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The Principle or all'Axioms of Intuition is: That all 
Intuitions of which we (hall become confciotis, nralt in¬ 
volve a'variety capable of being united in our confciouf- 
nefs ; that is, mud be extended quantities determinable 
by number. 
The Principle of all Anticipation of Apprehenfion is: 
That the Reality in an intuition or phenomenon which 
refers to fenfation, mult have a degree in time, that is, it 
mult arife in time or till up a fpace of time, otherwife it 
is nothing to us, it cannot be comprehended in our con- 
feioufnefs. 
Of the Analogies of Experience the Principle is •. That 
without the idea of a neceffary connection between our 
apprehenfions of‘experimental objects, no experience would 
be pofiible. 
Analogy the fujl. In all the changes which the Pheno¬ 
mena Undergo, the fubftance remains unaltered, and its 
quantum in nature is neither increafed nor diminifhed ; 
5 . e. every phenomenon mu ft be reprefented as containing 
fomething which remains and fomething which changes ; 
that is, every phenomenon mutt be conlidered as a fub¬ 
ftance which has accidents, or it is not reprefentable at all. 
Analogy the Jecond. All events in time mutt admit of 
being connected according to the laws of caufe and ef¬ 
fect, or we can have no experience of them. 
Analogy the third. All fubftances which have co-exift- 
ence in fpace, are in continual action and re-action; or, 
whatever phenomena may exift in fpace, they Hand in 
mutual connection. 
The Poltulates of Experimental Reafoning are: 
Firft, What agrees with the formal conditions of ex¬ 
perience, is poffible; or what in any object is conceivable 
and intuitive, i. e. knowable, is poffible ; may exijl. 
Secondly, What is coherent with the material condi¬ 
tions of experience, which are fenlations, really exifts; or 
what has become really known, that is, what has moved 
our fenfes, excited intuitions and conceptions, really exifts. 
Thirdly, What Hands in connexion with real exilt- 
ences, and has this connection warranted by the general 
conditions pf experience, exifts neceffarily ; or, whatever, 
according to the invariable laws of knowablenefs, is con¬ 
nected with what is really known, exijls neceffarily. 
The world with its objeCts and laws may be viewed by 
«ur fenfes alone,and then it is a world of phenomena; or 
it may be contemplated by the pure intellect alone, and 
then it is a world of noumena, or an intellectual world, 
or a world of fubftances ; which three gxprefiions mean 
t.he fame thing. 
The conception we have of the world of noumena, con¬ 
tains no knowledge of that world, but is a mere concep¬ 
tion of demarcation. It diftinCtly feparates that field of 
objeCts which may be known from that which can never 
be known. It is therefore of great importance, and 
teaches man where his ignorance begins. 
The underftanding thus giv.es laws to nature. Nature 
and pofiible experience are the*' fame thing. As there is 
nothing connected in our Intuitions, Conceptions, and 
Knowledge of Nature, which has not been connected by 
the mind; it follows, that the Synthetical aCts of the In¬ 
tellect contain the‘foie origin of all that .connection we 
find in Nature. Nature, materially conlidered, is a col¬ 
lection of phenomena, as they are reprefented by intui¬ 
tions ; coniidered with refpeCt to its .form, it is the con¬ 
nection of thofe phenomena, determined by general laws. 
It is now extremely eafy to give a grounded anfwer to 
the queftion, How is Nature pojjible f this queltion properly 
contains two queftions. 
First, How is Nature, materially confidered, pojjible9 
This depends upon the conftitution of our sensitive 
faculty, which is affeCted in a manner peculiar to it- 
fielf by objects which are in themfelves unknown it, and 
which are entirely different from the phenomena. The 
phenomena are the objeCts of our Senfations, and are that 
which fill up Time and Space ; i. e. they are external and 
N T. 
internal Intuitions. And thus is Nature, according to 
its matter, podible.—This, in the Critic of pure Reafon, is 
treated of under Tranfcendental Aeffhetics. 
