffes no receptive part like fenfe, but is completely ac¬ 
tive, and is furnifhed entirely by Senfe with materials to 
work upon, namely with intuitions. Without this con¬ 
nexion with fenfe, therefore, the Underftanding muft for 
ever remain a void and ufelefs faculty. It abfraBs the com¬ 
mon qualities from a number of intuitions, and thus produces a 
Conception, which is a univerlal reprefentation that is 
common to many objeXs ; for example, the Conception of a 
triangle in general can never refer to any particular 1 trian¬ 
gle, for it includes the common properties of all triangles, 
and differs effentially from an intuition of a triangle in 
which every thing is precifely determined. 
Underftanding is not like fenfe, a mere infiindlive reac¬ 
tion, but a fpontaneity which forms conceptions at plea- 
fure; for I can think of any objeX that I pleafe; that is, I 
can form a conception of any object, and unite it to any 
other conception. This faculty is ftriXly limited to time 
and fpace, and to the objedls contained therein. But the 
objefis in time and fpace are all intuitions; therefore the 
underftanding is the faculty of conneXing intuitions into 
conceptions. Thus the conception of Man in general is 
formed from a number of fucceffive intuitions of indivi¬ 
dual men, which have affeXed our fenfes. All the repre- 
fetttations formed by this faculty muft be general or uni- 
verjal, and can never be individual reprefentations ; for 
fenfe is confined to reprefentations of the latter kind, 
which are termed intuitions ; whereas the reprefentations of 
the underftanding are conceptions. The conceptions im¬ 
mediately arifing from intuitions are fo numerous, that 
they would overpower the memory if they were not re¬ 
duced to claffes adapted to the capacity of man. From 
conceptions, therefore,otherconceptions>are formed, which 
comprehend only the common nature of the/ormer, and fo 
«n in an uninterrupted feries of fpecies and genus, until.we 
arrive at the higheft conceptions that can be formed by the 
human intelleX, namely the twelve Categories which 
are the primary and original product of the underftanding 
itfelf. 
In every conception we diftinguith two things: firft, its 
matter, which is a variety already reprefented in an intui¬ 
tion, or {imply which is an intuition ; and, fecondly, its 
form, which is unity or conncBicn. This Unity is the prin¬ 
cipal thing to be attended to ; for the matter of all con¬ 
ceptions is intuition, to which they muft ultimately be 
reducible. This unity is the general form of all that is 
conceivable; and, as nothing is know-able whjcli is not 
Vol. XL No. 7 So„ 
N T. • Cog 
conceivable, this unity may be called oljeEUve unity, be* 
caufe no objedt can fall under any human cognizance un- 
lefs it is capable of being conneXed into this unity, or of 
being conceived. In order to produce the objeBivc unity, 
the underftanding is provided with twelve conneXing ai^s, 
or fynthetic powers, called Categories; but, as this faculty 
is a mode of conneXing in general, it follows that the va¬ 
rieties to be conneXed by it muft be general varieties. 
Now we have but two general varieties; namely, Time and 
Space. Hence by thefe twelve conneXing aXs Time and 
Space alone can be conneXed. But Time is a variety 
more general than Space, for it includes Space. Therefore 
the firft efforts of the conneXing aXs of the underftand¬ 
ing are exerted upon Time ; and the refult of this con- 
nedlion is the following unities, or conceptions, which are 
of a primary and original nature, and may be called In¬ 
tellectual Notions, or Categories. 
Thefe twelve fynthciie powers, or Categories, are com¬ 
prehended under the four Claffes of Quantity, Qua¬ 
lity, Relation, and Modality. Thus under Quan¬ 
tity Hands the power of forming Unity, Multitude, and To¬ 
tality ; under Quality, the powfr of forming Reality, Ne¬ 
gation, and Limitation ; under Relation, the powerof forming 
a Subfiance and its Accidents, a Caufe and its Ejfebts, and Action 
aid ReaRion. Thefe nine powers are originally cortftitu- 
tive; that is to fay, in order to cqnfiiute an objeB of Knowledge, 
the joint effeXs of thefe powers muft be exerted. For ex¬ 
ample; if any objeX affeXs our fenfes, it muft fill up time 
and {pace, e. g. a fone ; but this is an intuition, and, as 
fuch, unintelligible till it is comprehended under the oh- 
jeBivc unity, that is, till it is clafled under the Categories 
in the following manner : It muft Hand firft under Quan¬ 
tity, either as one, many, or all; but it is one fione^c on- 
fequently belongs to unity. Secondly, under Quality „ 
which includes Reality or Being, Negation or not Beiimy 
Limitation or Being limited. The fone exifts ; it is a rea¬ 
lity limited inTirne and Space. Thirdly, it is clafled under 
Relation, which includes Subfance and Accidents ; that is, 
the permanent in Space, and the properties which are con¬ 
tinually changing in time ; Caufe and EjfeR, which im¬ 
plies fomething antecedent, upon which a determinate and 
neceffary fomething is confequent, namely, an effeX » 
AElion and ReaRion, whereby all objeXs mutually deter¬ 
mine each other’s place in Space. And here the fone is 
ranked as a permanent in Space, having properties. If I 
throw this ftone from my hand, it will fall upon a certain 
place :—thus it comes under the Category of Caufe and 
Eftfcft ; and the place it now occupies in fpace is deter¬ 
mined by the refiftance of the bodies with which it is in 
contaX under the Category Aftion and ReaRion. In this man¬ 
ner the objeX, e. g. a Stone, is originally generated by the 
combination of thefe original fynthetic ads, or Categories-, —for 
it will be evident that the connexion which has taken 
place by means of this faculty is nothing more than a con- 
lieilion of fenfations under the original forms of the Un- 
derftanding; i.e. the Categories; which connection conftitutes the 
cbjeft, fo that it is, properly (peaking, merely a Phenome¬ 
non, and not a thing in itfelf;—for of the things in them- 
felves we know nothing. 
This procedure takes place while our fenfes are im- 
preffed by the fone, and is termed the original ufe of under¬ 
ftanding in the Categories, or the production of the origi¬ 
nal fynthetic objective unity of confdoifnejs, which is the bafis 
of the analytical unity of all conceptions whatfoever, and 
is that which fecures their intelligibility. This intelligibility 
can only be alcertained by analyzing a conception, as 
a compcftion produced by the Mind, that is, by the original ufe 
of the underftanding in the Categories. The objeX- of 
this Analyfis is to dilcover, in the conception under invef- 
tigation, whether the refult of thefe a6ls is to be found at 
the bottom of it, as the very elements of the conception 
itfelf; and every conception in which they are not to be 
found is thoroughly unintelligible. For example, the con¬ 
ception of the Human Soul contains none of the produXs 
of thefe original conneXing aXs; and in the very midft 
7 Q of 
