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The high eft conception, under which others are ar¬ 
ranged, mull be ftriftly universal; that is, it mull be an 
Idea,.otherwife no conclufion is poftible. Now, as Under- 
Handing and Reafon both apply a predicate to a fubjeft, they 
are both judging faculties; and in this capacity are both 
of a regulative life. This ufe of thern differs from their 
original ufe, which is conftitutive. The Underftanding in 
its original ufe conititutes every objeft of poftible and ac¬ 
tual Knowledge ; and Reafon, as will be ftiown, confti- 
tutes the Moral Nature of Man. It is not the bulinefs of 
Logic to enquire after the origin of our conceptions as to 
their matter; this enquiry belongs to Tranfcendental 
Phiiofophy, or Metaphytics. The Underftanding has con¬ 
ceptions, as fo many rules for thinking objects by adding 
certain marks or delignations to them. The whole bufi- 
nefs of Logic is to arrange Intuitions under Conceptions, 
and thefe Conceptions under higher conceptions, until it 
attains the greateft fyftematic unity of all our knowledge. 
Logic therefore ab ft rafts from all contents of Knowledge 
in conception, or from all matter of thought, and conli- 
ders conceptions merely according to their form, that is, 
fubjeftively. The logical origin of conceptions, as to their 
Jnere form, confifts in Refleftion, by which is produced ,a 
reprefentation common to feveral objefts. This is the 
form required by judgment. In order to beget concep¬ 
tions from given reprel'entations, we mufl be able to Com¬ 
pare, to RcJloCl, and to Abfiraffi. Thefe three logical ope¬ 
rations of the Underftanding are the effential and univer¬ 
sal conditions neceffary for the production of Conceptions. 
Comparifon and RefeClion are pofitive conditions ; but Ab- 
JiraEhon' is only a negative condition ; for we do not by 
abftraction obtain conceptions, but only perfeft and con¬ 
fine them within their determined limits. For example, 
1 fee a fir, a willow, and a lime : firlt I compare thefe ob¬ 
jefts together, and I perceive that they differ from each 
other with refpeft to their trunks, their branches, their 
leaves. See. Then I refleft upon that in which they agree, 
or which is common to them; namely, a trunk, branches, 
ana leaves. Laftly, I abftraft from the fize, figure, &c. 
of their different parts, and in this manner I obtain the 
conception of a tree. 
Thus, by an accurate definition of Judgment, namely, 
the comprehending the variety contained in an Intuiiion , under 
N T. 
the objefiive unity, that is, under a Conception ; and by re¬ 
flecting that there are but three kind of things in the 
.yvtDrld of which we can judge, namely, the properties of a 
thing, the fifeds of a thing, and the parts of a whole, (for no 
other caie is poftible;) we may now eafily arrive at the 
exaft number of the judging-afts of the underftanding, to 
which the following Queltions lead. 
1. What things can we judge of? 
2. How many things can we judge of ? 
3. How can we judge of thefe things? 
4. With what degrees of certainty can we judge ? 
The Anfw'ers to thefe Queftions completely exhauftthe 
Conception of the Judgments of Underftanding, according 
to the clue of the Categories, by furnifhing us with a 
complete Table of all poftible Judgments. 
Firft, What things can we judge of? Nothing but intui¬ 
tions, which can be only the properties of a thing, the 
effefts of a tiring, or the parts of a whole. The judgment 
of the firft is Categorical, that of the fecond Hypothetical , 
and that of the third Disjunctive. Thefe three l'pecies of 
Judgment exprefs the relations between things and their 
properties, caufes and their effefts, parts and their wholes; 
and form a clafs which is termed Judgments of Relation. 
Secondly, How many things can we judge of? The anfwer 
is very ealy : Either one, many, or all. The firft is Singu¬ 
lar, the fecond Particular, the third Univerfal ; and this 
clafs is -called Judgments of Quantity. 
Thirdly, How can we judge of thefe things? We can either 
affirm or deny, or deny infinitely. The firft is Affirmative, 
the fecond Negative, the third Infinite-, and this cjal’s is call¬ 
ed Judgments of Quality. 
Fourthly, With what degrees of certainty can we judge? We 
can judge that things may exifi, that they do exijl, or that 
they mujl exifi. The firft is Problematical, the fecond Afftr- 
torical, the third Apodi&ical. Thefe are called Judgments 
of Modality. This laft clafs of Judgments does not add 
any thing to the contents of a judgment as thofe of Quan¬ 
tity, Quality, and Relation, do, but only points out thofe 
afts of the mind which have been employed in forming 
the judgment. Thefe Judgments will be found perfeftly 
to harmonize with the Categories, and may be thus ex¬ 
hibited at one view. 
JUDGMENTS of UNDERSTANDING. 
Quantity. 
Singular, 
Particular, 
Univerfal. 
Quality. 
Affirmative, 
Negative, 
Infinite. 
Relation. 
Categorical, 
Hypothetical, 
Disjunctive. 
Modality. 
Problematical, 
Affertorical, 
Apodiftical. 
I now alk, Does my Conceptioir of Judgment contain 
Truth, is it clear, and is it univerfal ? Firft I find I have 
Truth in my idea of Judgment; for, if I judge at all, I 
mu ft comprehend a variety under a unity 5 therefore, my idea 
of Judgment contains Truth. It is clear, becaule, agree¬ 
ably to this definition, I can perform every thing that is 
required of Judgment. It is univerfal, for it is applicable 
to every aft of Judgment. 
I mult now prove that this Claffification is complete, nei¬ 
ther redundant nor deficient. Firft, If we judge of any 
thing, we mull either affirm or deny; and no other cafe is 
poftible. This regards judgments of Quality. Secondly, 
But we can only affirm or deny with refpeft to the pro¬ 
perties of a thing, the effefts of a thing, or the parts of a 
whole; and no other cafe is poftible. This refpefts Relation. 
Thirdly, We muff affirm or deny fomething, either of one 
thing, of many, or of all; and no other cafe is poftible. 
This regards Quantity. Fourthly, With refpeft to Modality ; 
the thing judged of mull either be poftible, aftual, or ne¬ 
ceffary ; and here alfo no other cafe is poftible. Hence it 
®ay be inferred, that: this claffification is quite complete j 
for it is out of the power of any one to add another clafs ; 
and, if one be taken away, the whole is deftroyed. 
Every Judgment mull Hand under all thele Claffes at 
once. For itiftance, The bird fngs-, is a lingular, affirma¬ 
tive, hypothetical, Judgment, with apodiftical certainty. 
Firft, it is conlidered under Quantity, as lingular. This 
Bird lings. Secondly, under Quality, as affirmative 
Something is affirmed of the Bird ; it ftngs. Thirdly, as 
hypothetical, for finging is an cffeEl produced by the bird. 
And, laftly, it is considered under Modality, as apodifti¬ 
cal, or as a judgment of the greateft degree of certainty; 
for, I have the teftimony of my fenfes, that the Bird ac¬ 
tually fings. 
By this logical procefs, the immenfe variety of repre- 
fentations which the Human Mind begets, may be reduced 
to three claffes, or wholes. Firft, a Unity or whole of 
Sense, that is, Intuition. Secondly, a Unity or whole of 
Understanding, that is, Conception. Thirdly, a Unity 
or whole of Reason, that is, Idea. Now, thefe are all the 
poftible wholes that can be conceived, and there cannot 
be any objeft of thought that is not comprehended un- 