Secondly, How is Nature , formally confidered, pojjible? 
This depends upon the confiitution of our Understand¬ 
ing, which connects all the reprefentations of lenfe, and 
neceffarily refers them to confcioufnefs. Thus, experience 
is pojfible only in confequence of the peculiar manner of 
our thinking, which confifis in comprehending Intuitions 
under the Conceptions of Underftanding; namely, the 
Categories, as fo many rules of fynthefis that generate expe¬ 
rience. The Categories cannot give any knowledge of 
the things in themfelves ; but are merely the laws under 
which all phenomena mult be ranked in the mind.—And 
this, in the Critic of pure Reafon, is treated of under 
Tranfcendental Logic. 
Experience is therefore, properly fpeaking, nothing but 
a continually connecting together (fynthefis) of Senla- 
tions with confcioufnefs. 
The vniverfal or formal laws of Nature arife from the Sche¬ 
mata, which are combinations of time with the Catego¬ 
ries ; and would for ever remain ufelefs and without mean¬ 
ing, if the particular or material laws of Nature were not 
comprehended under them. Thele arife from experience, 
that is, from the Senfes by means of Intuitions ; for ex¬ 
ample, the tranfuion of water into ice muft wholly depend 
upon one Intuition being confidered as caufe, and another 
asefteft. Indeed, how could the underftandingpoflibly give 
as a form if there were nothing to receive that form ; there 
muft of neceftity be a given matter or variety upon which the 
underftanding can exercife its functions ; therefore, every 
thing firft fprings from experience, in which alone con- 
iifts all Truth. 
The law’s of Kepler and Newton refpecling the motion: 
of bodies can now be traced to their proper lource, th© 
Categories, and will no longer be fought for among the 
changeable phenomena of experience. Nor is there the 
lealt danger that this fyftem fliould lead to “ Berkeley's 
Idcalifm," whofe chief principle is, that “All knowledge 
acquired by Senfe is nothing but mere appearance, and 
that Truth is only to be found in pure Underftanding 
and Reafon,” for the principle of the Critical Philofophy 
is diametrically oppolite to it, namely, that “All know¬ 
ledge of things fuppofed to be obtained by pure Under¬ 
ftanding and Reafon is nothing but mere appearance, and 
that Truth is to be found in Experience alone. 
The Science of the original uje of underfanding in the Ca¬ 
tegories is Tranfcendental or Critical Philofophy, and is 
oppofed to that cf the merely logical ufc of underfanding, 
which conftitutes Dogmatical Philofophy, or the fancy of 
the Knowledge of the Things in themfelves. The Criti¬ 
cal idcalifm confifis in the pofition, that the underfanding 
conjoins originally in the Categories, and that the conjunction 
which we place in the things refs entirely upon this original 
intellectual conjunction. This critical idealifm, when it is 
■adopted as a mode of thinking, is the Critical mode of 
thinking. Whoever therefore has made himfelf well ac¬ 
quainted with that which conftitutes all intelligibility, 
and is able to underftand himfelf in the ufe of his con¬ 
ceptions, is a Critical Philofopher. Critical Philofophy, 
confidered as a way of thinking, gives to a train of 
thoughts the dignity of philofophizing, and furnifhes 
liability and intelligibility to it, by founding it upon 
the original ufe of underftanding. The dogmatical phi¬ 
lofopher remains by the logical ufe of underftanding, 
whole chief principle is the analytical unity of conception, 
and the reprefentation of objects by adding certain defig- 
nations to them. This mode of thinking is that of the 
fuppofed knowledge of the tilings in themfelves. A train 
of thoughts eftablilhed upon this dogmatical call of mind 
is called Speculation. 
Scepticifin confifis in the difeovery of the unintelligibi¬ 
lity of a fpeculation. It difturbs the dogmatical way of 
thinking by enquiring after the conjunction of the repre*- 
fentation 
